Under the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) the application by the NLRB and its agents of different rules, theories, regulations, and procedures to petitioners in representation matters and complainants in unfair labor practice cases because of their predecessors, the scope of their organization or the nature of their affiliation was the source of much complaint to the Board itself and to Congress. The position of the independent union before the National Labor Relations Board was precarious to say the least. Success in being chosen as the bargaining representative appeared to give rise to a presumption, as far as the Board was concerned, that the union was employer-dominated and thus began the tortuous and expensive procedure which required the union to justify its existence at every turn.

This meant that an independent union must not only perform its functions as the bargaining representative of its members, but had to constantly defend itself from being disestablished on a charge of employer domination. It was an anomalous and vicious practice to subject only local unions which had not seen fit to affiliate with the AFL or CIO to company domination charges or to charges that their predecessors were so tainted and that the fracture between the tainted organization and the new was not complete. In all fairness to the Board, the situation had improved at the time of the passage of the Labor-Management Relations Act, but there is no basis whatsoever for such practices and they should continue to be illegal.

Complaints to Congress in this matter resulted in the following provisions being included in the Labor-Management Relations Act [reading]:

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SEC. 9. (c) (2) in determining whether or not a question of representation affecting commerce exists, the same regulations and rules of decision shall apply irrespective of the indentity of the persons filing the petition or the kind of relief sought and in no case shall the Board deny a labor organization a place on the ballot by reason of an order with respect to such labor organization or its predecessor not issued in conformity with section 10 (c). SEC. 10. (b) Whenever it is charged that *: Provided, That no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than 6 months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made, unless the person aggrieved thereby was prevented from filing such charge by reason of service in the armed forces, in which event the 6-month period shall be computed from the day of his discharge *

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SEC. 10. (c) The testimony taken by such *: And provided further, That in determining whether a complaint shall issue alleging a violation of section 8 (a) (1) or section 8 (a) (2), and in deciding such cases, the same regulations and rules of decision shall apply irrespective of whether or not the labor organization affected is affiliated with a labor organization national or international in scope * * *

These provisions of the Labor-Management Relations Act (TaftHartley) should be continued in the law and S. 249 should be amended to include the above-quoted language. To repeat, there is no basis whatsoever for applying different rules, principles, regulations, and procedures to unions dependent upon their nonaffiliation or affiliation with AFL or CIO. Equal justice before the National Labor Relations Board must be maintained and our national labor law must insure such equal treatment.

Much has been said and written with respect to the merits and objections to industry-wide bargaining. We do not propose at this

time to add generally to this picture, but believe that the committee should be informed with respect to the bargaining situation which exists in the telephone industry.

I do not presume nor present myself to this committee as an authority in labor-relations matters as having too much knowledge of labor-relations matters in other fields outside of the telephone industry. When the expression "the telephone industry" is used the public immediately thinks of the Bell system or the group of companies associated with the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. The Bell system operates in every State of the Union and enjoys a monopolistic place in the industry.

It employs 1 out of every 90 workers in the whole United States. If we eliminate domestics and agricultural workers, it employs 1 out of every 52 workers in the United States. It is an $8,000,000,000 corporation. Its effects and influences on the economy and on relationships within the United States extend into every small hamlet as well as every large city of the country. It is the largest industry in the United States, being second in size only to the United States Government.

We have had for many years difficulties in negotiating problems with an industry of that size, an industry of that magnitude.

In fact, some 90 percent of the telephone business is enjoyed by the Bell system, leaving the balance of 10 percent to be divided among more than 6,000 small companies unaffiliated with the American Telephone & Telegraph Co.

