The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict: From military assistance to ...

Confrontation Over Laos,

1961-1962

The continuing crisis in Laos during early 1961 appeared no nearer to solution than it was in the previous year. Increasingly disenchanted with General Phoumi's leadership, U.S. diplomatic officials began to seek suitable substitutes from the center of the Laotian political spectrum. This reassessment of U.S. policy coincided with the advent of the Kennedy administration, which was critical of unsuccessful U.S. actions to establish a viable pro-Western government in Laos or to retard the spread of Communist influence. The new administration eventually adopted a policy toward Laos that was in many ways dissimilar to that of its predecessor. Basic to the new concept was an emphasis on bilateral U.S.-Soviet efforts to establish Laos as a truly neutral buffer state. But convincing the Soviets of the strength of the U.S. position in Laos first required the reestablishment by the Royal Laotian Government of firm military and political control over much of the population. It was recognized that this objective could not be attained without a substantial increase in military assistance and political support by the United States. But, in contrast with the previous emphasis on unilateral actions, the Kennedy administration also stressed the importance of cooperation with the SEATO and pro-Western Southeast Asian nations.'

'CNO, memos for record, ser 030-61 of 10 Jan 1961; ser 0050-61 of 24 Jan; ser 00052-61 of 25 Jan; msgs, CP 070320Z Jan 1961; 092055Z; Stevenson, End of Nowhere, pp. 128-42; Fall, Anatomy of a Crisis, pp. 159-61; David K. Hall, "The Laos Crisis, 1960-61" in Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy; Laos, Cuba, Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), pp. 42-51; Goldstein, American Policy Toward Laos, pp. 236-44; Toye, Laos, pp. 166-67; Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 127-33.

U.S. Military Assistance to the Laotian Armed Forces and the March Alert

Although the military situation in Laos was static during January and February 1961, the respite for government forces was only temporary. CINCPAC reported at the beginning of March that the Communist forces defending the Plain of Jars were at the receiving end of a constant flow of supplies by way of Soviet airlift and road transportation from North Vietnam. He added that the "volume of this Commie supply effort obviously greater than needed to sustain [Pathet Lao] in defensive posture." This conclusion led the commander of U.S. Pacific forces to state: "It needs to be repeated again and again that the only way to save Laos now is by successful military action."2

To consider ways to strengthen the FAR, a meeting was called on 9 March at the White House, with the President, State and Defense Department, CIA, and other administration officials in attendance. Admiral Felt also flew in from Hawaii to present his observations in person. As if to reinforce the critical nature of the group's task, the Pathet Lao opened an attack on 6 March. By the time of the meeting, they had thrown Phoumi's forces back from the Plain of Jars in total disarray. At the Washington meeting, President Kennedy approved seventeen measures of support to improve Phoumi's military position.

Of most concern to the Navy was the President's authorization for the transfer to the CIA in Laos of sixteen (later reduced to fourteen) Marine H-34 helicopters crewed with U.S. military volunteers, half of whom were Marines and the other half from the Army and the Navy. This contingent would be supported by 300 Marine maintenance personnel to be deployed to Thailand. The new Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, assigned this task the highest priority and the Navy made urgent efforts to comply with the directive. In March 1961, the first increment in the helicopter transfer was airlifted from Hawaii to Thailand. On the 18th, CINCPAC ordered a further airlift of the 300 maintenance men of Marine Air Base Squadron 16 from Futema, Okinawa, to Udorn, Thailand. On 22 March, the first elements of the Marine unit arrived at their destination and established facilities to support subsequent helicopter

2Msg, CP 012300Z Mar 1961. See also CNO, memo for record, ser 000122-61 of 24 Feb 1961; msg, CP 290340Z Jan 1961.

'Hall, "The Laos Crisis," pp. 51-58.

operations in Laos. Naval Supply Depot, Yokosuka, Japan, and later the naval facility at Oakland, California, were designated as the supply sources for spare parts and other necessary aircraft material. Simultaneously, Admiral Byng's carrier task group, with Bennington and her two escorts, Braine (DD-630) and Cogswell (DD-651), proceeded to the Gulf of Siam for the helicopter transfer. The helicopters were flown off Bennington on the 28th.

Before this additional assistance arrived, however, Phoumi's war effort showed further disintegration in the face of renewed Communist attacks. Late on 19 March, Admiral Felt once again placed Joint Task Force 116 and its supporting forces in a heightened state of readiness. The following day, Major General Donald M. Weller, USMC, received orders to assemble his staff in Okinawa and activate the command. As in previous alerts, much of the Seventh Fleet was concentrated in the South China Sea. These preliminary measures paid off when, late on the 21st, CINCPAC ordered a readiness state just short of the condition where intervention was deemed imminent. In the next several days, additional ships and men of Admiral Griffin's Seventh Fleet converged on this troubled area. Rear Admiral Frank B. Miller's Lexington task group headed for a rendezvous with Midway and her escorts 200 miles off Danang. Working together, the carrier groups formed Task Force 77, under Rear Admiral Miller's command, to provide necessary air support for the Laos operation. Other air support was provided by shore-based aircraft from Sangley Point in the Philippines, which conducted air early warning patrols for the carrier task force. VMA 212, which deployed earlier to Cubi Point, went to maximum alert in preparation for employment from either a carrier or an airfield on the Southeast Asian mainland. Commander Seventh Fleet also ordered the immediate transfer from Naval Air Station, Atsugi, Japan, to Cubi Point of Marine Fighter Squadron (VMF) 312 and VMF 154 with their thirty-four F8U-1E Crusader aircraft.

