officers of the active list of the line of the Navy, exclusive of commissioned warrant officers, shall be equal to 44 per centum of the total authorized enlisted strength of the active list, exclusive of the Hospital Corps, prisoners undergoing sentence of discharge, enlisted men detailed for duty with the Naval Militia, and the Flying Corps."

(4) That portion of the first sentence after the subheading "Pay of enlisted men, active list", in such chapter, which appears at page 612 and which reads as follows: "and hereafter the number of enlisted men of the Marine Corps shall be exclusive of those sentenced by court martial to discharge.".

(5) The third sentence after the subheading "Pay of enlisted men, active list:" in such chapter, which appears at page 612 and which reads as follows: "The President is authorized, when, in his judgment, it becomes necessary to place the country in a complete state of preparedness, to further increase the enlisted strength of the Marine Corps to seventeen thousand and four hundred: And provided further, That the distribution in the various grades shall be in the same proportion as that authorized at the time when the President avails himself of the authority herein granted,".

(g) The first and second sections of chapter 20, Fortieth Statutes at Large, page 84, as amended.

(h) That portion of the second sentence after the heading "Maintenance" in chapter 9, Forty-first Statutes at Large, page 131, which appears at page 137 and which reads as follows: "and the President is hereby authorized, whenever in his judgment a sufficient national emergency exists, to increase the authorized enlisted strength of the Navy to one hundred and ninety-one thousand men”.

(i) That portion of the fourth sentence after the heading "Marine Corps. Pay, Marine Corps;" in chapter 228, Forty-first Statutes at Large, page 812, which appears at page 830 and which reads as follows: "The authorized enlisted strength of the active list of the Marine Corps is hereby permanently established at twentyseven thousand four hundred, distribution in the various grades to be made in the same proportion as provided under existing law: Provided, That".

(j) Section 2 and subsection (d) of section 15 of chapter 598, Fifty-second Statutes at Large, page 944, at pages 944 and 952, respectively.

(k) Chapter 74, Fifty-fifth Stagutes at Large, page 145, as amended by chapter 1, Fifty-sixth Statutes at Large, page 3.

Passed the House of Representatives December 4, 1945.

Attest:

SOUTH TRIMBLE, Clerk.

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. LOUIS E. DENFELD, CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL (ACCOMPANIED BY REAR ADM. HERBERT G. HOPWOOD, BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL)

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, Admiral, will you explain H. R. 4421

now.

Admiral DENFELD. I would like to say something off the record. (Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. We will go back to the record.

This bill is with reference to the enlisted personnel?

Admiral DENFELD. Yes, sir; and officers, and the transfer of the Regulars to the Reserves.

In consideration of the authorized personnel strength for the postwar Navy represented in the bill under consideration, H. R. 4421, it is appropriate to first consider the strength of the Navy in terms of ships, aircraft, and shore establishments.

There are two fundamental reasons why we should maintain a Navy after this war.

First, the outstanding lesson of the past quarter century is that the means to wage war must be in the hands of those who hate war. The United States should remain strong.

Second, the Navy is a major component of that strength. In each of the past 2 wars, our enemies failed to control the seas-and they were defeated.

In the future, as in the past, the key to victory and to the freedom of this country will be in the control of the seas and of the skies above them. Senator TOBEY. Would you not add to that the atomic bomb? Admiral DENFELD. Well, I might say, yes, sir.

Senator TOBEY. Do you think that you can consider this matter without also considering the atomic bomb as an important element? Admiral DENFELD. It all is involved; the atomic bomb is part. Senator TOBEY. But you do not mention it. You mention the sea power and the Army, but you say nothing about this new weapon and its supreme potentiality.

To me it seems that the whole situation will have to be reviewed by the Navy. I think that the naval strategy in the future has got to be changed in order to meet the import of that bomb.

You slide over that.

Admiral DENFELD. That is very true; but we have been changing strategy to keep abreast of the times. Ever since I have been in the Navy, which is a period of almost 40 years, changes have continuously been taking place.

With every new weapon there is a change. It is determined how that weapon will be used. Its effects upon our types of ships and our type of warfare are studied. That is always being done in the Navy. It will be done in the case of the atomic bomb.

