Opinion of the Court. 276 U.S. CERTIORARI, 275 U. S. 512, to a judgment of the Supreme Court of California, affirming an award of the State Industrial Accident Commission. Mr. Blair S. Shuman, with whom Mr. Allen L. Chickering was on the brief, for petitioner. Mr. G. C. Faulkner for respondent Accident Commission. MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court. While standing on the land in Alaska, respondent Peterson endeavored to push into navigable water a stranded boat, 26 feet long, theretofore used by him and another for taking fish, and, while so engaged sustained bodily injuries. The fishing season had ended, the nets had been removed, and the boat, partly in the water, was resting on the sand. The immediate purpose was to float it to the dock nearby in order that it might be lifted thereon and stored for the winter, according to the ordinary practice. Petitioner is a California corporation engaged in the business of taking fish in Alaska and canning them at its factory located in that Territory. Peterson resided in California. Within that State he entered into a contract with the Association whereby he agreed to go to Alaska as a seaman on its bark "Star of Iceland" and, after arriving at the cannery, to go ashore and act there as directed anything I was told to do." Among other things, he made nets, fixed up the small boats always kept there, took them out, and served as a fisherman on one of them. The Industrial Accident Commission of California, purporting to act under the laws of that State, made an award against the petitioner and in favor of Peterson, and this was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The judgment is 467 Opinion of the Court. challenged here upon the sole ground that when injured he was doing maritime work under a maritime contract and that the rights and liabilities of the parties must be determined by applying the general rules of maritime law, and not otherwise. Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U. S. 308, Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, and similar cases, are relied upon. Whether in any possible view the circumstances disclose a cause within the admiralty jurisdiction, we need not stop to determine. Even if an affirmative answer be assumed, the petitioner must fail. Peterson was not employed merely to work on the bark or the fishing boat. He also undertook to perform services as directed on land in connection with the canning operations. When injured certainly he was not engaged in any work so directly connected with navigation and commerce that to permit the rights of the parties to be controlled by the local law would interfere with the essential uniformity of the general maritime law. The work was really local in character. The doctrine announced in Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469, and Millers' Ind. Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U. S. 59, 64, is incompatible with the petitioner's claim. The judgment of the court below must be affirmed. Affirmed. LAMBORN ET AL. v. THE NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE OF NORFOLK. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT. No. 163. Argued January 12, 1928.-Decided April 9, 1928. On behalf of a client who had agreed to buy and pay for Java sugar upon delivery f. o. b. cars at Philadelphia, a bank issued a letter of credit to meet the sellers' drafts, which provided, among other conditions, that shipment be made by steamer or steamers from Opinion of the Court. 276 U.S. Java to Philadelphia. Held that the condition was complied with where the consignment came from Java to Philadelphia by a steamer originally destined from Java "to Port Said, option New York," but which was diverted while on the high seas, so that she pursued the same route to Philadelphia as if she had been destined to that port from the beginning of the voyage. P. 471. 15 F. (2d) 473, reversed. CERTIORARI, 273 U. S. 688, to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming a judgment for the respondent bank in an action by the petitioners to recover damages for the bank's refusal to honor a sight draft drawn against a letter of credit. See also 2 F. (2d) 23. Mr. Louis O. Van Doren, with whom Messrs. Edward R. Baird, Jr., H. G. Connor, Jr., and Edward S. Bentley were on the brief, for petitioners. Mr. Tazewell Taylor for respondent. MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court. This action was brought in the federal court for eastern Virginia by Lamborn & Company, of New York City, against The National Bank of Commerce of Norfolk. The jurisdiction of the District Court rested upon diversity of citizenship. The plaintiffs