States of maintaining large tactical combat forces could be reduced correspondingly. It was not long, however, before many academic theorists and retired military officers challenged the wisdom of this approach. Even Secretary of State Dulles, who first detailed the massive retaliation doctrine, publicly qualified his support for it in October 1957. The fundamental precepts of U.S. defense policy were further questioned after the Soviet Union demonstrated its technological sophistication with the Sputnik launch and orbit that same month. It then became apparent that the Communists had the potential for developing long-range nuclear warhead delivery systems, challenging the U.S. monopoly in this field. The following April, Dulles called for a serious review of strategic policy by the armed forces. The Secretary of State, at a meeting of the Armed Forces Policy Council on 7 April 1958, stated that "support for the present concept among our allies is diminishing rapidly" because the Soviet Union had also developed a lethal nuclear arsenal which would preclude resort to general war where "each side would wipe the other one out." The allies were concerned that the United States "would not invoke a massive retaliation under certain situations" such as limited conflicts or those where US forces were not directly involved. Secretary Dulles went on to question, "are we prisoners of this retaliatory concept? Are our forces, our weapons and our strategy frozen to the use of general retaliation?" He was afraid that "perhaps our military establishment was getting unable to do anything but drop large nuclear weapons.” The Secretary of Defense, Neil McPhoy, replied that "the position and forces developed do italics added) depend upon the strategic concept." Secre tary of State Dulles called for "more the ability than that concept alone will give us. in United States States, include - Dt of Retaliation, ~ster Dulles Oral CNO, memo for round, Region of Biscing with coopriary of Mate.co. ser 000188 58 of 7 Apr 1958 Scalarz Judin Prana Fuller Policy," Foreign Allam, Vol 56 59 1099 PoRT 1957, Arleigh A Burke, transcript at * * p91 of 30 Oct Development of the Flexible Response Concept The reanalysis of U.S. strategy within the national defense community already was underway, and it intensified in succeeding years. Advocates of a change in policy from one emphasizing nuclear retaliation to a more flexible system, using the full range of options available to the United States, included naval strategists and top-ranking officers. Present at the meeting with Dulles on 7 April was Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), who stressed the need "to have the capability for deterring or fighting general nuclear war, for large local wars and for small local wars. We needed tactical nuclear weapons. We needed to have a capability for conventional weapons and plans to use them. We needed to be able to move fast."3 The following month, Admiral Burke, writing to Lord Louis Mountbatten, British First Sea Lord and Chief of Staff of the Royal Navy, expressed his concern that perhaps the concentration on nuclear war "has caused us to generate excessive forces for retaliation and not give enough thought to those forces useable in more limited situations." He added that "nuclear retaliatory forces will not solve the myriad other problems with which we are confronted." The Chief of Naval Operations, anticipating future crises, warned that "if we go too far on the megaton road we will, I think, have found that the free world will have been lost by erosion, and perhaps not even military erosion.' 4 Others in the defense community also argued that the United States. should fashion its defense resources to meet all levels of potential enemy threats. Although nuclear weapons might form part of a response, conventional weapons and forces often were more appropriate. The History Project, Princeton University, in Washington, D.C., 11 Jan 1966, pp. 4-5, 52-54; Aliano, 'CNO, memo for record, ser 000188-58 of 7 Apr 1958. See also OP-93, ltr, ser 0007P93 of 30 "Ltr, Burke to Mountbatten, of 15 May 1958. States of maintaining large tactical combat forces could be reduced correspondingly. It was not long, however, before many academic theorists and retired military officers challenged the wisdom of this approach.' Even Secretary of State Dulles, who first detailed the massive retaliation doctrine, publicly qualified his support for it in October 1957. The fundamental precepts of U.S. defense policy were further questioned after the Soviet Union demonstrated its technological sophistication with the Sputnik launch and orbit that same month. It then became apparent that the Communists had the potential for developing long-range nuclear warhead delivery systems, challenging the U.S. monopoly in this field. The following April, Dulles called for a serious review of strategic policy by the armed forces. The Secretary of State, at a meeting of the Armed Forces Policy Council on 7 April 1958, stated that "support for the present concept among our allies is diminishing rapidly" because the Soviet Union had also developed a lethal nuclear arsenal which would preclude resort to general war where "each side would wipe the other one out." The allies were concerned that the United States "would not invoke a massive retaliation under certain situations" such as limited conflicts or those where U.S. forces were not directly involved. Secretary Dulles went on to question, "are we prisoners of this retaliatory concept? Are our forces, our weapons and our strategy frozen to the use of general retaliation?" He was afraid that “perhaps our military establishment was getting unable to do anything but drop large nuclear weapons." The Secretary of Defense, Neil McElroy, replied that “the position and forces developed do [italics added] depend upon the strategic concept." Secretary of State Dulles called for "more flexibility than that concept alone will give us.' 2 'Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957) and Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956). See also Paul R. Schratz, "The Military Services and the New Look, 1953-1961: The Navy'' in David H. White, ed., Proceedings of the Conference on War and Diplomacy (Charleston, SC: The Citadel, 1976), pp. 140-43; Richard A. Aliano, American Defense Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy: The Politics of Changing Military Requirements, 1957-1961 (Athens, OH: Ohio Univ. Press, 1975), pp. 24-46; Edward J. Marolda, "The Influence of Burke's Boys on Limited War," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (hereafter USNIP), Aug 1981. 