smoking. The Skyhawks also disabled or destroyed the other three enemy naval craft. By 1600H this action was over.

Completing the day's combat, six Ticonderoga aircraft flying armed reconnaissance along the coast sank another PT boat. Of the 34 PTs or Swatows estimated to comprise the Communist coastal fleet on 5 August, naval air units hit 33 of them with rocket and cannon fire. The American pilots destroyed 7 North Vietnamese vessels, severely damaged 10 ten more, and inflicted lesser damage to the other 16.27 On the American side, four of the sixty-seven aircraft engaged were damaged or destroyed and two naval aviators were lost. Another casualty occurred when Petty Officer Joe Lee Williams, after working for eighteen continuous hours on deck arming Ticonderoga aircraft, fell into the propeller of an E-1B and was killed.2

The Desoto Patrol Continues

At 0044H on 5 August, even before these air strikes began, CINCPACFLT directed the immediate resumption of the Desoto Patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin. He further ordered naval aircraft to attack and destroy any North Vietnamese patrol boats found in the area of the patrol. Captain Herrick subsequently advised the Seventh Fleet commander that he considered Maddox unsuitable for this task due to equipment failures experienced in the previous actions and her low ammunition stocks. Further, the captain pointed out that "Maddox considered to be [prime] target after evasion of several attempts at destruction. Believe DRV Navy will go to any lengths to achieve destruction of Maddox to save face."

27The exact figures on boats sighted and boats destroyed vary somewhat because of incomplete photo reconnaissance after the attacks. For example, CINCPAC, Command History, 1964, p. 372, lists eight boats destroyed and twenty-one damaged. The figures cited in the text were collected by the Seventh Fleet staff, which evaluated the relevant information in 1967. See COM7FLT, Pierce Arrow Chronology and Post Operation Questions, ser 1001 of 6 May 1967.

28JCS, NMCC OPSUMS, of 5 and 6 Aug 1964; COM7FLT, “NVN PT Boat Exploitation Team Report," July 1966, p. IV-B-1; OP-333E, Summary of Briefing Items, of 3, 5, 12 Aug 1964; msgs, CP 042227Z Aug 1964; CTG77.5 050414Z; 050450Z 050520Z; 051310Z; CPFLT 051428Z, CP 052000Z; CTF77 061140Z; CPFLT 140059Z; CTG77.6 140952Z; CTF77 141052Z; 141128Z; CPFLT 150207Z; CTG77.6 151235Z; 151237Z; CPFLT 151933Z; CTG77.6 160354Z; CTF77 160448Z; 160518Z; CTG77.5 161008Z; 161407Z; 041829Z Nov; ltr, CINCPACFLT to CINCPACAF, ser 21/00050 of 29 Oct 1964; memos, Haering to OP-05W, ser 00673-64 of 1 Sep 1964; ser 00881 of 10 Dec; Historical Summaries of CVW-14; VF-51, VF-53, VF-142, VF-143, VA-52, VA-55, VA-56, VA-144, VA-145, VA-146; CNO, Personnel Losses; Stockdales, In Love and War, pp. 25-33.

An enemy Swatow gunboat burns near Hon Ne following attack by naval aircraft during the Pierce Arrow strike on 5 August 1964.

Turner Joy was in a better condition of readiness, although Herrick observed that at one point in the action on 4 August all of the ship's 5inch/54-caliber guns were out of commission. The captain reported that all of these factors "caused concern."29 Nevertheless, at 0405H on 5

29 Msg, CTG72.1 042002Z Aug 1964.

August, Admiral Johnson directed that both ships reenter the Gulf of Tonkin to resume operations. In accordance with his orders, ten aircraft from Ticonderoga and Constellation orbited in the area from one hour before sunrise to one hour after sunset during the three-day patrol. Skyraiders provided an aerial barrier between the destroyers and the coast while Phantoms and Crusaders flew overhead cover. To ensure the proper use of the aerial resource, Commander Task Force 77 was assigned operational control of the Desoto Patrol.

After searching the area of the previous night's action for debris or other evidence, the two destroyers shaped a course shortly after 1200H on 5 August for the North Vietnamese coast, to which they were authorized to approach no closer than eleven miles. Several hours later, while moving toward the patrol track between points Charlie and Delta, Maddox reported nine rapidly approaching contacts on her radar. The destroyers prepared to open fire. However, the contacts disappeared. Two of Constellation's Phantoms sent to investigate sighted several small junks near the U.S. ships. After reaching the patrol line, Maddox and Turner Joy turned south toward Point Charlie before retiring at sunset to the mouth of the gulf. The next day the ships took on fuel from Kennebec (AO-36) and ammunition from Edson (DD-946) and Samuel N. Moore. During daylight hours on 7 and 8 August, the ships continued to patrol off the North Vietnamese littoral, without incident. Finally, at 1400H on 8 August, Maddox and Turner Joy steamed for the open sea, completing the last phase of a momentous Desoto Patrol.3

30

Further U.S. Reactions

While Maddox and Turner Joy undertook these operations, an extremely important political event occurred in Washington that exerted long-term influence on the role of the United States in Southeast Asia. On 7 August, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, as proposed by the Johnson administration, was passed unanimously in the House of Representatives and approved in the Senate by an eighty-eight to two margin. Based upon the recent events in the Gulf of Tonkin, this measure specifically stated that the United

30Msgs, CPFLT 041644Z Aug 1964; COM7FLT 042005Z; CTG72.1 042041Z; COM7FLT 042256Z; CTF77 071142Z; 071458Z; 080148Z; 080630Z; 080730Z; 090748Z; Maddox, Deck Log, 1-31 Aug.