sought damages for the refusal to honor a sight draft drawn against a letter of credit, given pursuant to a contract of T. S. Southgate & Company to buy 1,000 bags of Java white sugar at 22 cents per pound less 2%, duty paid, f. o. b. Philadelphia, landed weights. Payment was to be made in New York City upon presentation of sight draft with invoice and railroad order notify bill of lading attached. The letter of credit provided: "Shipment to be made during August, September, 1920, at option of the sellers from Java by Steamer or Steamers to Philadelphia." The sugar tendered had been shipped on the West Cheswald, a steamer which sailed from Java on September 30, 469 Opinion of the Court. and by a continuous voyage arrived in Philadelphia on December 16. Then followed promptly the discharge of 1,000 bags of sugar; the ascertainment of the net landed weight; the payment of the duty; the shipment free on board railroad cars at Philadelphia of the specified quantity of sugar to T. S. Southgate & Company; the drawing against the letter of credit of a sight draft for the purchase price, $48,009.81; its presentation, together with the appropriate shipping documents, for payment; and the refusal to honor. All this was done long before the expiration of the letter of credit. Between April 23, 1920, the date of the contract, and the tender of the sugar, the market price had fallen 11 cents. The Bank claimed that the sugar tendered failed to satisfy the requirements of the contract, because it had come, not on a steamer which had been continuously destined from Java to Philadelphia, but upon one which, originally destined from Java "to Port Said, option New York," was diverted by the charterers to Philadelphia, while on the high seas. The West Cheswald had sailed by a direct route from Java to Philadelphia, the diversion having been made while she was near Bermuda, about three days from port, so that she could pursue the same route to Philadelphia as if she had at all times been destined for that port. In fact, another steamship bearing sugar shipped by plaintiffs-the Washington Maruwhich sailed from Java two days earlier and had at all times been destined to Philadelphia, arrived there three days after the West Cheswald. The case was tried twice before a jury. The only question in serious controversy was one of construction-the meaning to be given to the clause in the letter of credit quoted above. At the first trial both parties requested a directed verdict. The verdict was directed for the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment entered thereon and ordered a new trial. 2 F. (2d) 23. At the second trial, the presiding Opinion of the Court. 276 U.S. judge, applying the rule declared by the appellate court, directed a verdict for the defendant. The judgment entered thereon was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 15 F. (2d) 473. This Court granted a writ of certiorari, 273 U. S. 688, because of conflict with cases decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Matthew Smith Tea, Coffee & Grocery Co. v. Lamborn (and other cases), 276 Fed. 325, 10 F. (2d) 697, certiorari denied, 271 U. S. 683, 685, 686. The defendant is obviously not liable unless there was a tender of sugar which met with the requirements of the letter of credit as to amount and quality of the sugar, as to the time, Norrington v. Wright, 115 U. S. 188, and the place, Filley v. Pope, 115 U. S. 213, of shipment; and as to the manner of shipment and the ultimate destination. The clause "shipment by Steamer or Steamers to Philadelphia" states the manner of shipment and the ultimate destination. Compliance with its provisions was confessedly a condition of liability. The Bank contends that there was not a compliance because the sugar tendered did not come by a steamer which at all times since leaving Java was destined to Philadelphia. We find nothing either in the words of the letter of credit, in the custom of the trade, or in reason, which justifies implying the condition that, from the inception of the voyage, Philadelphia must have been the destination intended. The transaction is not like the ordinary contract for goods to be shipped. It is not like the common c. i. f. contract for shipment from a foreign to an American port, where delivery to the ship at the port 1 Compare Bowes v. Shand, 2 App. Cas. 455; Ashmore & Son v. Cox & Co., [1899] 1 Q. B. 436; Landauer & Co. v. Craven & Speeding Bros., [1912] 2 K. B. 94; Hansson v. Hamel & Horley, Ltd., [1922] 2 A. C. 36; Merchants Bank v. Griswold, 72 N. Y. 472; Bank of Montreal v. Recknagel, 109 N. Y. 482; Mora y Ledon v. Havemeyer, 121 N. Y. 179; Iasigi v. Rosenstein, 141 N Y. 414. |