2CNO, memo for record, "Report of Meeting with Secretary of State on Concept of Retaliation," ser 000188-58 of 7 Apr 1958. See also John Foster Dulles, "Challenge and Response in United States Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Oct 1957), p. 31; OP-93, memo, ser 0007P93 of 30 Oct 1957; Arleigh A. Burke, transcript of interview with Richard Challener, John Foster Dulles Oral Development of the Flexible Response Concept The reanalysis of U.S. strategy within the national defense community already was underway, and it intensified in succeeding years. Advocates of a change in policy from one emphasizing nuclear retaliation to a more flexible system, using the full range of options available to the United States, included naval strategists and top-ranking officers. Present at the meeting with Dulles on 7 April was Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), who stressed the need "to have the capability for deterring or fighting general nuclear war, for large local wars and for small local wars. We needed tactical nuclear weapons. We needed to have a capability for conventional weapons and plans to use them. We needed to be able to move fast."3 The following month, Admiral Burke, writing to Lord Louis Mountbatten, British First Sea Lord and Chief of Staff of the Royal Navy, expressed his concern that perhaps the concentration on nuclear war "has caused us to generate excessive forces for retaliation and not give enough thought to those forces useable in more limited situations." He added that "nuclear retaliatory forces will not solve the myriad other problems with which we are confronted." The Chief of Naval Operations, anticipating future crises, warned that "if we go too far on the megaton road we will, I think, have found that the free world will have been lost by erosion, and perhaps not even military erosion."4 Others in the defense community also argued that the United States should fashion its defense resources to meet all levels of potential enemy threats. Although nuclear weapons might form part of a response, conventional weapons and forces often were more appropriate. The History Project, Princeton University, in Washington, D.C., 11 Jan 1966, pp. 4-5, 52-54; Aliano, 'CNO, memo for record, ser 000188-58 of 7 Apr 1958. See also OP-93, ltr, ser 0007P93 of 30 Oct 1957; OP-93, memo, ser 0008P93 of 3 Dec 1957; ltr, CNO to Flag and General Officers, of 22 Aug 1960, pp. 24-31; ltr, Burke to Stratton, of 14 Sep 1959; memo, OP-61 of SECNAV/CNO, ser 00195P61 of 8 Jun 1960; Anthony E. Sokol, "Sword and Shield in Our Power Structure,” USNIP, Vol. 85 (Apr 1959), pp. 44-53; Brown Taylor, "The Lesser Deterrent," USNIP, Vol. 85 (Aug 1959), pp. 33-39; K.W. Simmons, "National Security in the Nuclear Age," USNIP, Vol. 86 (Jun 1960), pp. 83-91; Gordon B. Turner, "Air and Sea Power in Relation to National Power" in Gordon B. Turner and Richard D. Challener, eds., National Security in the Nuclear Age: Basic Facts and Theories (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), pp. 242-45; Schratz, "The Military Services and the New Look," p. 141; Aliano, American Defense Policy, pp. 116-19. *Ltr, Burke to Mountbatten, of 15 May 1958. concept of "flexible response," which gained wide currency following its elaboration in General Maxwell D. Taylor's work, The Uncertain Trumpet, published in 1960, represented the demand for a less restrictive strategy than that of assured nuclear retaliation." Naval policymakers had long stressed the multiplicity of the Navy's mission and its balanced capabilities. The Navy possessed a capacity for general retaliation throughout the 1950s in the form of nuclear armed carrier aviation, although the role of the aircraft carrier was seen as primarily tactical in nature. The acquisition of Polaris ballistic missile firing submarines, the first of which, George Washington (SSBN-598), entered the fleet on 30 December 1959, provided the Navy with its only major single-purpose strategic weapon system. But the Navy also maintained a wide variety of conventional warfare weapons and forces, from ship and land-based aircraft, surface warships, and submarines, to amphibious ships and craft and deployed Marine units. The perceived advent of a period of mutual nuclear deterrence between the Soviet Union and the United States convinced many theorists that the ability of the Navy to deal with situations short of global war would become increasingly crucial. As an alternative to general nuclear war, U.S. strategists developed a variety of limited war concepts which reflected the effort to restrict, localize, and shorten armed conflicts. This, it was reasoned, would enable the United States to combat less than total Communist aggression in such areas as Southeast Asia while decreasing the risk of all-out war. And many observers, including concerned naval leaders, believed that the most probable armed conflicts of the future would take the shape of limited objective or "brush-fire" wars." "The extent of General Taylor's later influence with the Kennedy administration is reflected in the fact that he was to serve as Special Military Representative to the President from 1961 to 1962 and as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1962 to 1964. Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper, 1960); memo, OP-90 to CNO, No. 427-58 of 4 Dec 1958. "Lulejian and Associates, Inc., "Refining the Nuclear Attack Capability and Adapting It to a Mission (1952-1962),"' pt. II of "US Aircraft Carriers in the Strategic Role," of study "History of the Strategic Arms Competition 1945-1972," Oct 1975, p. II-38. OP-93, ltr, ser 0008P93 of 3 Dec 1957; CNO, Annual Report, FY1958, pp. 1-3; Rand Corporation, "The Sierra Project: A Study of Limited Wars," Report No. R-317 of May 1958; Department of Defense Science Board, Task Group on Limited War, “Final Report," Vol. III, 1 Sep 1958; Arleigh Burke, "The Sea Carries Security on Its Back," Navy - Magazine of Seapower, Vol. 1, No.1 (May 1958), pp. 9-10; Malcolm W. Cagle, "Sea Power and Limited War,” USNIP, Vol. 84, No. 7 (Jul 1958), pp. 23-27; George H. Miller, "Not for the Timid," USNIP, Vol. 85, No. 5 (May 1959), pp. 34-42; "Limited War: Where do they Stand," Army, Navy, Air Force Register, Vol. 80, No. |