Additional naval strength was gathered from other reaches of the Pacific. One element was the 1st Marine Brigade, which was embarking on board Amphibious Squadron 7 ships in Hawaii for scheduled participation in Exercise Green Light off the California coast. Admiral

'Memos, OP-06, of 10 Mar 1961; Bundy to Brown, of 20 Mar; Laos Task Force to CNO, ser 00039P33 of 21 Mar; ser 00046P33 of 28 Mar; msgs, CNO 162139Z Mar 1961; CP 171935Z; COM7FLT 191430Z; ADMINO CP 242120Z; CNO 040045Z Apr; CPFLT 180316Z; CP 190003Z; CHJCS 210920Z; Kerby, "American Military Airlift," p. 6.

U.S. Military Assistance to the Laotian Armed Forces and the March Alert

Although the military situation in Laos was static during January and February 1961, the respite for government forces was only temporary. CINCPAC reported at the beginning of March that the Communist forces defending the Plain of Jars were at the receiving end of a constant flow of supplies by way of Soviet airlift and road transportation from North Vietnam. He added that the "volume of this Commie supply effort obviously greater than needed to sustain [Pathet Lao] in defensive posture." This conclusion led the commander of U.S. Pacific forces to state: "It needs to be repeated again and again that the only way to save Laos now is by successful military action."2

To consider ways to strengthen the FAR, a meeting was called on 9 March at the White House, with the President, State and Defense Department, CIA, and other administration officials in attendance. Admiral Felt also flew in from Hawaii to present his observations in person. As if to reinforce the critical nature of the group's task, the Pathet Lao opened an attack on 6 March. By the time of the meeting, they had thrown Phoumi's forces back from the Plain of Jars in total disarray. At the Washington meeting, President Kennedy approved seventeen measures of support to improve Phoumi's military position.3

Of most concern to the Navy was the President's authorization for the transfer to the CIA in Laos of sixteen (later reduced to fourteen) Marine H-34 helicopters crewed with U.S. military volunteers, half of whom were Marines and the other half from the Army and the Navy. This contingent would be supported by 300 Marine maintenance personnel to be deployed to Thailand. The new Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, assigned this task the highest priority and the Navy made urgent efforts to comply with the directive. In March 1961, the first increment in the helicopter transfer was airlifted from Hawaii to Thailand. On the 18th, CINCPAC ordered a further airlift of the 300 maintenance men of Marine Air Base Squadron 16 from Futema, Okinawa, to Udorn, Thailand. On 22 March, the first elements of the Marine unit arrived at their destination and established facilities to support subsequent helicopter

2Msg, CP 012300Z Mar 1961. See also CNO, memo for record, ser 000122-61 of 24 Feb 1961; msg, CP 290340Z Jan 1961.

'Hall, "The Laos Crisis," pp. 51-58.

!

operations in Laos. Naval Supply Depot, Yokosuka, Japan, and later the naval facility at Oakland, California, were designated as the supply sources for spare parts and other necessary aircraft material. Simultaneously, Admiral Byng's carrier task group, with Bennington and her two escorts, Braine (DD-630) and Cogswell (DD-651), proceeded to the Gulf of Siam for the helicopter transfer. The helicopters were flown off Bennington on the 28th.

Before this additional assistance arrived, however, Phoumi's war effort showed further disintegration in the face of renewed Communist attacks. Late on 19 March, Admiral Felt once again placed Joint Task Force 116 and its supporting forces in a heightened state of readiness. The following day, Major General Donald M. Weller, USMC, received orders to assemble his staff in Okinawa and activate the command. As in previous alerts, much of the Seventh Fleet was concentrated in the South China Sea. These preliminary measures paid off when, late on the 21st, CINCPAC ordered a readiness state just short of the condition where intervention was deemed imminent. In the next several days, additional ships and men of Admiral Griffin's Seventh Fleet converged on this troubled area. Rear Admiral Frank B. Miller's Lexington task group headed for a rendezvous with Midway and her escorts 200 miles off Danang. Working together, the carrier groups formed Task Force 77, under Rear Admiral Miller's command, to provide necessary air support for the Laos operation. Other air support was provided by shore-based aircraft from Sangley Point in the Philippines, which conducted air early warning patrols for the carrier task force. VMA 212, which deployed earlier to Cubi Point, went to maximum alert in preparation for employment from either a carrier or an airfield on the Southeast Asian mainland. Commander Seventh Fleet also ordered the immediate transfer from Naval Air Station, Atsugi, Japan, to Cubi Point of Marine Fighter Squadron (VMF) 312 and VMF 154 with their thirty-four F8U-1E Crusader aircraft.

Additional naval strength was gathered from other reaches of the Pacific. One element was the 1st Marine Brigade, which was embarking on board Amphibious Squadron 7 ships in Hawaii for scheduled participation in Exercise Green Light off the California coast. Admiral

'Memos, OP-06, of 10 Mar 1961; Bundy to Brown, of 20 Mar; Laos Task Force to CNO, ser 00039P33 of 21 Mar; ser 00046P33 of 28 Mar; msgs, CNO 162139Z Mar 1961; CP 171935Z; COM/FLT 191430Z; ADMINO CP 242120Z; CNO 040045Z Apr; CPFLT 180316Z; CP 190003Z; CHJCS 210920Z; Kerby, "American Military Airlift," p. 6.

Books