always proceeding upon due consideration of the views expressed by the companies that it is regulating. That may be important to the railroads, to make sure that their views get some consideration. I do not think that would be in any way eliminated by sound administrative reorganization. Senator BENTON. Could you name the alternative ways of selecting the Chairman? One is by Presidential appointment; one is the rotating Chairman; one is by election by the Commission. Mr. LEVENTHAL. For a term; yes. The Federal Power Commission illustrates that. Senator BENTON. Are there any others besides these three? Mr. LEVENTHAL. NO; I think not. The only kind of variant that should be noted is in the case of the Maritime Commission: the President appoints the Chairman, but the Commission elects the Vice Chairman. It is just a sort of hybrid approach there. I do not know of any other way it could be done. Senator BENTON. I am still querying you as a member of the task force, which gives you a special background. Does the Congress have to consider three methods in reference to each other rather than in reference to some alleged standard of perfection? In other words, the choice is among these three procedures? Merely by pointing out the several weaknesses in any one, you cannot arrive at a satisfactory answer unless you weight those weaknesses against what may be greater weaknesses existing in the other two methods? Mr. LEVENTHAL. I think that point is well taken. Each of them may have certain advantages and certain disadvantages, but a choice should be made. I do not know whether this committee is aware of the fact that Commissioner Eastman, of the ICC, when he was Federal Coordinator of Transportation from 1932 to 1935, came out very strongly against the rotating chairmanship of the ICC. He said it led to inefficient procedures; it led to time-consuming methods that did not expedite the processes that he thought should be expedited. He very strongly recommended that there be a chairman for a term. I do not recall whether he expressed a preference between designation by the President or designation by the Commission, but he was very emphatic that a new Chairman every year, each new one trying to learn the ropes, was a very inefficient way to run the ICC, as it would be to run a railroad. Senator BURTON. You heard Mr. Webster's testimony this morning? Mr. LEVENTHAL. Yes. Senator BENTON. You heard that he disagreed with the testimony of the railroads, namely, that you would get less-efficient and less-able men on these Commissions if certain administrative authority was turned over to the Chairman? Mr. LEVENTHAL. Yes; Mr. Owen Young and Mr. Bowie state their conviction that, if the Commission is well run administratively, and you do not have these administrative trivia coming up to the top level, men of high caliber would be more willing to be Associate Commissioners on such a commission than on a commission where each gets a lot of detail and trivia for consideration. Senator BENTON. That would be my opinion. I tried to bring it out in questions to the railroad witnesses yesterday. Mr. Webster supported that view as you have supported that view. The second point made by the railroads is the point of political pressures, that the appointed Chairman-that was what was of concern to our Chairman who just left-with a Chairman appointed by the President, these Commissions would be more subject to political pressure. Might it not follow that if you have better men as Commissioners who are less weighed down by administrative trivia, that these men might be less subject to political pressures, and might be in a position to give more thought to policy? Mr. LEVENTHAL. Yes. The comment you made ties in with a question by Senator Schoeppel. If you will pass along to him this comment, I would be grateful. He asked Commissioner Webster how much time gets lost by virtue of the consideration of these trivia. The Commissioner indicated there was a certain amount of time. He did not know how much he could ascribe to it. The important objection to the administrative trivia coming up is not only that it wastes time but that it wastes the most precious time that an independent Commission has. It wastes the time that is set aside for Commission meetings. All of our survey officers encountered the situation in more or less degree than these Commission meetings would just spend their time to a considerable extent on trivia and, when it came time for discussion of basic questions, the time was more or less gone, and it had to be done in a hurry, or postponed. An hour lost in Commission meeting is more than an hour in a week out of 40. Senator BENTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Leventhal. Judge Roberson, we will be glad to have your statement at this time. (The following letter and appendix B were furnished later by Mr. Harold Leventhal in reference to statement by the chairman found on p. 179:) GINSBURG & LEVENTHAL, Subject: Hearings on Senate Resolutions 253, 254, 255, and 256 Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, DEAR SENATOR MCCLELLAN: On April 25, 1950, on behalf of the Citizens Committee for the Hoover Report, I presented testimony to your committee, including a prepared statement, endorsing the President's proposed Reorganization Plans 7, 8, 9, and 11. The last two paragraphs of my prepared statement are set forth in the enclosed appendix (pt. A), and present the position that Presidential designation of the chairman of independent regulatory commissions is desirable (a) as promoting more efficient internal administration, and (b) as being likely to improve channels of communication between the commission and the President. During the hearing on April 26, you referred to my statement and observed that it might be "just an irresponsible statement made here by a witness" (tr. 324, vol. 3). It seems appropriate for me to call your attention to the fact that my statement was a condensation of the task force report which was submitted by Mr. Robert R. Bowie and Mr. Owen D. Young to the Hoover Commission. The recommendation of Presidential selection of the chairman appears at pages 31-33 of the task force report, and is also set forth in the enclosed appendix (pt. B). The task force report contains the view I orally