that "any preparatory actions for additional Navy participation in South Vietnam action be taken with the objective of having this Naval activity remain under control of CINCPACFLT rather than having it transferred to some other command, such as COMUSMACV."25

On 11 March 1965 Commander Seventh Fleet inaugurated the U.S.South Vietnamese coastal patrol operation, soon designated Market Time, when he directed Admiral Miller to dispatch two of his destroyers to the coastal surveillance zone. Higbee (DD-806) and Black (DD-666) proceeded to the South Vietnamese coast between Hue and Nha Trang to monitor maritime traffic. SP-2Hs from Patrol Squadron 2, based at Tan Son Nhut, also began their daily flights over the coast. On the 15th, President Johnson gave formal approval to the U.S.-South Vietnamese anti-infiltration operation in the waters off South Vietnam. That same day, Admiral Blackburn activated the Vietnam Patrol Force (Task Force 71). By the end of March, ten Seventh Fleet ships patrolled the coastal waters in conjunction with five SP-2Hs and five A-1Hs.26

During this period, the combined U.S.-Vietnamese coastal surveillance force experienced both the satisfactions and frustrations that characterized Market Time operations in succeeding years. Early in March, units of South Vietnamese Coastal Division 11 intercepted a thirty-two-foot junk unloading cargo just south of the DMZ. The surprised crew quickly scuttled their vessel. After interrogating the captured crewmen and salvaging the junk's cargo, the South Vietnamese determined that this boat was part of North Vietnam's infiltration effort. Contraband recovered included Chinese rifles, ammunition, explosives, grenades, and other supplies. On the 18th, Higbee sighted another suspicious trawler. This contact was reported to the Naval Advisory Group, which immediately passed the communication to Vietnamese naval headquarters. Within ten minutes the captain of Higbee learned that the ship was cleared of suspicion by the South Vietnamese. The following day an RA-3B from Hancock, on an aerial photographic mission, spotted a coastal freighter near Cape Ke Ga, but the South Vietnamese refused to investigate since their patrol craft already had passed through the area and seen nothing. Nearby, on the 20th, other U.S. aircraft were fired on from two junks near Trau Island. South Vietnamese Skyraiders attacked the vessels as Buck (DD-761) and

25 OP-09A, memo, ser 000120P09 of 9 Mar 1965.

26

Higbee, Buck (DD-761), Pluck (MSO-464), Pivot (MSO-463), Radford (DD-446), Nicholas (DDE449), Phoebe (MSC-199), Peacock (MSC-198), Widgeon (MSC-208), and Vireo (MSC-205).

An SP-2 Neptune patrol plane of Operation Market Time visually inspects a junk in the South Vietnamese coastal waters off Vung Tau.

two South Vietnamese units converged on the scene. When friendly forces reached one of the heavily damaged junks, they found that twenty-one of the thirty-four persons on board were dead as a result of the attack. Three of them were South Vietnamese troops, indicating the difficulty of differentiating between friends and enemies. On the 28th, Coastal Division 33 approached a large, black, steel-hulled ship in the Dai River and the suspicious vessel immediately departed the area at high speed. Although Radford, Nicholas (DDE-449), and several other Market Time ships searched for the unidentified vessel, it was not located.

From this modest beginning, the U.S.-South Vietnamese Market Time program burgeoned in succeeding years, becoming a highly sophisticated anti-infiltration operation. The U.S. surface force eventually comprised destroyers, destroyer escorts, minesweepers, Swift boats, patrol gunboats, LSTs, and Coast Guard ships. SP-2s, P-5B Marlin seaplanes, and PVA Orions flying from South Vietnam and the Philippines provided aut surveillance. Coordination and tactical control was enhanced by a refined system of radar and communications-equipped coastal surveillance center located at key sites along the South Vietnamese littoral In addition, beginning in April, the coastal patrol received support from the P1 of the 34A maritime force, based in Danang, which now were ren toward a greater emphasis on anti-infiltration and intelligence to above and below the 17th parallel.27

The Seventh Fleet Lands the Marines at Damang

Even as the Market Time patrol took shaper, steps work taban la ilu Navy and Marines to establish a major presence whore of condon has

27Erdheim, Market Time, pp 4-6. 85. CVOMOT 1965," pp. 26-30; COM FLT, Command Havn FY1965, p. 19; CINCPAC, Command Hwony

15, 24-16-24-35; R.L. Schreacies. The New Vis (May 1971), pp. 186-91; COM FLY Berry but might des

Flag Plot, "Summary of Briefing wms

34, memo, ser 00175-65 of 16 MX WHET

172-73; CNO, "Vietnam Chronde va State, "Aggression From the org

COMUSMACV, CPFLT 22 Fe

the Army, "The Role of Camos a t Krisel, "Special Marine Opens a 31.

Behind this decision in March 1965 was a complex series of policy discussions. As early as August 1964, military commanders considered the deployment of ground troops to defend American installations in South Vietnam. That action was not taken, however, due in part to the assurances of CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT that the Marine Special Landing Force and airborne forces on Okinawa could rush to the defense of Danang, Bien Hoa, and Tan Son Nhut airfields should the need arise. After the Bien Hoa attack in November 1964, the issue reappeared. At that time the JCS gave consideration to landing units of the Special Landing Force at Danang and another force near Saigon. Admiral Sharp cautioned, however, that while U.S. troops "would enhance security [at South Vietnamese airfields] they will not solve the problem" of the worsening internal military situation.28 In the fall of 1964, Admiral Sharp and Admiral Moorer concurred in the need for enhanced defensive measures, but they were less concerned with the actions of local guerrillas than by the North Vietnamese and Chinese threat. Intent as they were on prosecuting the war against North Vietnam, these naval leaders were especially anxious to protect Danang, long considered in contingency plans as a strategic site and the base from which many actions against the North Vietnamese were launched. From that port and airfield complex, U.S. Air Force and Marine aircraft provided the Yankee Team and Barrel Roll operations in Laos with fighter, SAR, and other support and from there the South Vietnamese-manned 34A maritime force set out on their missions to the North. Although a company-size Marine security detachment reached the area in December 1964 and were joined there by the Marine Hawk missile battalion two months later, by early 1965 Danang remained a visible and vulnerable symbol of the U.S. commitment to defend South Vietnam.

While the two admirals realized the strategic importance of the base and sought to ensure its defense, they were reluctant to introduce large American ground forces into South Vietnam. For example, in October 1964, when the JCS proposed the use of the SLF to counter a suspected but never attempted Viet Cong offensive against Quang Ngai city, seventy-five miles southeast of Danang, Admiral Moorer cautioned that "prior to any landing of U.S. Marines, every effort should be made to

28Msg, CP 020400Z Nov 1964. See also Shulimson and Johnson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, p. xii; Sharp, Interview, Vol. I, pp. 234, 235, 242; msgs, CP 170530Z Aug 1964; COMUSMACV 150123Z; 021114Z Nov.