apply to the entire locomotive and tender and all its parts and appurtenances.

The developments in safety legislation thus far described represent, in the main, the logical outcome of the initial Safety Appliance Act of 1893, aimed primarily at protection to employees. It remains to consider the results of the Accidents Reports Act of March 3, 1901, which was enacted to throw light upon the causes of collisions and derailments.

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In the first place, while the reports were not complete enough to warrant categorical assertion as to the relation between fatigue and negligence of duty by trainmen, it was the commission's judgment that the number of accidents associated with excessive hours of service of employees warranted the inference that overwork was a more or less frequent cause. The Hours of Service Act of March 4, 1907 (34 Stat. L., 1416), was enacted to remedy this situation by limiting the hours of service of employees of interstate carriers, and the commission was given the duty of execution and enforcement of the act. The means adopted by the commission to determine whether the provisions of the law were being observed was a requirement that carriers should file monthly reports under oath, showing the excess service of employees and the causes thereof. Many carriers refused to file such reports until the Supreme Court sustained the commission's authority in this respect.

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The reports showed that the carriers were utilizing the special emergency exempting clauses of the act to require employees to be on duty for more than the statutory period. Furthermore, several of the courts ruled that railroads were excused under the proviso from the operation of the law where delay was caused after a train had started upon its run by hot boxes, leaky flues, or other ordinary incidents of railroad operation. The commission, therefore, recommended that the law be made more specific in this particular in order to restrict the exercise of discretion on the part of carriers in determining whether a given incident was a casualty or "unavoidable" accident within the meaning of

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54

55

Dixon, Railroad Accidents, Atlantic Monthly, vol. 99, p. 583.

Baltimore and Ohio Railroad v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S., 612.

the law and to eliminate conflicting decisions and litigation in the courts over the interpretation of the proviso. This recommendation was renewed in each annual report of the commission between 1908 and 1915.“

Study of the accident reports showed a large proportion of casualties due to excessive dependence upon the human factor in railroading. The obvious advantages of the block system in lessening such dependence and the necessity for stimulating the laggard roads to adopt it impelled the commission in 1904 to prepare a draft of a bill, following the English model, providing for the gradual installation of the system on the American roads. No particular mechanism was prescribed, but a policy was established, the detailed execution of which was relegated to the railroad experts. Congress did not enact this measure but by joint resolution of June 30, 1906 (34 Stat. L., 838), the commission was directed to investigate, report, and recommend advisable legislation in relation to the use of and necessity for block-signal systems and appliances for the automatic control of trains, and $50,ooo was appropriated in 1907 (Act of March 4, 1907; 45 Stat. L., 1312), to enable the commission to make experimental tests. A body of experts was appointed under these laws, designated as the Block Signal and Train Control Board," to supervise and conduct the proposed tests and carry out the purpose of the joint resolution of June 30, 1906.

Although the Congressional resolution was confined strictly to block signals and automatic stops, many other devices were submitted to the board for investigation and test, and the commission suggested that enlargement of the scope of the resolution was desirable if Congress wished information on these devices. By the act of May 27, 1908 (35 Stat. L., 317, 325), the board was required

56

By a decision handed down on June 4, 1917 (Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. U. S., 244 U. S. 336), this situation was relieved. The court held that the act required the carrier to do all reasonably within its power, to confine the hours of service within the limits stated and that it was not the intent of the emergency clause to relieve the carriers from diligent effort to avoid exceeding the limits of service which the act specified.

57

See Annual Report, 1907, p. 122 et seq. for a full account of the organization of the board.

to take cognizance of any appliances or systems intended to promote safety in railroad operation.

After four years of investigation the board recommended " the compulsory use of the block system on all passenger railroads. It reported that while automatic train stops, if properly installed and maintained, would in its opinion contribute to safety of railroad travel, there had been so little actual experience with such devices on steam surface railroads that it deemed it doubtful whether legislative requirement for the use of automatic stops would be wise at that time. It recommended, however, that legislative action be taken if due diligence should not be exercised by the railroads in developing such systems. It referred to the piecemeal character of existing safety legislation and stated that the results obtained were not commensurate with the cost to the public or the railroads. It recommended, accordingly, that some central authority be established with power to deal as adequately with matters relating to physical operation of railroads as the existing legislation dealt with rates and accounts.

