During 1964 the North Vietnamese greatly stepped up their infiltration by sea into South Vietnam but this surge remained unsubstantiated until early 1965. Then, on the morning of 16 February, a U.S. Army helicopter pilot made a discovery that had a profound effect on this situation. Flying several hundred feet above the coast south of Qui Nhon, the officer sighted a camouflaged ship close to the shore in Vung Ro, a bay in central Vietnam. He reported his finding to the 2nd Coastal District Senior Advisor at Nha Trang, Lieutenant Commander Harvey P. Rodgers, who immediately notified Lieutenant Commander Ho Van Ky Thoai, the South Vietnamese coastal district commander. South Vietnamese Skyraiders soon were dispatched to the bay, where they capsized and sank the enemy trawler. Nonetheless, a substantial amount of the ship's cargo already was unloaded and stacked at various points on shore.

To destroy the contraband and scour the area for the enemy, the South Vietnamese command ordered a search by ground troops, salvage of the ship's cargo by Vietnamese LDNN commandos, and additional air strikes for that night. However, the local province chief temporarily disapproved use of his troops, fearing that the enemy was too strong around the bay. And the requested air force planes never arrived overhead. The next day, however, air strikes were carried out against supply caches ashore. South Vietnamese escort Chi Lang II and LSM Tien Giang (HQ-405), the latter with a paramilitary regional force company on board, also made several attempts to enter the bay, but the Viet Cong drove them back with small arms fire. Further delays on the part of the South Vietnamese resulted in inaction on the 18th.

Finally, after three days and nights, during which time the enemy was free to secure many of the supplies already ashore, the South Vietnamese landed in the bay. Early on the morning of the 19th, following a largely inaccurate napalm air strike on suspected enemy positions, submarine chaser Tuy Dong, Chi Lang II, and Tien Giang closed the beach, only to meet heavy machine gun and small arms fire, 500 to 800 yards offshore, that forced a withdrawal. The flotilla tried again at 1035 but withdrew after pouring 3-inch and 20-millimeter fire into the Viet Cong positions. A third attempt was successful. The troops in this operation landed at 1100 and by 1515 were able to secure the area around the ship and to evaluate

the extent of the enemy's supply cache. Then, fifteen LDNN and their SEAL advisor, Lieutenant Franklin W. Anderson, retrieved supplies from the sunken wreck.

19

These forces found the largest concentration of Viet Cong munitions and supplies discovered to date. The 130-foot ship and a jungle area the size of three football fields contained 100 tons of Russian and Chinesemade weapons, ammunition, explosives, and medical supplies. From papers retrieved by the divers, it was clear that the trawler was North Vietnamese. There also were indications that previous deliveries had been made to the bay.

The discovery of the enemy trawler in Vung Ro made a significant impression on senior officers. Vice Admiral Paul P. Blackburn, Jr., only recently assigned as Commander Seventh Fleet, observed:

Although there have been numerous unconfirmed reports of sea
infiltration in the past, none of these have been verified. The event at
Vung Ro Bay, however, is considered to be positive proof that sea
infiltration is occurring and raises the strong possibility that at least a
portion of the unconfirmed reports of the past were, in fact, true. Sea
infiltration into RVN is now proved.20

General Westmoreland fully shared the admiral's views, and he pressed for the reinstitution of a U.S. anti-infiltration patrol in conjunction with the South Vietnamese, who as yet were unable to mount an effective effort. Indeed, their poor showing at Vung Ro reaffirmed previous observations by U.S. naval advisors that the South Vietnamese coastal operation was inadequate.

Although the Vung Ro incident had a definite influence on the decision to undertake a combined U.S.-South Vietnamese coastal patrol, other stimuli also were at work. One of these was the new stress on isolating the southern battleground from outside sources of support. Additionally, Admiral Moorer observed that "it seems clear that our national policy

19The total included 1 million rounds of small arms ammunition, 3,500 to 4,000 rifles and submachine guns, 500 pounds of TNT, 2,000 mortar rounds, 1,500 grenades, 1,500 rounds of recoilless rifle ammunition, 1 57-millimeter recoilless rifle, and 17 machine guns of various caliber. 20Msg, COM7FLT 141500Z Mar 1965. This conclusion, however, still was not universally accepted. Even in March 1965, for example, the Secretary of the Navy and CNO continued to express skepticism that coastal infiltration was substantial. See CNO, "Vietnam Chronicle," Vol. I, "Sea Surveillance, Market Time," 1965.

