19 September. Pacific commanders continually urged that the pressure on North Vietnam to desist from its militant policies not be lessened. At the same time, however, concern grew in Washington that U.S. actions in the gulf might escalate the conflict. As a result, the administration cancelled the patrol proposed for mid-August. The September cruise of Morton and Richard S. Edwards was authorized, but the ships had orders to sail farther from the hostile coast than before. The confusing results of that patrol fostered greater caution. No additional Desoto Patrols were approved, and during the remainder of the year the strength of the U.S. naval presence off North Vietnam diminished markedly. Thus, from a military standpoint, the naval actions in August and September proved anticlimactic. Their real significance was to inspire the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which to many Americans marked the beginning of the war in Southeast Asia. Preparations for an Expanded Throughout the latter months of 1964, as the Navy improved the combat readiness of its Pacific Fleet forces, U.S. policymakers considered the direction of American policy in Southeast Asia. Despite the North Vietnamese naval attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin and the American retaliation, the basic American approaches to ending North Vietnamese support of the war in South Vietnam and Laos did not change. These events merely intensified the debate between those who believed that the problem could be resolved by placing the primary focus on actions within South Vietnam as opposed to leaders, such as Ambassador Taylor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCPAC, and CINCPACFLT, who inclined toward increasing military pressures against the North. Despite this difference in emphasis, there was general agreement among American leaders of the need for an overall increase in the nation's military efforts in Southeast Asia. By the fall of 1964, the various measures to deter North Vietnam were embodied in CINCPAC Operation Plan 37-65.' Among the documents used as a basis for the new strategic guide was Admiral Felt's Operation Plan 33, promulgated in 1963, and his Operation Plan 37-64. Also integrated into the new plan was COMUSMACV's Operation Plan 34A, which detailed the maritime and other covert activities against North Vietnam. The refined strategic appreciation, which was entitled "Military Actions to Stabilize the Situation in RVN and/or Laos," embraced "all actions and force options designed to cause the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) to cease and desist in its support of communist insurgency in Laos and RVN."2 The JCS approved the plan on 7 August 1964. 'CINCPAC, Command History, 1964, p. 53. 2 Ibid. As in the earlier Operation Plan 37-64, three increasingly severe phases of military action were outlined. They were (1) border control operations in the South Vietnam-Cambodia-Laos border areas, which entailed activities to interdict enemy infiltration; (2) "tit-for-tat" reprisals against targets in North Vietnam in the form of one-time bombing strikes, commando raids, and aerial mining of major ports; and (3) a systematic air campaign against North Vietnamese military and industrial resources. In this latter stage, the objective was not just to diminish the enemy's will to fight, but also his physical capability to support the war in the South. Appended to Operation Plan 37 was a comprehensive list of ninety-four targets in North Vietnam considered to be crucial to the enemy's warmaking ability and his sustenance of the insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos. Grouped into five categories, the targets included airfields, transportation assets, military installations and logistic facilities, industrial plants, and targets of opportunity along lines of communication. The Pierce Arrow strikes of August 1964 already made use of the information developed in the "94 target list" to locate and hit the North Vietnamese coastal flotilla. Operation Plan 37, with its targeting annex, eventually became the vehicle by which U.S. naval forces conducted the bombing campaign against North Vietnam in early 1965. Several other actions that were not listed in Operation Plan 37, but which were intended to exert subtle pressure on the North Vietnamese, were recommended within two weeks of the Tonkin incidents. At that time, Admiral Sharp proposed a landing exercise in South Vietnam by the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. In addition to its possible psychological influence on Hanoi, CINCPAC felt that this landing would offer excellent training for naval and Marine Corps amphibious forces. Secondly, the admiral suggested the creation of a major U.S. base in South Vietnam that "would provide one more indication of our intent to remain in [Southeast Asia] until our objectives are achieved. . . . By an acknowledged concrete U.S. commitment, beyond the advisory effort, it informs the communists that an overt attack on the RVN would be regarded as a threat to U.S. forces."3 Because of its accessibility from the air and sea, port facilities, and strategic location, Admiral Sharp saw Danang as the optimum location for that base. Although neither of these proposals was approved at the time, the use of an expanded American military presence 3Msg, CP 170530Z Aug 1964. 