should be vested with power to inflict injury upon innocent third parties with impunity.

I recall one case in point where an envelope company in San Francisco received a demand for a closed shop and recognition, and was threatened with a secondary boycott.

The employees of that particular concern signed a petition and made representations to the National Labor Relations Board. They did not desire to be represented by the union. Notwithstanding that, the employer was under such terrific pressure that he eventually signed the closed shop contract, and forced those employees into the union. I could, if I had the time, cite other cases to indicate exactly the technique having been used on many occasions.

Senator TAFT. That was not after the law.

Mr. ROTH. That is prior.

Senator TAFT. Prior to the law.

Mr. ROTH. That sort of practice has ceased under the law obviously in our city, and in the whole area out there.

The use of the secondary boycott against canners, dairies, and other food processing plants prior to the adoption of the Taft-Hartley law resulted in critical losses of food supplies.

There was a time on one particular occasion in California when I compiled 26 instances of secondary boycotts which were interfering with food production in that State, and that, too, was prior to the adoption of the Taft-Hartley law.

It puts the farmers at the mercy of the ambitious labor organizers who seek to organize transient farm labor.

If the provisions of this bill were adopted in the present form you could expect the widespread use of the "lazy man's" method of organizing unions. Furthermore, we shall see the revival of the indefensible practice of imposing feather-bedding and make-work restrictions upon industry through the use of secondary boycotts.

If the law is passed in its present form without any requirement that unions, as well as employers, bargain in good faith, the secondary boycott will again be used to impose unilateral terms and conditions of employment on employers and workers without any pretense at collective bargaining.

To illustrate, some years ago in San Francisco, prior to the adoption of this law, unions called upon the principal restaurants in the city and merely handed them a list of terms and conditions under which they would be permitted to operate, with the threat that if they did not post those terms and conditions in their plants, that the suppliers of those materials, food supplies to those restaurants, would be picketed. We took the matter up with the central labor council, and advised them that we were going to demand the right to bargain collectively on the part of the employers, which we did. We went through a 60day strike. We finally won after considerable loss, and inconvenience to the public, the right to bargain collectively by economic pressure, and a knock-down, drag-out battle with the union. That is the type of thing that was growing, and which will continue if the obligation to bargain on the part of unions is not included in this law, and if the unions are permitted to engage in secondary boycotts.

I am not going to attempt at this time in the short space I have to enumerate other cases, but they are already in your records, both in

the House and in the Senate, and I will give reference here to the places where they can be found.

So far as the United States Conciliation Service is concerned, I should like to say that I have dealt personally with that Service for 12 years. During that time organizations of which I have been the president have had occasion to use the Service on at least 300 different occasions.

I have discussed the work of the Conciliation Service with hundreds of employers and employee representatives. As the result of these experiences I strongly urge that the Conciliation Service be continued as an independent agency for the following reasons:

1. The effectiveness of the Conciliation Service depends in a large measure upon its reputation for impartiality.

2. An agency which is operated under the direction of the Secretary of Labor who is charged by law, as has been fully developed here by your committee, with the duty of promoting the interests of labor, in the very nature of things cannot be regared by employers as impartial. The crux of the matter is not whether Mr. Tobin or any other Secretary of Labor is fair or impartial, but whether he is so regarded by employers.

The very nature of the Conciliation Service requires that both parties have the utmost confidence in the conciliator, and that they be willing to deal with him on a confidential basis.

In my opinion, and in the opinion of employers very generally, the effectiveness of the Conciliation Service has increased since the Department has enjoyed an independent status.

The test of the effectiveness of the Conciliation Service is not the number of cases handled before its separation from the Labor Department compared with those which have been handled since. Obviously there have been fewer disputes during the past year and a half than there were previous to the adoption of the Taft-Hartley law, which invalidates the numerical comparison of cases handled.

Furthermore, prompt and willing acceptance of the Conciliation Service is a most important factor in its acceptableness.

I know from personal experience that it has often been difficult under the former set-up to persuade employers to accept conciliation or to extend their confidence to the field representatives of the Conciliation Service.

This reluctance on the part of the employers has often resulted in needless delays with resultant losses to workers, employers and the public.

I speak as one, incidently, who has always enjoyed a cordial relationship with the Labor Department, serving as one of its chairmen of one of its committees now in the National Safety Conference, who has cooperated with it to the fullest extent.

I have read Mr. Ching's testimony which he has presented to this committee, and I endorse most heartily the reasons which he has assigned as the basis for his belief that it should be given the independent status that he desires.

I favor the retention of the present provision of the Labor-Management Relations Act relating to national emergency strikes with some modifications, which I shall later mention.

I favor them for the following reasons:

1. The provisions of the present law have been in effect for too short a time to fairly appraise their effectiveness. We should give them a more extended trial before it is determined whether or not they should be radically revised. But even so the present procedures have proven reasonably effective. In only one out of seven cases where they were employed by the President have they failed to prevent a national strike.

This is a rather impressive record of effectiveness. I see no objection to the elimination of the requirement for the vote on the employer's offer. I also see no objection to the elimination of the boards of inquiry.

As far as I can observe the efforts of such boards have contributed little to the settlement of disputes and in some instances they have interfered with the processes of conciliation, as testified by Mr. Ching.

I believe that the President should be granted authority to ask for an extension of the cooling-off period, and for the establishment of an additional cooling-off period in cases where, in his judgment, such an extension or a new cooling-off period is advisable.

I believe that the very possibility that the President might ask for an extension of the cooling-off period and the maintenance of the status quo would act as a stimulant for the settlement of disputes.

In some instances new issues may arise after the cooling-off period has expired and a strike has been called. This was true in the recent maritime strike.

