finest geographical positions on the whole coast, was crippled by its burning at the hands of the British. Baltimore, on the other hand, made good capital out of shipments of tobacco and flour in its own swift schooners. With more foresight and a few more ships, it was in the power of the British to have blockaded it as effectively as they did in the next war; and to have nipped that budding commerce.

The ports of North Carolina were able to sneak a good many little cargoes in and out. The peculiar coast line has only a few inlets through the great sand barriers, and these are extremely hazardous for large vessels. This aided the colonists and made it almost impossible for the British to check their clandestine trade. Charleston in South Carolina, until captured in 1780, conducted a substantial amount of business, for its indigo was one of the valuable American offerings. It developed a considerable state navy to keep the approaches clear. Savannah's experience was similar, although on a smaller scale.

The risks involved varied frequently, but were generally considerable. Against the already quoted remark that at one time six out of every seven vessels leaving Philadelphia were being captured must be placed the experience of a Newburyport firm that lost only one vessel in thirty voyages to the West Indies. The insurance rates, including both marine and war risks, were as usual a fair barometer, but would probably have been lower had more capital been available. At their best, in 1775, Philadelphia merchants could insure a voyage to Europe for 21⁄2 per cent, little more than ordinary marine rates. By 1781, they were having to pay around 50 per cent on a voyage to Havana, while the Tory shipowners of New York were having to pay the same rate to Jamaica. The normal range during the war lay midway between those extremes-from 20 to 30 per cent. Lloyd's even charged the British government 4 per cent for insuring gold for troop payments conveyed in warships to America. And, too, the profits on successful ventures were excellent. Not everyone could write, as did a Chesapeake merchant in 1777, "Goods are

outside the harbor entrance between Cape Ann and Georges Bank did not prevent a flourishing trade, which often left the warehouses glutted with imports.

Newport, on the other hand, never recovered its colonial prosperity after the British occupation. Some of its former trade shifted to near-by Providence. New London did a fair business until it was burned by Benedict Arnold; but the small boats full of Tory privateersmen crippled New Haven and the other Sound ports. Connecticut got along by selling provisions to the army. As for New York, it had plenty of thriving business after the British occupation, but it was all on loyalist or British account. Before that, the presence of the Royal Navy's Asia, 64 acted as a damper upon its trade.

Philadelphia, which had been the foremost port since 1749, had periods of excellent prosperity, with almost half of the early powder supplies landed there. Its trade was vulnerable, however, because of the bottleneck at the Delaware Capes, which became a favorite lurking place for British cruisers and Tory privateers. Outgoing merchantmen sometimes gathered by the dozens in the river, awaiting a Continental cruiser to convoy them out to sea. For a full year after the British evacuation in 1778, these raiders almost paralyzed Philadelphia's trade. It was said that not one vessel in seven escaped their vigilance; and that flour, salt, and firewood had to be rationed within the city. An embargo on shipping was proposed "to deprive our enemies of their expected prey," but instead the merchants financed a state cruiser to clear the bay. In five months she captured some Tory privateers and recaptured several valuable merchantmen. Her services yielded a clear profit of £449,000, in addition to ensuring that "food, commodities and military stores once more entered the port of Philadelphia in a steady stream." As late as 1781, nevertheless, the Tory privateer Ladies Delight captured seven merchant vessels in Delaware Bay.

The circumstances of the Revolution played a strong part in determining that Baltimore rather than Norfolk would thereafter be the port of Chesapeake Bay. Norfolk, with one of the

finest geographical positions on the whole coast, was crippled by its burning at the hands of the British. Baltimore, on the other hand, made good capital out of shipments of tobacco and flour in its own swift schooners. With more foresight and a few more ships, it was in the power of the British to have blockaded it as effectively as they did in the next war; and to have nipped that budding commerce.

The ports of North Carolina were able to sneak a good many little cargoes in and out. The peculiar coast line has only a few inlets through the great sand barriers, and these are extremely hazardous for large vessels. This aided the colonists and made it almost impossible for the British to check their clandestine trade. Charleston in South Carolina, until captured in 1780, conducted a substantial amount of business, for its indigo was one of the valuable American offerings. It developed a considerable state navy to keep the approaches clear. Savannah's experience was similar, although on a smaller scale.

The risks involved varied frequently, but were generally considerable. Against the already quoted remark that at one time six out of every seven vessels leaving Philadelphia were being captured must be placed the experience of a Newburyport firm that lost only one vessel in thirty voyages to the West Indies. The insurance rates, including both marine and war risks, were as usual a fair barometer, but would probably have been lower had more capital been available. At their best, in 1775, Philadelphia merchants could insure a voyage to Europe for 21⁄2 per cent, little more than ordinary marine rates. By 1781, they were having to pay around 50 per cent on a voyage to Havana, while the Tory shipowners of New York were having to pay the same rate to Jamaica. The normal range during the war lay midway between those extremes-from 20 to 30 per cent. Lloyd's even charged the British government 4 per cent for insuring gold for troop payments conveyed in warships to America. And, too, the profits on successful ventures were excellent. Not everyone could write, as did a Chesapeake merchant in 1777, "Goods are

exceeding scarce here, and will sell at any price a man's conscience will let him take," but profits of 100 per cent, before the insurance had been deducted, were common.

Altogether, the Americans did pretty well to keep themselves supplied with munitions, salt, and luxuries from beyond the seas in view of what the powerful Royal Navy might have done to their trade. It was, however, no time for a nervous man to venture himself or his savings in maritime pursuits. According to a French visitor to Philadelphia in the later years of the war, "There was scarcely a captain, or even a common sailor, who had not been taken six or seven times during the war, nor a merchant who had not been more than once rich and ruined."

Neutral Profits

IN THE GENERAL GLOOM OVER AMERICAN COMMERCE IN THE DISMAL years immediately following the Revolution, the solitary gleam of hope lay in the rumors of a pending Anglo-French conflict. One New York merchant revealed his anticipation of neutral shipping profits in the wishful lines that he penned to his Jamaica correspondent late in 1787: "Should a war (O, horrid war!) take place between Great Britain and France, will not your ports be open to us, and our commerce with you as neutrals be an object of consideration?" Not for over five long years did the hoped-for war materialize, but with it came a tremendous boom to gladden the hearts of American shipping circles. The next years were to see soaring profits and high adventure alongside chronic international complications and warfare against both belligerents. This "heroic age" of our merchant marine was a high point equaled only by the more peaceful "golden age" of the clipper ships a half century later.

The merchants and shipowners of 1787 had good cause to long for such neutral profits. After 1783, the Americans had become foreigners in British eyes. To their chagrin, they found themselves forced to view that self-sufficient empire from the cold outside. This was a galling blow to their pocketbooks. After fighting for eight years to be free from the political implications of membership in the British Empire, they complained bitterly at the loss of the old economic advantages. The imperial divorce had knocked askew the old "sugar triangle," the very foundation of the commerce of the northern and middle colonies.

A depressed and at times desperate undertone ran through the commercial letter books of that period. The new nation was too loosely joined to present a united front for collective bar