In the Bell system the basic wages, hours of employment, conditions of employment, pension rights, sickness, disability and death benefits, operating practices and methods are controlled by the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. through agreements, stock control, ownership, interlocking directorates, and other monopolistic corporate devices. The National Telephone Panel established by the War Labor Board to meet the special wage problems of the telephone industry in its Report on Wage Stabilization Problems and Recommended Policy in the Operating Telephone Industry, dated February 13, 1945, described the wage structure of the Bell system as follows (reading):

The over-all wage structure of the Bell system reflects the centralized policies of the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. The unifying influence of the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. appears in the close similarity of most nonrate aspects of the wage structures of the various associated Bell companies. Each Bell company, for example, has the same four major operating departments. Further, these same four departments in all companies carry almost identical job or task titles, and task routines. This same unifying influence is evident also in the existing interrelation of Bell system wage rates, not only among departments and specific jobs of each company, but, likewise, among the total wage-rate structures of the companies themselves.

That particular thing was concurred by a representative of the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. as well as the managerial representatives of the independent companies as well as two public and two labor members of a telephone commission. I point this thing out for one reason: That is, to emphasize our support of that portion of S. 249 which makes it possible for the President, or someone acting in his stead, to declare a state of emergency or to declare that the welfare and health of the Nation is imperiled should there be a total strike in an industry which might affect the Nation's health

and welfare; to permit the President to set up emergency boards which would not only find the facts in the dispute, not only try to mediate and bring the parties into agreement, but which also would make a recommendation to the public, I presume as well as to the President, on how the parties could be brought together.

This control, however, is not of such character as to divest the individual companies of the Bell system of their corporate identities or of their characters as employers. Each company is recognized in the eyes of the law as an employer even though the discretion of the management of that company is controlled by the parent corporation. Collective bargaining between our divisions and individual companies of the Bell system has produced the expected result, namely, that no basic change in wages, hours, and working conditions are made without the sanction and approval of the parent company. This condition has resulted in the need for bargaining on a Bell-system basis between our union and the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. with respect to matters designated by the local member unions as items for national bargaining.

In 1946, after our local affiliates were unable to secure agreements with the local companies of the Bell system and a Nation-wide strike appeared imminent, national bargaining produced an acceptable agreement and work stoppages were thus prevented.

A few words about the Bell-system plan for employees' pension, disability, and death benefits will further demonstrate the need for bargaining on a Bell-system rather than on a local basis. Each company of the Bell-system has its separate plan for employees' pension, disability, and death benefits. The provisions and benefits of these several plans are exactly alike and by agreement with the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. must conform with the plan established by the American Co.

This means that the individual telephone company cannot change its plan for employees' pension, disability, and death benefits unless the change first is made in the plan of the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. Local bargaining under such circumstances is futile and productive of industrial unrest.

Local bargaining will produce local disagreements and local work stoppages. In some industries local work stoppages may be insultated from the national or industry picture, but this is not true in the telephone industry. Each community is so inextricably bound up by the wires of the telephone system with other communities that the effect of local work stoppages cannot be confined to any given local area. It is safe to predict that so far as the telephone industry may be concerned, any requirement of law that bargaining must be local will produce less industrial peace and will provoke more service interruptions than industry-wide or national bargaining.

In March 1947 the National Federation of Telephone Workers, which was succeeded by the CWA in June 1947, sought to coordinate the bargaining activities of its affiliates under a voluntary policy committee arrangement in an effort to secure some uniformity of wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment. It was immediately accused of attempting to bargain on a Bell-system basis by the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. and the companies associated with the Bell system. No bargaining consequently resulted

at either local or national levels. It was necessary for the affiliates of the NFTW and other telephone unions bargaining with companies associated with the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. in the Bell system to conduct a strike for a period of some 42 days before new contracts were negotiated.

In 1948 the CWA has made no attempt to bargain on a national or system-wide basis. For nearly 10 months its divisions have been attempting to bargain new contracts. Some divisions have succeeded after many months in reaching agreements, but others have not been successful. The pattern of each conference is the same. The arguments, proposals, and stalling tactics reveal the direction and instruction of the centralized management policies of the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. A proposal by the management policies of one company is parroted within 24 hours by the managements of all other companies within the system.