I sincerely believe that if the President had secured an extension or a renewal of the injunction in that case we would have been able to work out a settlement without the hardship and losses resulting from that strike.

I do not believe that the procedures for dealing with national emergencies provided for in this bill will prove effective for the following

reasons:

1. The bill provides no effective method for delaying a strike. It is naive to expect that all labor leaders will respect the President's proclamation, which amounts to nothing more than a request that they maintain the status quo.

2. The provisions for fact finding would be unsatisfactory. In practice the employer would be under great compulsion to accept the Board's findings, whereas labor unions, if we can judge by past experiences, would be likely to disregard the recommendations.

We had such experience with fact finding in the railroad industry during the early days of the war, and that is just about what happened. In other words, in practice the process would likely be a one-way street. Neither do I favor compulsory arbitration.

We may have to come to it as the result of public demand, but certainly I do not think we have reached the situation yet where it is wise to provide it by statute.

It seems to me to be somewhat paradoxical that the bill avoids the use of the injunctive process in dealing with national emergency strikes, and yet incorporates the remedy of injunctive relief by giving the courts authority to enforce cease and desist orders relating to jurisdictional strikes.

In the latter case, the so-called absolute right of labor to strike is certainly abridged.

I must admit, however, that the process of enforcing cease and desist orders is so involved and so slow that its effectiveness has been greatly minimized in this bill. The principle involved, however, is the same in both cases.

In his prepared statement, Mr. Tobin has refrained from any comment on the merits of the non-Communist affidavit requirements and many other meritorious provisions of the Taft-Hartley law which have been omitted from this bill.

Included among the items which have been so omitted are the restraints against intimidation of workers, requirements for filing by unions of financial statements, the requirement that unions bargain collectively in good faith, the so-called freedom of speech for employers' provisions, and others.

I think it is a fair assumption that no attempt was made to justify the repeal of these desirable features because their deletion from a fairly balanced labor relations act cannot be justified.

I have not the time, within the limitations here, to discuss all these provisions, but I should like to say that so far as the noncommunist affidavit is concerned, it has been generally recognized by the public and by labor, that this requirement has had a most helpful and salutary effect in pointing up and stimulating the efforts of the unions to rid themselves of the Communist influence.

This provision has served to earmark Communists who have infiltrated into union leadership, and hence encourage the rank and file of union members to clear house.

I had hoped to have available and to submit at this time a résumé of the actions which have been reported in the press which have been taken by unions throughout the length and breadth of this land to rid themselves of Communist influence. I am a long way from my base, and unfortunately I was not able to get it.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Chairman, if Mr. Roth would like to file that, I move you respectfully that he be permitted to do so. The CHAIRMAN. We will be glad to have it, Mr. Roth. Mr. ROTH. Thank you very much. It has not arrived. The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Roth, you may proceed.

Mr. ROTH. I do not have the material. It may be due to the snow in California, for all I know, but at any rate it is not here.

I have not the time to go into the question of reorganization of the National Labor Relations Board within the limits of time, but it has been our experience on the Pacific coast, and this is the judgment of many people to whom I have talked and who deal with the NLRB, that the separation of the judicial and the prosecuting functions of the National Labor Relations Board has increased its effectiveness and its prestige.

The employers that I represent, and I believe employers generally, strongly favor the retention of the National Labor Relations Board's present set-up.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions?

Senator TAFT. Are you calling on members one by one, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. I thought if you want to go one by one, that would be satisfactory, Senator Taft.

Senator TAFT. There was filed, Mr. Roth, with this Board yesterday, and there is a question of whether it was made a part of the record or not, an appendix to Mr. Goldberg's statement, one dealing with four strikes, two of which were in California. One of them was the strike in the oil industry, and the other was the longshoremen's strike. Have you read those statements?

Mr. ROTH. I looked through them very hurriedly. I have not had a chance to read them critically.

Senator TAFT. I do not want to ask you about them, I only want to ask that if they do not state the facts, that you obtain from California statements of those who dispute those facts, similar statements, which could be filed with the committee.

Is that possible for you to do?

Mr. ROTH. I will say that, putting it mildly, they are misleading and distorted statements of the situation.

Senator TAFT. Well, can you obtain statements

Mr. ROTH. I should be very glad to do so.

Senator TAFT. To file with the committee so that if they should be included in the record, both points of view will be included in the

record.

Mr. ROTH. I will be very glad to do so.

Senator TAFT. Mr. Roth, on the subject of closed shop, which has been probably more prevalent, or was before the act, more prevalent in California than anywhere else in the country, I think, is that a fair statement to make, that it has been more prevalent out there?

Mr. ROTH. In San Francisco it certainly has, and to a very large extent in Los Angeles.

Senator TAFT. Do you favor the retention of the prohibition of the closed shop?

Mr. ROTH. I do.

Senator TAFT. You favor the retention of-supposing that the closed shops were legalized again. What restrictions, if any, could be imposed to eliminate what you consider the evils of it? I assume you consider there are evils since you want to continue to have it abolished. What over-all restrictions are possible, and are there any to prevent the abuses that have arisen in the nature of regulation of hiring halls, and in tht field?

Mr. ROTH. Well, basically if you give to the union the right to determine who is going to work, by compelling the employer to go to the union and take from the union his new employees, then I do not see how you can establish any regulations that will cure that evil.

My objection to that is, first, that it deprives the employer, not of the ability to choose his employees who in his judgment are suitable and well qualified, but it makes it necessary for him to take whoever happens to be a member of that union.

Secondly, the men who are given that opportunity under that kind of monopolistic control by union leaders naturally feel obligated to those union leaders for their opportunity to work, and in many cases for their continued employment. That gives to the union leader a power that is extremely potent over the individual members of his union.

Senator DOUGLAS. Would the Senator yield for a moment?