The commission is commenting on this report, expressed its belief that the board's work in investigating block signal systems and automatic control appliances was so near completion that it was not necessary to continue it and that so far as the enlarged field of inquiry authorized by the act of May 27, 1908, was concerned, there was little utility in the work of a temporary board with its limited appropriation, for the merits of miscellaneous safety appliances and systems could not be conclusively established by mere investigation but by practical application and experience in railroad service. The commission urged, as in previous years, legislation to make the block signal system compulsory, but again Congress only authorized further investigation regarding the use and necessity of block signal systems, automatic train control appliances, and other safety devices. Experimental tests to be conducted under certain conditions were also authorized. In December, 1913, the duty of carrying out these provisions of the law was assigned by the commission to the newly established Division of Safety. The appropriation

58

See Annual Report of 1911, pp. 85-87 for a summary of recommendations of the board.

acts of subsequent years made provision for the continuance of this work of investigation and the testing of safety appliances.

As early as 1905 the commission had pointed to the need of amending the accident reports law in various particulars. In 1909, it called attention to the inadequacy of the accident reports themselves. "Mere statistics," it said, "can only call attention to the necessity of preventing accidents, they afford no help in solving the problem." It was pointed out that the notes in the quarterly accident bulletin on the causes of 122 of the more important train accidents of the fiscal year, emphasized by their incompleteness, the need for public investigation of accidents. Congress complied with the commission's suggestion in the act of May 6, 1910 (36 Stat. L., 350), which became effective July 1, 1910. This law replaced the accident reports act of March 3, 1901 " and gave the commission authority to investigate all collisions, derailments, or other accidents resulting in serious injury to persons or property occurring on the line of any common carrier by railroad engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. The commission assumed that it was not the intent of Congress to require investigation of train accidents generally throughout the country with the intent of locating the blame in particular cases, the expense of which procedure would be prohibitive, but to determine for the benefit of Congress and the public the lessons to be learned from typical accidents.

The investigations of the commission under the law soon developed important information regarding causes of accidents: the superiority of steel equipment, the necessity of ascertaining and improving the physical condition of the tracks and roadways used in interstate commerce, and the need for standardization of operating rules. Attention was also called to the large number of accidents resulting from trespass upon the tracks of the carriers. In its investigation of accidents involving broken rails, the commission received aid from the Bureau of Standards, which had

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50 The act of March 3, 1901, limited monthly accident reports to casualties to passengers and employees on duty. All other accidents were included in their annual reports. The new law required monthly reports of all collisions, derailments, or other accidents resulting in injury to persons, equipment, or roadbed, and relieved carriers from including accident reports in the annual report.

facilities and expert personnel for determining with accuracy the causes of rail failures. It was found that "the line of demarcation between safe and unsafe conditions " had not been demonstrated in practical railroad engineering, and that it was not known how much or how little margin of strength resided in the track. An exceedingly large proportion of train accidents were found to be due to dereliction of duty on the part of employees. On this point the commission spoke emphatically:

The evidence is that in the main the rules are understood, but they are habitually violated by employees who are charged with responsibility for the safe movement of trains. The evidence also is that in many cases operating officers are cognizant of this habitual disregard of rules and no proper steps are taken to correct the evil. Many operating officers seem to proceed upon the theory that their responsibility ends with the promulgation of rules, apparently overlooking the fact that no matter how inherently good a rule may be, it is of no force unless it is obeyed. On very many railroads there is little or no system of inspection or supervision of the work of train-service employees so far as pertains to those matters which vitally affect safety. Employees are not examined on the operating rules except at the time of their promotion, and only the most perfunctory efforts are made to determine their fitness to perform the duties assigned to them from time to time.

This lack of supervision and inspection with respect to matters affecting the safety of trains is unexplainable when the careful supervision of all matters directly affecting the revenue of the roads is considered. The auditing and checking systems used for detecting the dishonesty of employees are marvels of ingenuity and careful attention to detail, but means of determining whether trains are operated in accordance with the requirements of safety and in conformity with the rules are almost entirely lacking."

An improvement was noted in this respect a few years later, which the commission attributed in large measure to the public investigation of accidents and the evil operating conditions thereby disclosed.

The loss of life and property, which from time to time resulted from improper packing, handling, or loading of explosives, led to the enactment of the act of May 30, 1908 (35 Stat. L., 555),