Page images
PDF
EPUB
[graphic][merged small]

Collection of Admiral Arleigh Burke
Leaders of the national defense establishment confer in April 1961. Those present include, left to right: General George H. Decker, Army
Chief of Staff; Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations; General David M. Shoup, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps;
Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (light suit); General Thomas D. White, Air Force Chief of
Staff; Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara; and General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

troops in Vientiane, they could be driven out."15 The members of
Congress briefed on the situation in Laos, including Senators Mike J.
Mansfield, Hubert H. Humphrey, Richard B. Russell, Everett M.
Dirksen, Carl Vinson, and Styles Bridges and Representative Sam
Rayburn were unanimously opposed to intervention in Laos. The
overriding conclusion drawn by the assembled leaders was that Laos was
"a terrible place to fight a war.

16

Of the national leaders present, only Admiral Burke spoke forcefully in favor of a U.S. military stand in Laos." The CNO stated that a failure to act in Laos would result in the eventual, if not immediate, loss of Southeast Asia:

If the Thais and Vietnamese who were fighting against Communism
would come to believe that the United States would not really support
them when it came to a showdown, they would then try to accommodate
themselves eventually...to Communism because they would not have
confidence in the United States coming to their aid if they needed it. 18

Further, the physical control by a friendly regime of southern Laos would enable the North Vietnamese to markedly increase their support of the war in South Vietnam. The admiral observed that "if Laos were Communist, South Vietnam would...have a long border against a Communist nation. This border is a junction border which could not be patrolled and which could not be guarded even to the extent of preventing a minor degree of infiltration of people across borders to South Vietnam.” The Chief of Naval Operations strongly recommended that "regardless of the difficulties of fighting in Laos, regardless of the possibility of escalation of the war, regardless of the possible need to need to use nuclear weapons eventually, and regardless of all of these things we should try to hold the

"CNO, memo for record, ser 000231-61 of 27 Apr 1961.

16 Ibid.

"Admiral Burke has stated that Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson expressed some agreement with the CNO's views. See Arleigh Burke, transcript of interview with Joseph E. O'Connor, John F. Kennedy Library, in Cambridge, MA.

18CNO, memo for record, ser 000231-61 of 27 Apr 1961. See also OP-33, memo for record, ser 00090P33 of 27 Apr 1961; Burke/Ward, transcript of conversation, of 5 May 1961; CINCPAC, Command History, 1961, p. 70; Burke, transcript of conversation with Bob Donovan, New York Herald Tribune, of 7 Jul 1961; Burke, transcript of conversation with Hanson Baldwin, New York Times, of 27 Jun 1961; ltr, Burke to Griffin, of 27 Jul 1961; memo, OP-40 to OP-60, ser BM0009461 of 25 Apr 1961; ltr, CINCPACFLT to CINCPAC, ser 41/000146 of 30 May 1961; Hall, "The Laos Crisis," pp. 68-70.

significant part of Laos, including Vientiane." The admiral concluded by asking, "if we do not fight in Laos, will we fight in Thailand where the situation will be the same sometime in the future as it is now in Laos? Will we fight in Vietnam? Where will we fight? Where do we hold? Where do we draw the line?"19

Although Admiral Burke's views did not prevail, there appeared to be general agreement that the introduction of U.S. forces into South Vietnam or Thailand, if their fall loomed, should be accomplished. Admiral Burke drew two conclusions from the deliberations on 27 April: first, that airlift and airborne operations could not be conducted or supported in enough strength to ensure success in the crucial first stages of a landing; and second, that Laos, unlike South Vietnam and Thailand, "could not be defended and would go down the drain because it didn't have a sea coast.'

,,20

While President Kennedy deferred for twenty-four hours a plan of action regarding Laos, the decision not to intervene had, in effect, been made. The CNO informed Admiral Felt that "after a series of meetings today, I am fearful that we may not execute." Planning now was focused on aiding other Southeast Asian nations which had direct access to the sea. Admiral Burke advised CINCPAC that "we may land about 5,000 Marines in Vietnam and an equal number of Army and Air Force troops in Thailand."21

Despite the general perception that the odds now were against saving Laos from a Communist takeover, the National Security Council continued to explore various solutions to the problem in that country, if only to forestall the direct threat to South Vietnam and Thailand. By early May, hopes were pinned on the success of United Nations and SEATO diplomatic initiatives. But, military options continued to be considered by President Kennedy, including the possible landing of a U.S. force in Thailand in an effort to hasten Communist acceptance of a ceasefire. On 1 May the chief executive, through Secretary of Defense McNamara, specifically queried Admiral Burke as to the readiness of the BLT afloat off Bangkok. The admiral responded that the battalion and the ships in which it was embarked were ready and waiting twelve-hours steaming time from the Thai capital. Due to the fear that an overt demonstration by

19CNO, memo for record, ser 000231-61 of 27 Apr 1961.