presented, that Presidential designation of the chairman leaves the commission fully independent and free of partisan influence. It points out that the experience of the commissions where the President now appoints the chairman indicates that this power does not interfere with their independence, and that the President has not injected himself in particular matters handled by the commission. May I respectfully request you to add this letter, including the enclosures, to the hearing transcript, and to circulate the copies transmitted herewith to the other members of the committee. Yours sincerely, HAROLD LEVENTHAL. APPENDIX B. TASK FORCE REPORT ON REGULATORY COMMISSIONS Prepared by Mr. Robert R. Bowie and Mr. Owen D. Young, for The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (The following excerpt appears at pp. 31-33) Our recommendation is merely that the practice of selection by the President be made the general rule by statute, and that the chairman serve as such at the pleasure of the President in all cases, although protected against removal as a member. IMPROVED CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION Designation by the President provides an acceptable channel of communication between the commission and the President, without impairing the proper independence of the commission. The previous chapter has stated our conviction that the commission should be independent and free from partisan influence in the decisions affecting individual rights and in the ordinary administration of the statute. The experience of the commissions where the President has either directly or informally named the chairman indicates that this power does not interfere with such independence. The investigations of our staff have not revealed that the President has sought to interfere in, or influence the determinaion of, particular controversies or matters handled by such commissions. On the basis of this evidence, we discount the objection that such designation would impair their essential independence, although we would give it great weight if it appeared well taken. But where there is need for coordination between the independent commission and other agencies, the President is properly interested in its being achieved. In a few instances, where the need is crucial, Congress has given the President authority to override a commission, but if applied widely, this would destroy their independence. Furthermore, experience indicates that the necessary coordination can be attained without giving the President such power, if convenient means are available for communication between the President and the commissions on such matters. In order to facilitate such communication, it appears desirable that each commission be headed by the member most acceptable to the President. This will enable the President to obtain a sympathetic hearing for broader considerations of national policy which he feels the commission should take into account. It will still lie with the commission as a whole to decide what weight should be given to such views, but in our opinion there should be available means for transmitting them in the most direct manner. This arrangement has advantages for the commission as well. Over the long pull, it must function as a part of the Government as a whole. For one thing, it can accomplish its duties only with proper appropriations and that may require sympathetic help from the Chief Executive with respect to its budget. In other fields, where activities of an executive agency interfere with attainment of the regulatory objectives, it may be to the advantage of the commission to have access to the President to assure that its point of view is fully understood by him. Perhaps more important, such a relation may give the members some voice in new appointments to a commission. The incumbent members are likely to desire men of ability and character and to be able to judge the fitness of potential nominees. In the past, where the chairman has enjoyed the confidence of the President, it has not been unusual for him to consult the chairman for suggestions or comments. Even if this does not insure the naming of those best qualified, it may often give the chairman the chance to prevent the appointment of ill-fitted members. Ordinarily, the President would be unlikely to nominate a new member over the active protest of a chairman designated by himself. IMPROVING ADMINISTRATION The second important advantage of Presidential designation is that it assists in achieving the objective of improving the internal administration of the commissions. The next chapter analyzes some of the serious administrative shortcomings of these agencies and proposes that the chairman be made expressly responsible for administration. As explained there, our recommendation is not intended to deprive the other members of fully equal participation in the making of policies and substantive decisions of the agency. It is only designed to center the administration in one member, responsible to the commission, to relieve the other members of these duties, and to assure effective supervision essential for expeditious handling of cases and orderly dispatch of business. Our staff reports indicate that the absence of such supervision today accounts In large measure for the delays and backlogs now too common. They also clearly show that the members will seldom voluntarily delegate to the chairman or any other official, for a substantial period, the necessary authority to perform these essential duties. On the contrary, where the members select the chairman, he is ordinarily little more than a presiding officer without any real administrative role. This is the case in the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade Commission, where the office rotates annually. It is also true in the Federal Power Commission where the Chairman serves out his term as Chairman. In the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Chairman was clearly the administrative head in the early years, when the members usually followed Presidential wishes in selecting him, but more recently there has apparently been some decline in his position. Even when the President names the chairman, he is not always accepted as the administrative head of the agency. But