Mr. Wm. G. Lynch, with whom Mr. Harvey Roney was on the brief, for Nigro. Congress intended that those persons who came within the classes named and defined should be required to register and pay the special tax, and none other. If this construction be correct, then, if § 2 be construed as including all persons in the United States, it is unconstitutional under the doctrine laid down in United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394. That case and this are parallel, at least insofar as the principle is concerned, that the Harrison Narcotic Act is a revenue measure and can only be applied to those who are required to register and pay the special tax. It is only from those persons that the Government can derive any revenue by means of registration, and the only constitutional authority which Congress has is to enact such a law for revenue. Wong Sing v. United States, 260 U. S. 18. The statute, as said in the Jin Fuey Moy case, does not purport to be in execution of any treaty. If it did, then, as this Court there remarked, another grave question would arise. Doremus v. United States, 249 U. S. 86. The Doremus case arose under the original Act and is not applicable to the first section of that Act as amended by the Act of February 24, 1919. Under the amended Act only certain persons are allowed or required to register, and only such persons are penalized for doing any of the things in relation to the drugs which would require them to register, and if § 2 is construed to apply to all persons, then it goes beyond § 1 as amended, and it cannot assist in the collection of the revenue. The provision in § 2, that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, shall cause suitable forms to be prepared, &c., and the provision that no collector shall sell any such forms to any person other than a person who has registered and paid the special tax as required by § 1, and the provision that it shall be unlawful for any person to obtain by means of said order forms any of the aforesaid drugs for any purpose other than the use, sale or distribution thereof by him in the conduct of a lawful business, and the provision that no sales can be made except upon order forms, or upon a physican's prescriptions, or to certain to certain governments purchasing them for the health service, army, navy, etc., show plainly that the purpose of Congress in enacting § 2 was to confine the drugs to their use as medicine. When the restrictions and conditions Congress attached to the sale and distribution of the drugs under § 2 are carefully considered, it is clearly seen that Congress had in mind the stamping out of drug addiction, and thereby to subserve the health and general welfare of the people of the United States. If § 2 covers all persons within the United States, then it was not merely incident to the raising and protection of the revenue, because all persons within the United States were not required to pay it; and unless it is restricted to those who are required to pay it, then, as to all other persons, it is necessarily unconstitutional and void. If Congress by § 2 intended only to aid the collection of the revenue, why would it not permit persons who had not registered to procure order forms and purchase the drugs upon them, or upon a physician's prescription? By limiting and conditioning the sale of the drugs as it did, and limiting the use of the drugs to medicine, it is manifest that the moral rather than the revenue end was in view. The public health and morals are subjects reserved to the several States and to the people, as provided by the Tenth Amendment. United States v. Daugherty, 269 U. S. 360; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251; Child 332 Argument for the United States. Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20; Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44; Linder v. United States, 268 U. S. 5; United States v. One Ford Coupe, 272 U. S. 321, 350. Solicitor General Mitchell, with whom Messrs. O. R. Luhring, Assistant Attorney General, and Harry S. Ridgely, Attorney in the Department of Justice, were on the brief, for the United States. The prohibition contained in § 2 of the Narcotic Act against selling, bartering, exchanging, or giving away drugs, except in pursuance of an order form, is not limited to persons required to register, but applies to "any person." As the Act was originally enacted in 1914, it contained no stamp tax provision. The only taxes prescribed were the occupation taxes on importers and dealers. It required every person selling or dealing in the drug, without regard to any stamp tax or stamped package, to register and pay the occupation tax, and the words " any person in the first sentence of § 2 as originally enacted clearly provided that every person selling the drug should exact the order form from the purchaser without regard to whether or not the vendor was in fact registered. The stamp tax provisions of § 1 were added by the Revenue Act of 1918, and the registration and occupation tax provisions in § 1 were then amended so as to provide that only those who deal at wholesale or retail in or from original stamped packages are required to register and pay the dealer's occupation tax. For the first time there were created two classes of dealers-those who sell in or from stamped packages and are required to register and pay the occupation tax, and those who sell only in or from unstamped packages, every sale by whom is a violation. of the stamp-tax provisions, and who are not required to register. Argument for the United States. 276 U.S. No change was made in § 2, and there is no reason to believe that Congress intended that a restricted meaning should be given to it as a result of the amendments to § 1. Prior to the amendment of 1918, the words "any person" in § 2 had been literally construed to apply to sales by any person whether registered or not. Fyke v. United States, 254 Fed. 225. Section 2 had been so generally applied in other cases. When overhauling the Harrison Act by the amendments of 1918, Congress made no change in § 2. It should be presumed to have acquiesced in the construction which had been placed upon it. Coleman v. United States, 3 F. (2d) 243; United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394. The purpose of the order-form provisions of the Act was to keep the traffic aboveboard and enable the United States to observe all transactions in drugs. Looked at as an aid to enforcement of the two tax provisions of the statute, one imposing an occupation tax and the other a stamp tax, the purpose of the Act is defeated if a purchaser of drugs from an unregistered dealer is not required to furnish the prescribed order form. Making it incumbent on the vendor, whether registered or not, to exact a written order on the prescribed form from the purchaser serves the purpose of the statute in enabling public authorities to observe the disposition of the drug by the purchaser and to enforce the registration, occupation tax, and stamp-tax provisions. If Congress has power to require vendors to decline to sell to anyone not producing a written order on a prescribed form, it has power to require those not registered, as well as those registered, to follow this practice. Section 2, broadly construed, is not unconstitutional. The provisions imposing stamp taxes are valid. Alston v. United States, 274 U. S. 289. Those involving occupa 332 Opinion of the Court. tion taxes are valid, and the provisions making it unlawful to purchase or sell unstamped drugs or to deal in stamped drugs without registering or paying the occupation tax are clearly valid. The order form provisions of § 2 were sustained in United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86. United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250. The Doremus case dealt with the statute as originally enacted and sustained it as a revenue measure, although the only tax imposed by it was an annual occupation tax on purchasers, importers, and dealers of $1 each, and the revenues derived were obviously nominal, and the Act was attacked as not a genuine revenue measure. By the amendments of 1918, this weakness of the Act was repaired. The occupation taxes were made substantial, and, in addition, the stamp tax on the drugs at the rate of one cent an ounce or any fraction thereof was added. These tax provisions produce substantial revenue, and the Act, as a whole, can be sustained as a genuine tax measure. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT delivered the opinion of the Court. This case comes here by certificate of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit, and is intended to submit to us, for answer, certain questions concerning the validity and proper construction of the Anti-Narcotic Act of December 17, 1914, c. 1, 38 Stat. 785, as amended in the Revenue Act of 1918, February 24, 1919, § 1006, c. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1130. The Circuit Court of Appeals bases its questions on issues arising in its consideration on error of a judgment of conviction on the second count of an indictment drawn under § 2 of the Act. The count charged that one Frank Nigro and one Roy Williams unlawfully sold to one A. L. Raithel one ounce of morphine, not being sold in pursuance of a written order of A. L. Raithel on a form |