States was prepared "as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."31 This resolution served as the legal basis for the armed support provided by the United States to South Vietnam throughout the Southeast Asian conflict.

In the meantime, U.S. forces concentrated in the South China Sea to support Task Force 77 and to deter a possible North Vietnamese or Chinese military reaction. During the week following the Pierce Arrow strikes, Bon Homme Richard's scheduled deployment to the United States was postponed, and Ranger was ordered from the Eastern Pacific to Southeast Asian waters. Following JCS direction, on 7 August CINCPAC ordered his naval component commander to maintain four attack carriers in the Western Pacific, two of them in the South China Sea. During the same week, Admiral Johnson sailed from Japan on board his flagship, Oklahoma City, to coordinate the operations of the Seventh Fleet. Topeka (CLG-8) and her cruiser-destroyer group also steered a southerly course. Further, steps were taken to ensure the safety of naval forces from Communist submarines. The antisubmarine carrier Kearsarge and her escorts steamed from Yokosuka for Yankee Station, while seaplane tender Pine Island headed for Danang to establish a base there for the P5 Marlin squadron then at Sangley Point. The Seventh Fleet Patrol Force established an antisubmarine barrier with shore-based aircraft between the Chinese mainland, Taiwan, and Luzon to detect and track any Communist submarines moving toward Southeast Asia. Finally, the Seventh Fleet's Amphibious Ready Group, composed of Valley Forge, Alamo (LSD-33), and Cavalier (APA-37), and embarking the Marine Special Landing Force, sortied from Subic on the evening on 5 August for a point off the coast of central South Vietnam.

As extra insurance in case the Pierce Arrow retaliation led to an outright Communist attack, the 9th Marine Expeditionary Force began loading in Okinawa on board the ships of Rear Admiral John M. Lee's Amphibious Force, Seventh Fleet. The Marine air group on the island and the 1st Marine Brigade in Hawaii also were alerted for deployment to the operating area. In addition, CINCPAC readied for possible movement to

31Public Law 88-408 (78 Stat. 384).

Southeast Asia two Army infantry brigades, sizeable Pacific Air Force units, and the Floating Forward Depot ships in Subic.

Between 5 and 12 August, U.S. Pacific forces converged on the scene. By the end of the week, Ticonderoga, Constellation, Kearsarge, Oklahoma City, Topeka, 25 destroyers, 4 submarines, 10 minesweepers, and the land-based planes of the Seventh Fleet Patrol Force formed a powerful fleet concentration. In addition, on board 15 amphibious ships were three Marine battalions prepared for immediate landing.32

Another consequence of the Tonkin Gulf crisis was a CINCPAC recommendation of 8 August to undertake an additional destroyer patrol in the area starting four days later. Admiral Sharp observed that the "primary purpose of patrol is to assert U.S. rights in the international waters off NVN and to ascertain through NVN reaction whether they intend to continue attacks on [the] high seas."33 On 17 August, the admiral called for a concerted follow-up to the Pierce Arrow actions, including a resumption of the Desoto Patrol and the deployment to South Vietnam of U.S. air base defense forces. CINCPAC stressed that "pressures against the other side once instituted should not be relaxed by any actions or lack of them."34 He felt that the shock effect of the Pierce Arrow strike and the U.S. military presence in Laos of the Yankee Team effort should not be dissipated. Indeed, the admiral warned that a fall off of activity "could easily be interpreted as period of second thoughts about Pierce Arrow and events leading thereto as well as sign of weakness and lack of resolve."35 Nevertheless, due to continuing concern in Washington that these operations might stimulate a Communist reaction, none of Admiral Sharp's proposals was approved at the time.

The September Incident

On 9 September 1964, however, national authorities approved the recommendations of CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT for another Desoto

32OP-333E, Summary of Briefing Items, August 1964; CINCPAC, Command History, 1964, pp. 371-73; msgs, CPFLT 041653Z Aug 1964; COM7FLT 041750Z; 042040Z; 042321Z; JCS 050043Z; CPFLT 050158Z; 052323Z; 052324Z; 060841Z; 061514Z; CP 070422Z; CPFLT 070521Z; COM7FLT 071430Z; CPFLT 080417Z; COM7FLT 122130Z; 181031Z; Sharp, Interview, pp. 232-33.

33Msg, CP 080155Z Aug 1964. See also msg, JCS 101403Z.

34Msg, CP 170530Z Aug 1964.

35Ibid. See also Johnson, Interview, p. 240.