Page images
PDF
EPUB

Commerce Commission, and further, that Reorganization Plan 7, considered against the background of the other reorganization plans which have been submitted, particularly plan 21, is but one step in a continuing trend, the final result of which will be yet further curtailment of Commission independence and further subjection to the executive branch of the Government. The desirability of Commission independence and impartiality as an arm of the Congress, we assume, may be taken for granted; the question then arises whether plan 7 affects that status to an extent requiring its rejection despite minor economies achieved.

The power of the Commission Chairman under Reorganization Plan No. 7 is broad and undefined. It includes "all executive and administrative functions," not limited to the three fields specifically named: (1) Appointment and supervision of personnel, (2) distribution of business among personnel and administrative units, and (3) use and expenditures of funds.

Certain limitations are provided on the exercise of this power by the Chairman, but these limitations appear uncertain and inadequate, That the Chairman be governed by "general policies of the Commission and by such regulatory decisions, findings, and determinations" is so vague as to raise doubt with respect to its practical enforcement. The provision with respect to the distribution of appropriated funds is minor in view of the detail as to the use of such funds provided in the appropriating statutes. The approval of the Commissioners with respect to appointment of heads of major administrative units at best could be but an uncertainly exercised veto power, carrying no right of affirmative action, however meritorious the situation which might require it. Further, such approval power is extended to far too few key personnel. The effective functioning of the Commission is dependent also on the wise selection of other personnel-attorneys, examiners, statisticians, accountants, et cetera-with respect to which no such approval is provided.

Under the broad powers conferred upon him the Chairman would be in a position to exert a controlling influence upon the activities and decisions of those under his jurisdiction. The power of assignment of duties, of retarding or promoting advancement, of actual hiring and firing of personnel, is too potent to expect it to exist without reflection in the action of that personnel. It should not be overlooked that we are here concerned with potential power rather than the misuse of power. In the hands of the most conscientious and impartial of chairmen that power should not exist where it cannot but be reflected in the activities of those within its scope.

Of substantial public significance would be the impaired usefulness of the Commission as public knowledge if this situation becomes more widespread. One of the prime reasons for the success of the Commission over a period of years and for the high regard in which it has been held has been the public confidence in its impartiality and ability. Such confidence must fade under an organization such as plan 7 proposes.

The appointment of the Chairman of the Commission by the President, rather than by the Commissioners themselves as at present, is also objectionable, as tending to destroy the independence of nonpartianship of the Commission. The President's power to appoint a

65954-50-15

chairman, in turn with authority to appoint and supervise personnel and distribute activities among such personnel and administrative units, would give to the executive branch an influence on policy which will be directly felt; there is no reasonable expectation that such power of influence would remain unused. The accountability and responsibility of the Chairman to the President are expressly stated by the President in his message with respect to the provisions of the reorganization plans.

The President has defended plan 7 by attempting a distinction between "substantive responsibilities" and "internal administrative functioning" and has stated that only the latter is to be placed under the control of the Chairman. It is a questionable and certainly arguable whether such a distinction is either valid or practicable. When an individual, either a Commission Chairman or of personnel within the Commission, becomes administratively responsible to another, substantive responsibility must follow in large part.

The President's message further points out that the President, by law, today designates the Chairman of three of the other regulatory commissions covered by these plans: the Federal Communications Commission, National Labor Relations Board, and the Civil Aeronautics Board. That Congress has seen fit to alter the completely independent status of three of the seven regulatory commissions is no reason that it should now follow a similar course with respect to the status of those created according to the original concept of an independent commission as an arm of the legislative branch of the Government. On the contrary, this perhaps provides an opportunity to reexamine that original concept and to reassert the independence of these particular commissions. The Hoover Commission did not recommend the appointment by the President of these commission chairmen, and it is certainly open to question whether "the designation of all chairmen follows out the general concept of the (Hoover) Commission."

The provisions of the plan with respect to appointment of personnel and the assignment of the work will impair the internal functioning of the Commission. The work of the Commission today is carried out by the assignment of certain subject matters to individual Commissioners or to divisions of the Commission, and by long association and particular qualifications such Commissioners and divisions have acquired familiarity with such matters and the ability to deal impartially therewith to a degree which cannot possibly be attained in the hands of one man. Continuation of that method and plan of dealing with the burden of the Commission work should not be prevented or discouraged.

The whole subject matter of national transportation policy, the place in transportation of the various agencies now performing service, the substantive matters of the regulatory statutes, and the activities of the regulatory agencies are now before both Houses of the Congress in general investigations, in the conduct of which substantial time and effort have been expended. There seems to be no urgency with respect to the putting into effect of Reorganization Plan No. 7, no immediate objective or economy to be obtained, which would require its approval before these investigations can be carried to a conclusion. While piecemeal handling of the country's transportation problem may be justified or required in certain instances, in the long run more consistent results will be obtained as over-all objectives are adhered to and the problem dealt with as a whole. Reorganization Plan No. 7 could well be held in abeyance pending further progress in the general investigations.