generally speaking, he does occupy a stronger position in this respect and is usually able to take more responsibility, especially if it is clear that he enjoys Presidential support. Furthermore, the examples of outstanding administration within the commissions are uniformly found among those where the President has formally or informally named the chairman. In other words, such designation may not be a guaranty of effective administration but, on the whole, it seems to be the best means of promoting it, especially in conjunction with the other measures recommended in the next chapter. (Subsequently, the following letters were furnished for the record by Dr. Robert L. Johnson, Chairman, Citizens Committee for the Hoover Report (see pp. 131, 179).) Hon. JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR THE HOOVER REPORT, United States Senate, Washington, D. C. Washington, D. C., May 1, 1950. DEAR SENATOR MCCLELLAN: Pursuant to the kind invitation which you tendered in your letter of February 14, 1950, I requested Mr. Harold Leventhal, a member of the National Citizens Committee and a sponsor of the Greater Washington Citizens Committee, to present the views of the Citizens Committee on Reorganization Plans 7, 8, 9, and 11. Mr. Leventhal is admirably qualified to do so, because of his wide experience in legal matters and because of the important post which he held on the Commission's Task Force on Independent Regulatory Commissions. On April 24, 1950, I wrote Mr. Leventhal requesting him to represent the committee. A copy of my letter to him is attached hereto as exhibit A. Although Mr. Leventhal appeared as a private citizen at his own time and expense, the Citizens Committee agrees with his prepared statement and with his oral elaboration of the matters covered in it. We stand behind his views on Reorganization Plans 7, 8, 9, and 11. As to your request for information on the Citizens Committee, the National Committee and its 45 State and 300 county and local affiliates were specifically established for "public education in support of the Hoover Report." The committee is a voluntary, bipartisan, nonprofit organization of private citizens. It prepares and distributes education tools such as (1) digests of the Commission's report; (2) high school and university short courses; (3) discussion group outlines; and (4) series of articles giving simplified explanations of the report for use by newspapers, farm weeklies, union publications, and industrial employee magazines. Additionally the committee maintains contact with some 93 national organizations who have signified their cooperation by resolution, by broad affiliation, and by other action and are informing their members of the progress of the reorganization program. The committee's policies are determined by its board of directors in accordance with the charter and bylaws under the laws of the State of New York in which it was incorporated. At the last meeting of the board of directors, I, as chairman, was authorized to act as spokesman for the Citizens Committee and to consult with members of the Hoover Commission and its task forces on matters on which special information was required. I was also authorized to undertake two principal steps with regard to legislative measures and Presidential reorganization plans: First, to have studies made by the committee's staff in order to determine factually the extent to which such measures and plans conform with or differ from the majority recommendations of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government; and, second, to endorse those matters which are, after such studies, so determined to be generally in accord with the recommendations of that Commission. Also, administrative direction of the Citizens Committee and certain other duties were vested in me by the board of directors. There is a widespread demand for analytical material of this sort on the part of our affiliated committees, the press, and Members of Congress. With respect to the 21 reorganization plans currently under discussion in Congress, I instructed the committee's staff to prepare a detailed analysis of each plan in order to determine the extent of its conformance or lack of conformance with the Commission's recommendations. A copy of this analysis, entitled "Circular Letter No. 2," is attached hereto for your information as exhibit B. The analysis discloses that 19 of the 21 reorganization plans submitted by the President are generally in accord with recommendations of the majority of the Hoover Commission. One of the two remaining plans (plan No. 12) only partially so conforms to the recommendations. The status of one other plan (No. 17) is debatable. Circular Letter No. 2 has been given extremely wide currency in the Nation's press. Also, several thousand copies of it have been circularized to our State and local committees, certain members of the committee, cooperating organizations, and other interested persons or groups. In view of the questions which have been raised in connection with this matter, it would be greatly appreciated if this statement could be placed in the record. Respectfully yours, ROBERT L. JOHNSON. (Circular letter exhibit B, referred to is on file with the committee.) Mr. HAROLD LEVENTHAL, EXHIBIT A Ginsberg & Leventhal, Washington, D. C. APRIL 24, 1950. DEAR MR. LEVENTHAL: The Citizens Committee would greatly appreciate it if you, acting as a private citizen, would present the committee's views on Reorganization Plans Nos. 7, 8, 9, and 11 to the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. These plans, in our opinion, conform with the Report of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government and would offer economies and improvements in the public service, while at the same time protecting the integrity of these bipartisan commissions. The Citizens Committee therefore wholeheartedly supports the plans enumerated. Because of your position as a key member of the Task Force on Independent Regulatory Commissions, we believe that you will be able to elaborate on the reasons why these plans should be supported and to state to the Expenditures Committee for us your expert views on this most complicated matter. Please accept my thanks for your assistance. Very truly yours, ROBERT L. JOHNSON. |