The CHAIRMAN. There have been changes in training, too?

Admiral DENFELD. Yes.

When I first came into the Navy, the airplane had just started. Since then, the ships, because of the airplane, have changed so much; they are so different that there is no comparison.

Attacks upon us or attacks by us must cross on, over, or under the That fact is an accident of geography which you can confirm by any map.

sea.

No enemy can reach us without coming across the sea. cannot reach or defeat an aggressor without crossing the sea.

We

Therefore, control of the ocean and of the air over it is the key to our own security. It is also, I might add, the key to our ability to participate as a member of a world organization in the suppression of aggression wherever it may occur.

The control of the sea and of the air above it is the mission of the United States Navy-and the Navy will continue to discharge that mission with whatever weapons are most effective.

I think these two reasons-the importance of the United States remaining strong and the importance of control of the sea-are adequate justification for the continuation of a navy.

The determination of the size of what is popularly called the postwar Navy is one of the outstanding problems and one of the most vital issues in the United States today.

The size of the Navy is, of course, governed by the use to which it is to be put in carrying out the policies of the United States determined by the Congress. Of immediate concern is that the United States will have a Navy in the future which will be adequate to support the national policy as we understand it.

We are unable to make any other representation until we have a more definite national policy as we understand it. We are unable to make any other representation until we have a more definite national policy than we have now. Even in order to do this we have had to

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make certain assumptions about the tasks which the Navy will be called upon to discharge in conjunction with the Army. They are three; that is, there are three assumptions.

The first one we are quite sure of, the security of the continental United States and its overseas possessions.

The second derives from the Act of Chapultepec and is coupled with the Monroe Doctrine and relates to the security of the Western Hemisphere.

The third assumption-which is the least well defined-relates to the commitments of the United States to preserve the peace of the world.

In conjunction with these assumptions consideration must be given to those sea areas, vital to the United States, over which this country must retain and maintain undisputed control.

These areas are: The western part of the North and South Atlantic Oceans and the entire Pacific Ocean.

Based upon the premises previously mentioned, a thorough study of the normal naval forces and bases for their support has been made and will be presented to you as the postwar Navy necessary to carry out the control of the sea areas which have been named.

Quite obviously we do not need to keep in full commission during the period now at hand the enormous naval might which we accumulated in order to win this war.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to interrupt; but is there not something left out in those first two lines? It doesn't seem to make sense to me [reading]:

* * * normal naval forces and bases for their support has been made and will be presented to you as the postwar Navy necessary to carry out the control * * *

Admiral DENFELD. Do you mean:

* * * a thorough study of the normal naval forces and bases for their support has been made and will be presented to you as the postwar Navy necessary to carry out the control of the sea areas which have been named.

Is that it?

Senator SALTONSTALL. That is it.

Admiral DENFELD. Well, we have a number of bases.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I understand, but do you mean the personnel for the bases, is that what you mean?

Admiral DENFELD. We have to have the bases, the personnel to man them and the equipment for the bases.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Then I do not think that sentence does really say what you mean.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose, Senator Saltonstall, that they mean that they must proceed on the assumption of a given number of bases that they were going to retain, a given number of vessels of various categories that they were going to retain; and that the number of bases will determine the number of officers and enlisted men that will be required.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Then I think there should be added the words "personnel" and "equipment.'

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Admiral DENFELD. On the other hand, we might conceivably wish at some time in the future to muster almost our full naval strength.

Therefore, we suggest that the postwar Navy be divided into three components, an active fleet, a reserve fleet, and an inactive fleet.

By the "active fleet," we mean vessels fully commissioned and with full peacetime crews.

By the "reserve fleet," we mean relatively few vessels that will be in commission with only nucleus crews-perhaps about a third of the peacetime total; they will be used to train midshipmen and naval reservists and will be available for active service in about 30 days.

The "inactive fleet," comprising 60 percent of the total fleet, would be ships wholly out of commission, tied up and with only caretaker crews aboard.

The postwar active fleet would consist of approximately 300 major combatant ships, or about 30 percent of the total fleet-together with auxiliary craft in proportion. Therefore, the number of fully commissioned major combatant ships in our proposed postwar active fleet would be numerically smaller than our prewar fleet of December 1941. However, it would be faster and incomparably stronger in firepower and aviation.