In conclusion, fundamentally the questioning remaining before Congress in Reorganization Plan No. 7 is whether that body is to surrender or even endanger the independence and nonpartisan character of the Interstate Commerce Commission, long recognized as the most important and successful of the congressional arms in the field of administrative law, yielding to, or dividing that control with the executive branch of the Government. The improvement of administrative accountability and the attainment of businesslike and effective administration are desirable, but the principles of democratic governinent and the independent exercise of the legislative function through such agencies as Congress may determine, should not be sacrificed in their attainment.

We urge that you approve Senate Resolution 253.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions?

Thank you very much.

Mr. Отт. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Your entire statement will be printed in the rec

ord at this point.

Mr. Oтт. Thank you, sir.

(The document referred to follows:)

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. OTT, JR., ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF PRIVATE MOTOR TRUCK OWNERS

My name is W. H. Ott, Jr. My address is Des Plaines, Ill. I am appearing on behalf of the National Council of Private Motor Truck Owners, as chairman of its legislative committee.

The National Council of Private Motor Truck Owners, Inc. is a Nation-wide organization representing the transportation interests exclusively of those persons, businesses, and organizations which operate motor vehicles as an incident in the conduct of their business or other activities, whether those activities be agricultural, extractive, processing, manufacturing, distributing, service, or otherwise. The private motor vehicles so employed comprise about 87 percent of the total property carrying vehicles in the country.

Membership in the council is made up of three classes: (1) persons and concerns operating motor vehicles as an incident to the carrying on of their own businesses; (2) trade associations of national scope whose memberships make substantial use of private motor vehicles; and (3) State associations whose membership is exclusively private motor vehicle owners. This combined membership in the council represents the ownership of over 1,000,000 vehicles. No "for-hire" transportation interest or activity is represented in or by the council.

The membership of the council has a vital interest in the entire national transportation situation, the regulatory policies which may be applied to the different transportation instrumentalities, and the regulatory agencies involved. Operators of private motor vehicles, classified as "private carriers" under the provisions of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, are regulated under section 204 (a) of that act in matters relating to safety of operation, and such regulations are administered by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Council membership is also a large user of all for-hire transportation agencies and has a direct interest in the regulatory procedures as applied to those agencies.

I appear in opposition to Reorganization Plan No. 7 and to urge your approval of Senate Resolution 253. Such action is taken on direction of the board of directors of the council given at a meeting in Washington, D. C., on April 6, 1950, Basically, the council position is determined by one fact, our belief that Reorganization Plan No. 7 will tend to impair the independence and nonpartisan character of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and further, that Reorganization Plan No. 7, considered against the background of the other reorganization plans which have been submitted, particularly plan No. 21, is but one step in a continuing trend, the final result of which will be yet further curtailment of Commission independence and further subjection to the executive branch of the Government. The desirability of Commission independence and impartiality as an arm of the Congress, we assume, may be taken for granted; the question then arises whether plan No. 7 affects that status to an extent requiring its rejection despite minor economies achieved.

The power of the Commission Chairman under Reorganization Plan No. 7 is broad and undefined. It includes "all executive and administrative functions," not limited to the three fields specifically named: (1) Appointment and supervision of personnel, (2) distribution of business among personnel and administrative units, and (3) use and expenditures of funds. Certain limitations are provided on the exercise of this power by the Chairman, but these limitations appear uncertain and inadequate. That the Chairman be governed by "general policies of the Commission and by such regulatory decisions, findings, and determinations" is so vague as to raise doubt with respect to its practical enforcement. The provision with respect to the distribution of appropriated funds is minor in view of the detail as to the use of such funds provided in the appropriating statutes. The approval of the Commissioners with respect to appointment of heads of major administrative units at best could be but an uncertainly exercised veto power, carrying no right of affirmative action however meritorious the situation which might require it. Further, such approval power is extended to far too few key personnel. The effective functioning of the Commission is dependent also on the wise selection of other personnel, attorneys, examiners, statisticians, accountants, etc., with respect to which no such approval power is provided.

Under the broad powers conferred upon him the Chairman would be in a position to exert a controlling influence upon the activities and decisions of those under his jurisdiction. The power of assignment of duties, of retarding or promoting advancement, of actual hiring and firing of personnel, is too potent to expect it to exist without reflection in the action of that personnel. It should not be overlooked that we are here concerned with potential power rather than the misuse of power. In the hands of the most conscientious and impartial of chairmen that power should not exist where it cannot but be reflected in the activities of those within its scope.

Of substantial public significance would be the impaired usefulness of the Commission as public knowledge if this situation becomes more widespread. One of the prime reasons for the success of the Commission over a period of years and for the high regard in which it has been held has been the public confidence in its impartiality and ability. Such confidence must fade under an organization such as plan No. 7 proposes.

The appointment of the Chairman of the Commission by the President, rather than by the Commissioners themselves as at present, is also objectionable, as tending to destroy the independence and nonpartisanship of the Commission. The President's power to appoint a Chairman, in turn with authority to appoint and supervise personnel and distribute activities among such personnel and administrative units, would give to the executive branch an influence on policy which will be directly felt; there is no reasonable expectation that such power of influence would remain unused. The accountability and responsibility of the Chairman to the President are expressly stated by the President in his message with respect to the provisions of the reorganization plans.

The President has defended plan No. 7 by attempting a distinction between "substantive responsibilities" and "internal administrative functioning." and has stated that only the latter is to be placed under the control of the Chairman. It is questionable and certainly arguable whether such a distinction is either valid or practicable. When an individual, either a Commission Chairman or of personnel within the Commission, becomes administratively responsible to another, substantitve responsibility must follow in large part.

The President's message further points out that the President, by law, today designates the Chairman of three of the other regulatory Commissions covered by these plans, the Federal Communications Commission, National Labor Relations Board, and the Civil Aeronautics Board. That Congress has seen fit to alter the completely independent status of three of the seven regulatory commissions is no reason that it should now follow a similar course with respect to the status of those created according to the original concept of an independent commission as an arm of the legislative branch of the Government. On the contrary, this perhaps provides an opportunity to reexamine that original concept and to reassert the independence of these particular commissions. The Hoover Commission did not recommend the apointment by the President of these Commission Chairmen, and it is certainly open to question whether "the designation of all Chairmen follows out the general concept of the (Hoover) Commission."

The provisions of the plan with respect to appointment of personnel and the subject matters to individual Commissioners or to divisions of the Commission, The work of the Commission today is carried out by the assignment of certain subject matters to individual Commissioners or to divisions of the Commission, and by long association and particular qualification such Commissioners and divisions have acquired familiarity with such matters and the ability to deal impartially therewith to a degree which cannot possibly be attained in the hands of one man. Continuation of that method and plan of dealing with the burden of the Commission work should not be prevented or discouraged.

The whole subject matter of national transportation policy, the place in transportation of the various agencies now performing service, the substantive matters of the regulatory statutes, and the activities of the regulatory agencies are now before both Houses of the Congress in general investigations, in the conduct of which substantial time and effort have been expended. There seems to be no urgency with respect to the putting into effect of Reorganization Plan No. 7, no immediate objective or economy to be attained, which would require its approval before these investigations can be carried to a conclusion. While piecemeal handling of the country's transportation problem may be justified or required in certain instances, in the long run more consistent results will be obtained as over-all objectives are adhered to and the problem dealt with as a whole. Reorganization Plan No. 7 could well be held in abeyance pending further progress in the general investigations.

In conclusion, fundamentally the question remaining before Congress in Reorganization Plan No. 7 is whether that body is to surrender or even endanger the independence and nonpartisan character of the Interstate Commerce Commission, long recognized as the most important and successful of the congressional arms in the field of administrative law, yielding to, or dividing that control with the executive branch of the Government. The improvement of administrative accountability and the attainment of businesslike and effective administration are desirable, but the principles of democratic government and the independent exercise of the legislative function through such agencies as Congress may determine, should not be sacrificed in their attainment.

We urge that you approve Senate Resolution 253.

The CHAIRMAN. The chairman wishes to announce that hearings on these four resolutions, and the plans that they involve are now concluded; and where we have granted permission in the record to provide statements, they will be received. Any other statements received with the request that they be inserted will be withheld until the committee acts on them.

Is there any suggestion from any member of the committee?
The hearings on these plans, then, are concluded.

The chairman announces that hearings will be held tomorrow (April 27, 1950), starting at 10 a. m., on Senate Resolution 259 introduced by Senator Wiley of Wisconsin, to disapprove Reorganization Plan No. 5 of 1950 on the reorganization of the Department of Commerce. We hope to limit the hearings to 1 day on that plan, and conclude them tomorrow.

I do not know who any of the witnesses are, other than possibly Senator Wiley, who will appear.

Hearings will also be held on Senate Resolution 263, to disapprove Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1950, on the Department of Agriculture, which was introduced by Senators Holland, Johnston, Schoeppel, and Thye. Those hearings will start next Tuesday, May 2, at 10 a. m.

The committee stands adjourned.

(Thereupon, at 12:05 p. m., the committee was adjourned.)

X

« PreviousContinue »