towards SVN is shifting from one in which we attempted to maintain an 'advisory' image in SVN to one of active and overt U.S. participation.” He advised Admiral McDonald that the fleet was "on the scene with the capability and if our efforts are needed we are ready to go."2 In addition to using naval forces for coastal patrol, Admiral Moorer noted that his Pacific Fleet units could take strong action to aid the South Vietnamese with shore bombardment, aerial mining, UDT inshore activities, over-thebeach logistic support, amphibious lift for South Vietnamese troops, submarine reconnaissance, and naval air strikes against the Viet Cong. Admiral Moorer wanted to "confirm the President's reported belief that the Navy offers the most effective and uncomplicated means to bring pressure to bear in the [Southeast Asian] area." He informed Admiral McDonald, "unless you feel to the contrary, I will push in this direction."22

On 9 March, one day before Admiral Moorer forwarded his recommendations to Washington, General Westmoreland and Rear Admiral Roger W. Mehle, Director of the Strike Warfare Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, arrived on board Ranger, Commander Task Force 77's flagship, to discuss naval participation in the war with Admiral Miller. The general suggested that carrier aircraft operating from Yankee Station conduct aerial reconnaissance of suspected enemy ammunition and supply caches in Quang Ngai Province. Once the Viet Cong were found, attack aircraft could immediately be directed to strike the targets. On the following day, the Seventh Fleet received approval to use its carrier-based air units against enemy forces in South Vietnam. Reflecting the change in direction of the Southeast Asian war, air operations in the South then were given priority over those in Laos and North Vietnam. The actual commitment of Seventh Fleet aircraft, however, was delayed until the land-based air forces under COMUSMACV proved unable to handle the growing number of combat missions and until a fourth aircraft carrier was deployed to the Western Pacific at the end of the month. In April, for the first time, the fleet lent its air support to the war in the South with a strike by Midway, Coral Sea, and Yorktown (CVS-10) aircraft on Viet Cong positions northwest of Saigon. For the next sixteen months, similar in-country operations were launched

21 Msg, CPFLT 100023Z Mar 1965.

22 Ibid.

An F-4 Phantom II from aircraft carrier Midway (CVA-41), deployed at Dixie Station, bombs Viet Cong positions in South Vietnam.

from a new operating area southeast of Cam Ranh Bay, at 11°N 110°E, known as Dixie Station.23

Another purpose of the meeting on board Ranger was to complete planning for the U.S.-South Vietnamese coastal patrol. General Westmoreland informed the naval officers present that "he needed help from all the resources in the...area in order to beat the VC military machine and to inspire or shame the Vietnamese, particularly the [navy], into doing a better job, since they were about the worst of the three services in VN."24

23 CINCPACFLT, "Naval Operations against North Vietnam, August 1964-May 1968," p. 7; CINCPAC, Command History, 1965, Vol. II, pp. 325, 414, 420-21; msg, CPFLT 100023Z Mar

24 Msg, CPFLT 100023Z Mar 1965.

By this time, representatives of the Naval Advisory Group, the Seventh Fleet, and the Vietnamese Navy had developed an overall concept of operations for the coastal patrol, including command relationships, rules of engagement, division of operational areas and responsibilities, and a myriad of other details. Initially, the U.S. Navy planned to implement its new coastal surveillance role in stages. However, General Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff, who was undertaking an important fact-finding mission to Saigon for the President, voiced criticism of this incremental approach. As a result, the Navy elected on 11 March to begin a full program immediately.

As finally established, the Seventh Fleet conducted the coastal patrol with 3 or 4 destroyers, 6 minesweepers, 3 to 5 shore-based SP-2H Neptune reconnaissance aircraft, and 3 carrier-based A-1 Hs. Carrier photographic reconnaissance planes also overflew coastal areas. In conjunction with 16 South Vietnamese coastal patrol craft and 100 junks, the U.S. units established a barrier at the 17th parallel and eight patrol areas along the entire coast. The area covered extended forty miles out to sea. The SP-2s carried out a daily patrol from Tan Son Nhut Airfield on the outskirts of Saigon. The A-1Hs scanned the coast between Cape Ke Ga and the DMZ. Both groups of naval aircraft gave special attention to ten likely enemy landing spots.

U.S. patrol ships and aircraft used visual search, their radar, and other electronic equipment to detect and track suspicious contacts of trawler size and vector South Vietnamese ships to them. But, only South Vietnamese personnel were authorized to board, search, or seize suspected infiltrating vessels, and then only within the three-mile territorial limit (later changed to twelve miles). To enhance coordination and radio communication, Vietnamese naval personnel accompanied U.S. ships and land-based aircraft. At the same time, U.S. naval advisors sailed with South Vietnamese units.

U.S. naval units, both surface and air, were organized as the Seventh Fleet's Vietnam Patrol Force. To coordinate that force with COMUSMACV's efforts, U.S. naval officers responsible for tactical control in an operating area established liaison with the Saigon headquarters and the Vietnamese Navy through the Naval Advisory Group and five Coastal Surveillance Centers at Danang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Vung Tau, and An Thoi. This command relationship was influenced by guidance from the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Horacio Rivero, who advised