How can there be any real collective bargaining under these conditions unless the unions join together and bargain with the parent company? But the A. T. & T. Co. protests that it is not the employer and bargaining should be carried out at the local company level. How long will the puppet master continue its activities beyond the veil of corporate entities? These are not the cries of a frustrated union, but represent conclusions which are supported by an abundance of factual evidence.

To forbid by law collective bargaining on an industry, national, or system basis by a labor union or to forbid a labor organization from coordinating, cooperating, or unifying its demands with respect to more than one employer is to perpetuate the corporate control with which we are faced in the Bell system.

The American Telephone & Telegraph Co. will continue to control the discretion of the local telephone companies associated with the Bell system while refusing to bargain on a system basis on national items. Such a situation cannot produce industrial peace, but only chaos or servitude unless the law requires-(or at least promotes)national bargaining for integrated industries, such as the Bell sys

tem.

We are not at this time attempting to persuade this committee that it should amend the law to provide for industry-wide bargaining, even though we believe it would be desirable in the Bell system, but have stated our experiences as a background for a suggested amendment to the powers granted to the emergency boards created under title III, National Emergencies, of S. 249.

It is our belief that similar situations with respect to collective bargaining exist in other industrial empires in this Nation and that it would materially aid and assist in the settlement of disputes which are found by the President to constitute a threatened national emergency if the emergency board was empowered by law to summon as additional parties to its proceedings those parties, corporations, and so forth, which control directly or indirectly the policies, activities, and decisions of the principal parties to the dispute.

We feel that that is a good step in the right direction. We feel it should be strengthened, however, in instances such as ours where we have a corporation as influential, as rich, as powerful, as monopolistic, as the Bell system.

We, therefore, recommend that section 303 of S. 249 be amended by adding thereto subsection (b) which shall provide, as follows [reading]:

Any emergency board appointed under this section, on its own motion or at the request of one of the parties to the dispute, shall summon as additional parties to its proceedings any company, corporation, labor organization, or individual which appears to the Board to control, directly or indirectly, or to be responsible, in whole or in part, for the policies, activities and decisions of any of the parties to the dispute through ownership, stock ownership, stock control, membership, association, affiliation, or other similar devices or agreements.

I offer that as language which might be used in any bill coming out of this committee for the consideration of the Senate.

I realize that the language of S. 249 may permit someone to conclude that an emergency board appointed by the President could summon witnesses in any dispute that might exist for the purpose of getting an over-all picture of the dispute in order to make proper recommendations. But we feel the language is rather obscure in that regard, in S. 249, and we submit for the consideration of this committee that, in instances of industries such as that which I outlined the Bell system is, the language be made clearer to point out that board's actual powers and authority will be to summon as parties to the proceedings anyone who has the kind of control which we know from experience the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. has upon the associated companies of the Bell system.

It is our opinion that inclusion of the powers contained in our proposed amendment will better enable an emergency board to find an area of settlement in disputes involving the industrial empires of our Nation.

Further, in connection with the powers of the emergency boards, we endorse the policy which provides that such boards shall not only investigate the dispute, but that they shall explore the area of settlement and give the parties the benefit of their considered disinterested judgment by suggestions for settling the controversy. Such assistance will produce a result based upon free collective bargaining.

We urge that Congress speedily enact S. 249 with the amendments which we have suggested.

I think that runs me close to my 10 minutes, if not slightly over.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murray.

Senator MURRAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield to Senator Pepper.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pepper.

Senator PEPPER. Mr. Beirne, you are president of the Communications Workers of America?

Mr. BEIRNE. That is right.

Senator PEPPER. How many members are in that organization?
Mr. BEIRNE. We hold contracts covering 230,000 people.

Senator PEPPER. Is the union membership distributed over the country pretty well?

Mr. BEIRNE. In approximately 40 States.

Senator PEPPER. Now, you appear on behalf of those members of your organization here before this committee to protest against the Taft-Hartley law and to recommend that this committee support, I assume you said, substantially, the Thomas bill?

Mr. BEIRNE. That is correct.