20 Ibid.

21Msg, CNO 280133Z Apr 1961. See also msg, CNO 271905Z Apr 1961.

the United States would upset the ceasefire negotiations, however, this military measure was not undertaken.2

22

Ceasefire in Laos

Although the Pathet Lao continued to engage in sporadic attacks in the first days of May, and seized the strategically important town of Tchepone near the South Vietnamese border, the military pressure on Vientiane, Luang Prabang, and the other major population centers eased. The reasons for this development were many. While the Kennedy administration decided against intervention in Laos and deferred possible landings in South Vietnam and Thailand, the Communists had reason to fear these initiatives. The resolve of SEATO member nations was demonstrated by the well-publicized Pony Express exercise, which was the largest combined SEATO maneuver to date; and the U.S. contingent of the SEATO Field Forces command was activated in the Philippines. The United States additionally took visible unilateral steps indicating its determination. These included the transfer of helicopters to friendly forces in Laos and the establishment of the Marine helicopter support base at Udorn, close by the Laotian border. On 19 April, the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Laos, was formally established. In the meantime, material and advisory assistance to the FAR increased significantly, and the Seventh Fleet was poised and ready in the South China Sea, within striking distance of the mainland, with its carrier aircraft and amphibious forces.

Conversely, it seemed likely that a ceasefire would leave the Pathet Lao and their supporters in a position of strength. The North Vietnamese then would possess a supply route to South Vietnam, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and the Pathet Lao would retain the capability to complete the destruction government forces and seizure of the government. These factors

of

22At the same time, Vice President Lyndon Johnson received a briefing by Commander Harry C. Allendorfer, Jr. and Lieutenant (j.g.) S.E. Wood of the Flag Plot Branch in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The briefers revealed that the Vice President's "mind is not made up as to what is the best course of action but he seemed to lean towards taking a stand against Communism in some place other than Laos." Memo, Britten to Burke, of 1 May 1961. See also OP-33, memos for record, ser 00092P33 of 28 Apr; 00093P33 of 29 Apr; 00084P33 of 29 Apr; 00095P33 of 1 May; 00098P33 of 1 May; memo, SECSTATE to PRES, of 1 May; CNO, memo for record, ser 000240-61 of 2 May; Hall, "The Crisis in Laos," pp. 70-72; U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk. 11, pp. 62-66; Stevenson, End of Nowhere, pp. 149-53; Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 643-47; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 334-40.

apparently led the Pathet Lao to agree, on 3 May, to meet with Laotian government officials to arrange a ceasefire.23

As these negotiations began, U.S. Pacific forces adjusted to the changing situation. In order to obtain some indication of the amount of military support flowing to the Pathet Lao, CINCPAC requested permission to conduct aerial photographic reconnaissance over key areas in Laos. Following State and Defense Department concurrence, on 3 May the Joint Chiefs authorized the use of Seventh Fleet aircraft. The sorties, conducted between 4 and 8 May, provided valuable information on the Communist military presence in Laos.24

On 8 May, five days after the interested parties announced that a ceasefire was agreed to, Pacific naval commanders gradually relaxed once again their high state of operational readiness. Admiral Griffin ordered Coral Sea to depart her station in the South China Sea and put in at Subic for replenishment and relief on 13 May by Bon Homme Richard. The following day, 9 May, Commander Seventh Fleet directed the Amphibious Ready Group to leave the Gulf of Siam and sail for Subic for a much needed rest, while remaining on twelve-hours steaming notice. Once there, the 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, would be relieved by the 3rd Battalion of the regiment. The latter unit became the new BLT afloat in Thetis Bay, Paul Revere, and Monticello. And, on the 12th, Admiral Griffin ordered the Task Force 76 elements which assembled in Subic after completion of Pony Express, to sail for Okinawa. Two days later, CINCPAC officially relaxed the alert condition of the forces slated for the Laos operation. Nevertheless, the Seventh Fleet commander was confident that his forces could be quickly concentrated again. He observed:

79.

With good luck and sufficient time before the [next] "flap," we can pick up the pieces, reassemble MGEN Weller's [Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division] scattered BLT's offload and unscramble the [various] contingency and exercise cargoes in TF 76 ships and fall in, ready to jump again in an orderly fashion if directed.25

23 Lee, Communist China's Policy Toward Laos, pp. 7-8, 86-87, 91; Hall, “The Crisis in Laos," pp. 172

24Wheeler to Burke, transcript of telecon, of 4 May 1961; msgs, CTG77.6 070553Z May 1961; 101415Z; 111334Z; CP, Command History, 1961, pp. 63-64.

25Msg, COM7FLT 180808Z May 1961. See also msgs, 050726Z May 1961; CPFLT 050927Z; 060239Z; 062144Z; COM7FLT 070452Z; 070506Z; 071506Z; 080250Z; 080358Z; 090746Z; 090916Z; COM7FLT 111342Z; 121018Z; 121144Z; CP, Command History, 1961, pp. 96-97; Kerby, "American Military Airlift," pp. 7-8.

« PreviousContinue »