In other words, qualitatively it would be superior in every respect, even though quantitatively a little smaller. It would be augmented by many amphibious craft and other special types developed during the war. Hence, the postwar active fleet will require more men and more logistic support.

Approximately 80 additional major combatant ships would be in the reserve fleet; that is, in reduced commission.

I now specify the types simply as a matter of convenience to the committee, and in doing so I would like to emphasize that all of this is for planning purposes. It is a pattern to which we work, but it is not a fixed and final or complete commitment. It will be in constant process of review and revision, and should be.

By types, the active fleet would be approximately as follows: 4 battleships, 13 aircraft carriers, including three 45,000-ton carriers, 13 escort carriers, 8 heavy cruisers, 20 light cruisers, 135 destroyers, 90 submarines, 36 destroyer escorts, plus tender, mine, patrol, service, and amphibious craft.

The reserve fleet would consist of: 6 battleships, 5 aircraft carriers, 9 heavy cruisers, 9 light cruisers, 40 destroyers, and the necessary supporting craft.

All the battleships, carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines listed here are new ships, completed since our defense program started in 1940.

What should we do with the balance of our Navy? We suggest that a new element be introduced into our system of national preparedness-the inactive fleet of about 700 major combatant ships, plus required auxiliaries, securely preserved and ready on short notice to join the first-line battle fleet.

The inactive fleet would include: 1 new and 7 old battleships, 19 carriers, all built since 1940, 66 escort carriers, all new since 1940, 14 heavy cruisers, 14 light cruisers, 191 destroyers, 272 destroyer escorts, 109 submarines, as well as mine, patrol, service, and amphibious forces.

The existence of an inactive fleet would give the Nation the ability to flex its strength quickly if we again enter a period, like 1930-41, of disturbed world conditions.

This inactive fleet is cheap insurance. It is estimated that the yearly preservation cost will amount to only one-tenth of 1 percent of the original cost of the ships.

So far I have spoken only of vessels for the postwar Navy. It is estimated that something less than 12,000 planes-about 8,000 of which will be in full active duty status-will be necessary in order to have a balanced postwar Navy.

The carrier task forces of this war have been the spearhead of our attack, both against the Japanese Empire and against the submarine packs in the Atlantic.

These carrier task forces are a unique creation of the United States; they are an evolution of this war which no naval officer in the world had any preconception of 5 years ago, and are one of the most powerful forces in existence in the world today. They have a remarkable mobility and an enormous reach.

In my judgment, these great carrier task forces, backed by the surface power of the fleet and by the amphibious striking force of the Marine Corps, constitute an all-purpose weapon which the United States, if Congress sees fit, can put at the disposal of an international organization for the maintenance of peace.

The Navy Department's proposals for the postwar Navy result in a balanced Navy-balanced as to types and classes of combatant and auxiliary ships. The proposal represents the considered judgment of the Navy of what ships, aircraft, and personnel are required to meet the naval needs of the United States-so far as we now have the promises on which to base such judgment-in the national interest. The proposed immediate postwar Navy will consist of (1) an active fleet of 319 major combatant ships and 1,694 of other types, or a total of 2,013, to be manned with a personnel complement of 70 percent of wartime complement for all except smaller ships; (2) a reserve fleet of 73 major combatant ships and 2,282 ships of other types, or a total of 2,355, to be manned at from 20 to 30 percent of wartime complement; (3) an inactive fleet of 701 major combatant ships and 2,119 other types, or a total of 2,820, to be manned by only sufficient personnel for preservation purposes.

In order to man a Navy of the size proposed and with personnel complements as indicated necessitates an authorized enlisted strength of 500,000 enlisted men and 58,000 officers, of which 40,000 will be line officers and 18,000 staff officers and warrant officers.

Before proceeding with a discussion of the personnel strength required for the postwar Navy, it might be well to review the personnel situation as it existed just prior to World War II, and during the war, in a chronological order, and our plans for the immediate future.

On September 8, 1939, at the time of the declaration of the limited emergency by the President, the personnel strength of the Navy and Naval Reserve, active and inactive, was 23,596 officers and 152,181 enlisted, broken down as follows: