Unconvinced that the North Vietnamese intended to cease funneling troops and supplies through eastern Laos and into Vietnam via the trail, U.S. leaders, after a pause, resumed use of the resources of the CIA to support and train Meo and other hill tribesmen, as well as certain of Phoumi's troops. As Admiral Felt observed in July, the "signing of Geneva Agreement will not end struggle. Laos will continue to have pivotal role in future of SE Asia."47 The confrontation over Laos did much to shape current and future developments in South Vietnam. From 1959 through 1962, events in Laos reflected a growing military activism on the part of the Asian Communists, most notably the North Vietnamese. It was matched by growing U.S. determination to resist these advances. But, in the last analysis, the compromise achieved in Laos was less than satisfactory to many American leaders, including top-ranking naval officers. Not only was the Geneva settlement seen as detrimental to South Vietnamese internal security, it was viewed as a psychological blow to Diem's faith in the American commitment. The perceived political failure in Laos greatly stimulated the U.S. effort to aid in the defense of South Vietnam, lest it become another victim of Communist expansion. In each of the Laos crises, naval forces played a major role in the U.S. response through their presence. This show of strength included the deployment of task forces into the South China Sea, multi-ship fleet exercises, symbolic ship visits to Southeast Asian capitals, aerial reconnaissance, military aid, advisory assistance, and the landing of Marine combat forces, as in Thailand during 1962. The confrontation over Laos reaffirmed the conclusion drawn by naval leaders after the Lebanon and Taiwan Strait crises of the late 1950s that a determined stand by U.S. military forces could forestall Communist actions. Specifically, the presence of the Seventh Fleet in the Southeast Asian the Pathet Lao, p. 79; Department of State, A Threat to the Peace: North Vietnam's Effort to Conquer South Vietnam (Washington: GPO, 1961), pt. I, pp. 40-42; Department of State, “Aggression From the North," p. 407; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 151-55; Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Vietnam: The Anti-U.S. Resistance War, pp. 30-32. 47 Msg, CP 180651Z Jul 1962. See also ltr, CNO to Flag and General Officers, of 20 Aug; memos, OP-61 (Acting) to SECNAV, ser 00663P61 of 20 Aug; OP-61 to CNO, ser 00673P61 of 19 Sep; OP-61 to OP-06, ser 00682P61 of 1 Oct; Dommen, Conflict in Laos, pp. 227-30; Stevenson, End of Nowhere, pp. 178-92; Toye, Laos, pp. 187-90; Goldstein, American Policy Toward Laos, pp. 263-68, 28189; Thee, Notes of a Witness, pp. 300-34; Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present (New York: The Free Press, 1977), pp. 148-58. area and its potential for further action were believed by many to have been a primary factor in deterring the Communists from a complete takeover in Laos. The reluctance of political and military leaders alike to commit ground forces aside from the limited deployment of troops to Thailand - was contrasted with the utility of air and naval forces in influencing enemy behavior. But, the repeated shows of force over Laos also revealed to naval leaders that greater efforts were required to provide a fleet capable of sustained combat. As measures were instituted in this regard, steps also were taken to assist the peoples of Southeast Asia in their fight against insurgencies that posed immediate threats to their continued existence. The testing ground for this latter effort was South Vietnam. The Navy, Counterinsurgency, and the Growing Threat in South Vietnam, 1959-1961 Throughout the Laos crises, the United States became increasingly concerned that Southeast Asia was most endangered by Communistinspired insurgency. A number of U.S. leaders were convinced that traditional military actions for dealing with aggression were ill-suited to this threat and they reasoned that the politico-military phenomenon could be successfully countered only through special counter-measures. This approach evolved into the doctrine of "counterinsurgency," which was defined as embodying the "entire scope of military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by or in conjunction with the government of a nation to defeat insurgency. 1 Admiral Felt, the Pacific commander, was an early advocate of preparing U.S. and friendly forces to cope with insurgency. He believed that the key "ingredient" to the economic and political prosperity of a Western-oriented Southeast Asia was "internal security against subversion and its accompanying manifestations of banditry, hunger, devastation and chaos." These ideas were reflected in Operation Plan 32-59, issued by Admiral Felt on 16 December 1959, which was the first comprehensive plan concerned with the defense of Southeast Asia. Although the document considered all forms of Communist aggression, it emphasized that the enemy would "seek to gain their objectives by means other than war, general or limited" by employing “political, economic, diplomatic, and psychological means. . . . Subversion and the fostering of indigenous 'CNO, "Terminology for Counterinsurgency Matters," ser 361P60 of 29 Mar 1962. 2Ltr, Felt to Draper, of 28 Dec 1958. Admiral Felt, when he served on the staff at the Naval War College in the early 1950s, introduced guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare to the curriculum. dissident forces [would] be exploited to the fullest." In contrast to Laos, South Vietnam was not believed in imminent danger. U.S. leaders repeatedly affirmed during 1959 that the insurgency in South Vietnam, spearheaded by an estimated 1,000 to 2,000 guerrillas, was being successfully combatted. In November, Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams, USA, the Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Vietnam, went so far as to state that "MAP arms and training [had] enabled the regular forces of [sic.] Vietnam to reduce the internal communist threat to the point where the economic growth of the country" could proceed.4 This appraisal of Viet Cong strength soon was overtaken by the events of late 1959 and early 1960. Beginning in September 1959, sizeable enemy units attacked government troops and installations, exhibiting aggressiveness and skill in their operations. New intelligence estimates increased the number of armed insurgents to between 3,000 and 5,000. Many of these men infiltrated from North Vietnam, some reportedly by sea. At the same time, assassination of government officials and supporters became epidemic. Conversely, South Vietnamese forces, in general trained in conventional tactics, were increasingly unable to deal with either the guerrilla units or more covert insurgents." These developments prompted a reanalysis of Communist intentions and capabilities and of measures needed to counter the heightened threat to internal security. On 7 March 1960 the U.S. country team, in a lengthy report, detailed the seriousness of the situation. Admiral Felt also was concerned with the deterioration of South Vietnam's stability and the apparent inability of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) to combat successfully Communist guerrilla tactics and subversion of the population. On 14 March, he proposed the development of an antiguerrilla capability within the Vietnamese armed forces by a redirection in training of selected units. The following month, CINCPAC, in response CINCPAC, Operation Plan 32-59, ser 000253 of 16 Dec 1959. See also CINCPAC, Command History, 1959, pp. 37-38; ltr, Hopwood to Burke, of 12 Sep 1959; memos, Kalen to Ricketts, ser 0035P004 of 14 Mar 1959; OP60 to CNO, ser BM96-59 of 19 Mar; OP-60 to CNO, ser BM224-59 of 4 Jun; ser BM420-59 of 12 Sep; Felt, Interview, Vol. II, pp. 577-79. 'Msg, CHMAAGVN 300429Z Nov 1959. See also CINCPAC, Operation Plan 32-59; memos, OP-61 to CNO, ser BM39-56 of 13 Dec 1956; OP-004, ser 000600P004 of 11 Dec; OP-60 to CNO, ser BM224-59 of 4 Jun 1959; OP-612 to OP-06, ser BM35-59 of 25 Jun; OP-61 to OP-06, ser BM49. 59 of 8 Sep; OP-92B1 to OP-06, ser 000624-59 of 8 Sep. 'Msg, AMEMB Saigon of 7 Mar 1960 in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk. 10, pp. 1254-75; bk. 2, pt. IVA.5, pp. 43-48. The Navy, Counterinsurgency, and the Growing Threat in South Vietnam, 1959-1961 Throughout the Laos crises, the United States became increasingly concerned that Southeast Asia was most endangered by Communistinspired insurgency. A number of U.S. leaders were convinced that traditional military actions for dealing with aggression were ill-suited to this threat and they reasoned that the politico-military phenomenon could be successfully countered only through special counter-measures. This approach evolved into the doctrine of "counterinsurgency," which was defined as embodying the "entire scope of military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by or in conjunction with the government of a nation to defeat insurgency. 1 Admiral Felt, the Pacific commander, was an early advocate of preparing U.S. and friendly forces to cope with insurgency. He believed that the key "ingredient" to the economic and political prosperity of a Western-oriented Southeast Asia was "internal security against subversion and its accompanying manifestations of banditry, hunger, devastation and chaos." These ideas were reflected in Operation Plan 32-59, issued by Admiral Felt on 16 December 1959, which was the first comprehensive plan concerned with the defense of Southeast Asia. Although the document considered all forms of Communist aggression, it emphasized that the enemy would "seek to gain their objectives by means other than war, general or limited" by employing “political, economic, diplomatic, and psychological means. . . . Subversion and the fostering of indigenous 'CNO, "Terminology for Counterinsurgency Matters," ser 361P60 of 29 Mar 1962. 2Ltr, Felt to Draper, of 28 Dec 1958. Admiral Felt, when he served on the staff at the Naval War College in the early 1950s, introduced guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare to the curriculum. |