1 on South Vietnamese soil to deter or counter Communist actions was adopted in early 1965.4 At the end of September 1964, CINCPACFLT forwarded his overall appraisal of the alternatives available to the United States in resolving the Vietnam conflict. Admiral Moorer viewed a total disengagement from South Vietnam as unlikely unless there was a greater deterioration of the internal situation. The more probable course of action envisioned by the admiral had the United States exerting greater influence over the South Vietnamese government and war effort, increasing U.S. military participation in the counterinsurgency struggle, and taking offensive measures against North Vietnam. Anticipating that some measure of increased military effort would be approved, the naval leader recommended the reinforcement of U.S. ground, air, and naval forces in the Western Pacific and the buildup of logistic resources in Thailand, the Philippines, and Okinawa. He endorsed CINCPAC's concept for the establishment of a major base and port complex at Danang, including the construction of piers, magazines for ammunition storage, and fuel dump facilities; the widening of the existing airfield runway; and the completion of a parallel runway. In addition, he called for the construction of a jet-capable airfield at Chu Lai. Admiral Moorer also proposed the development of a fleet anchorage and small advanced naval base at Cam Ranh Bay, an operational and supply base near Vung Tau, and a naval and air complex at Phu Quoc. Of even greater significance, the Pacific Fleet commander recommended the deployment to these sites of strong American air defense and ground combat units to provide security. While calling for these unilateral U.S. steps, however, Admiral Moorer observed that without a solid government, based on popular support, the military effort against the VC in the RVN has little chance of success as is rather conclusively borne out by the events and deteriorating situation which have been evidenced over the past year. The strategic concept required for success in the RVN calls for a careful coordination of military operations with the governmental development of a national improvement program aimed at urban and rural development to influence and "Memo, OP-60 to CNO, ser BM00945-64 of 19 Jun 1964; CINCPAC, Command History, 1964, pp. 52-54; MACV, Command History, 1964, pp. 160-65; Sharp, Strategy For Defeat, pp. 46-48; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp. 87-109, 112; U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk. 4, pt. IVC.2(b), pp. 4, 1624; JCS Papers 2343/326-6, 332, 383, 426, 441, 446, 450, 477; msg, CPFLT 160137Z Aug 1964; JCS, History, pt. 1, pp. 10-38-10-40, 11-18-11-19, 11-34-12-20, 13-5-13-9. benefit the masses. While it seems we (and the RVN) have given this considerable lip service, this concept has really never been meaningfully applied." For this purpose, CINCPACFLT stressed the need to expand the role of U.S. military personnel in the advisory effort, and especially their work to promote control of the population by the government. In addition, he called for greater use of U.S. material assistance as a means of influencing South Vietnamese policies. The admiral stressed, however, that merely maintaining the status quo in South Vietnam was an unacceptable strategy. He felt it "plain that if we are really serious about Vietnam we should stop treading water in midstream and take positive action against NVN." The admiral added that U.S. actions "may well involve direct confrontation with the CHICOMS," but he accepted it "as a necessary risk" if the whole of Southeast Asia were not to be lost. CINCPACFLT concluded his appraisal by emphasizing that "time is running out on us and unless some drastic action is taken now" the only recourse would be the total implementation of military measures planned against North Vietnam, including an all-out bombing campaign, aerial mining of ports, and a maritime blockade." The 34A Maritime Campaign The drastic action against North Vietnam sought by Admiral Moorer was not provided by the 34A maritime operation, which lost momentum in the latter months of 1964. In fact, on 4 August, during the Tonkin Gulf crisis, the boat force moved from Danang to Cam Ranh Bay, due to the possibility of North Vietnamese retaliation for the Pierce Arrow strikes. The force remained there for five days while U.S. leaders awaited the possible Communist response. With none forthcoming, the Danang establishment soon resumed routine functions, but operations into North Vietnamese waters did not begin again until the fall of 1964.' 'Msg, CPFLT 290418Z Sep 1964. "Ibid. 'Msgs, COM7FLT 041537Z Aug 1964; CP 041607Z; COMUSMACV 041911Z; JCS 042119Z; COMUSMACV 070231Z. |