COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS DAVID I. WALSH, MILLARD E. TYDINGS, Maryland RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Georgia HARRY FLOOD BYRD, Virginia PETER G. GERRY, Rhode Island CHARLES O. ANDREWS, Florida ALLEN J. ELLENDER, Louisiana JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, Arkansas JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Washington FRANCIS J. MYERS, Pennsylvania Massachusetts, Chairman CHARLES W. TOBEY, New Hampshire C. WAYLAND BROOKS, Illinois OWEN BREWSTER, Maine EDWARD V. ROBERTSON, Wyoming LEVERETT SALTONSTALL, Massachusetts M. E. GALLAGHER, Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MAY 10 '46 CONTENTS Statement of: Blandy, Vice Adm. William H., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations McAuliffe, Maj. Gen. A. C., USA, Ground Force Adviser to Commander, Sawyer, Dr. R. A., technical director, Joint Task Force 1---- JOINT RESOLUTION TO AUTHORIZE THE USE OF NAVAL VESSELS TO DETERMINE THE EFFECT OF ATOMIC WEAPONS UPON SUCH VESSELS THURSDAY, APRIL 18, 1946 UNITED STATES SENATE, Washington, D. C. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a. m. in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator David I. Walsh (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Walsh (chairman), Eastland, Gerry, Ellender, Robertson, Morse, Brewster, and Saltonstall. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. The committee is meeting this morning to further consider Docket No. 187, House Joint Resolution 307, to authorize the use of naval vessels to determine the effect of atomic weapons upon such vessels. (H. J. Res. 307 is as follows:) [H. J. Res. 307, 79th Cong., 2d sess.] JOINT RESOLUTION To authorize the use of naval vessels to determine the effect of atomic weapons upon such vessels Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Navy, with the approval of the President, is authorized to employ vessels of the Navy as targets for purposes of test and experimentation in determining the effect of atomic weapons upon such vessels. SEC. 2. After employment pursuant to authority contained in section 1 of this Act vessels may, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Navy or such other person as may be designated by him, be (a) sunk if considered unseaworthy; or (b) retained with or without repair for further test and experimentation, for further naval use, or for other disposition in accordance with other provisions of law. SEC. 3. Prior to the employment of any vessel of the Navy under authority of section 1 of this Act, the Secretary of the Navy shall come into agreement with the Naval Affairs Committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives with respect to such prospective employment. SEC. 4. The Secretaries of War and of the Navy shall take such measures as they may deem necessary to safeguard the information, observations, findings, conclusions, and recommendations pertaining to and resulting from these tests and which are of a military nature as would normally be attached to any other vital military information or military secret. SEC. 4A. The President is authorized to in his discretion may appoint an advisory board to cooperate with the Secretaries of War and of the Navy in the conduct of these tests, to undertake an independent study of the tests and to submit its observations, findings, conclusions, and recommendations to the Secretaries of War and of the Navy. This advisory board shall be composed of (a) five civilians, one of whom shall be designated as chairman of the advisory board; (b) three naval officers, at least one of whom shall be a naval aviator; and (c) three Army officers, at least one of whom shall be an Army aviator. SEC. 5. Such provisions of this joint resolution as relate to the employment of vessels of the Navy as targets shall terminate two years after the date of its enactment into law. Passed the House of Representatives March 12, 1946. SOUTH TRIMBLE, Clerk. The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Blandy, will you come forward, please? STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. WILLIAM H. BLANDY, UNITED STATES NAVY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (SPECIAL WEAPONS) AND COMMANDER, JOINT TASK FORCE 1 The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Blandy, I do not think it is necessary to review the testimony you gave before. I believe the only thing that you need to respond to now is to tell us what progress you have made in the line-up of the number of vessels that can be or should be or would be satisfactory to carry out the tests. I rather assume that the full number, perhaps, would be better than a lesser number; but I believe it has been indicated as a result of studies that a lesser number could be used and get effective results. I understand that a study has been made by you and your associates. What have you to report on that? Admiral BLANDY. Yes, sir. With your permission, I would like to read a letter, if you have no objection. The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would. Admiral BLANDY. This is a letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Honorable David I. Walsh, chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, and it reads as follows: MY DEAR SENATOR WALSH: Referring to your letter of April 1 regarding the atomic-bomb tests, I wrote you on April 2 a letter which evidently crossed yours. My letter enclosed information upon the purposes of the tests and the reasons for holding them at an early date. In your letter, you expressed the opinion that it was important that we should know exactly the President's position. As you know, the President has now stated his position, as being in full agreement with the belief of the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the tests are of vital importance to the national defense. Regarding your suggestions that we should have a review and restudy of the extent and scope of the Navy vessels to be used in making the tests, Vice Admiral Blandy has been making this restudy and I understand that he furnished your naval liaison officer on April 13 with certain data in this regard. I believe that these figures now show a total number of 61 commissioned United States naval vessels to be exposed in the first test, plus 3 foreign ships, 10 small selfpropelled barges or lighters, and 3 floating concrete structures, non-self-propelled. Compared with the previous figure of 97 so-called target ships, the difference is due partly to the actual withdrawal of some transports and destroyers from the target array, and partly to the erroneous original classification of some of the smaller noncommissioned craft as "ships." Considerable misunderstanding apparently has existed in the minds of a number of people, including a few Senators, that a large number of valuable naval vessels would be destroyed in the atomic bomb tests. This is not at all |