at Yankee Station that would prepare them for the later aerial offensive against North Vietnam.4

40

The Yankee Team reconnaissance operation, in addition to the Seventh Fleet's "show of force" deployments into the South China Sea, and the anchorage and naval base surveys on the South Vietnamese coast, represented the Johnson administration's growing focus during 1964 on overt military measures against North Vietnam in order to preserve the faltering government of South Vietnam. Key American naval leaders were influential advocates of this course of action, convinced as they were that the North Vietnamese lacked the will or physical capacity to prevail against an increasingly strong application of U.S. air and naval force. Further, they minimized the likelihood of a Chinese military response. Continued weakness of the South Vietnamese politico-military effort, concern by other U.S. leaders over Chinese intentions, ongoing diplomatic activities, and other considerations, however, dictated a limited use of American military power in Southeast Asia.

40JCS, NMCC Summaries, of 19, 26 Jun, 13, 16, 21, 23, 24, 31 Jul 1964; memos, OP-333E to OP002, of 29 Jun 1964; OP-33B of OP-09B, ser 003131-64 of 27 Aug; ser 003132-64 of 3 Sep; ser 00032P33 of 17 Sep; msgs, COMUSMACV 021345Z Aug; CPFLT 030104Z; CP 120323Z; 200325Z Sep; JCS 281438Z; CTF77, "Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for Yankee Team (YT)," ser 0031205 of 7 Dec; COM7FLT, Weekly Summaries, Jun-Dec 1964; CINCPAC, Command History, 1964, pp. 271-72; CINCPACFLT, Annual Report, FY 1964, pp. 4, 51; FY1965, pp. 5, 54, 55; Flag Plot, "Laos Chronology 17 June-31 July;" JCS Paper 2344/92; MACV, Command History, 1965, pp. 208-10.

Naval Engagements in the

Gulf of Tonkin

The Tonkin Gulf crisis of August 1964, which focused American attention on Southeast Asia in a highly dramatic fashion, traced its origin to March 1962, when Admiral Schoech, Commander Seventh Fleet, proposed a destroyer patrol in international waters along the Chinese Communist coast. The purpose was to "collect intelligence concerning CHICOM electronic and naval activity...establish and maintain Seventh Fleet presence in area [and] serve as a minor cold war irritant to CHICOMS." Soon afterward, the JCS, through CINCPAC, authorized inauguration of the operation, designated the Desoto Patrol, in international waters off the Chinese mainland.

1

In mid-April 1962, DeHaven conducted the first operation. The ship steamed along the northern coastline of the Peoples Republic of China. Once each month for the next five months, U.S. destroyers cruised the same general area without significant incident, although the Chinese broadcast protests. The October patrol of Hollister (DD-788) and the November mission of Shelton (DD-790) were extended to include, for the first time, surveillance along the North Korean littoral. As before, there was no significant Communist reaction.

'Msg, COM7FLT 140536Z Mar 1962. The following sources, of varying usefulness and quality, specifically treat the Tonkin Gulf crisis. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Gulf of Tonkin, the 1964 Incidents (90th Cong., 2nd sess.) (Washington: GPO, 1968); Anthony Austin, The President's War (New York: Lippincott, 1972); John Mecklin, Mission in Torment (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1965); Joseph C. Goulden, Truth is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin Affair — Illusion and Reality (New York: Rand McNally, 1969); Eugene G. Windchy, Tonkin Gulf (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971); John Galloway, The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (Rutherford, NJ: Farleigh Dickinson Univ. Press, 1970); U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Nomination of Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, to be Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (91st Cong., 2nd sess.) (Washington: GPO, 1970); Jim and Sybil Stockdale, In Love and War: The Story of a Family's Ordeal and Sacrifice During the Vietnam Years (New York: Harper and Row, 1984); Samuel E. Halpern, WEST PAC 64 (Boston: Branden Press, 1975).

The first surface surveillance of North Vietnamese coastal waters, as part of the Desoto Patrol program, was carried out in mid-December 1962. Departing Keelung, Taiwan, on 16 December, Agerholm (DD-826) sailed around Hainan Island and into the Gulf of Tonkin to 21 north latitude. As with the other ships, Agerholm was directed to approach no closer than twenty miles to Communist territory. The mission of the patrol was to "collect general and electronic intelligence [and] increase U.S. knowledge concerning CHICOM and North Vietnamese military forces."2 The cruise coincided with reconnaissance flights over the same area by EC-121 and EA-3B electronic intelligence planes. Thus, Communist radar emissions were monitored from the air and the sea. In keeping with past practice, the Chinese protested the approach of the U.S. patrol to their territorial waters, but took no further action.

During 1963, there were six additional Desoto Patrols along the Chinese, Soviet, Indonesian, and North Vietnamese coastlines. Once again, the patrolling destroyers were prohibited from approaching closer than twenty nautical miles from the Communist mainland. In mid-April, Richard S. Edwards (DD-950) operated off Hainan and North Vietnam. The Seventh Fleet ship was shadowed by five or six North Vietnamese submarine chasers and coastal minesweepers and a number of Chinese aircraft. The Chinese again issued "serious warnings."'

On 7 January 1964, Commander Seventh Fleet issued a revised directive governing conduct of the Desoto Patrol. The mission of the operation was broadened to include the collection of "all-source intelligence" in order to "increase both COMSEVENTHFLT and national fund of information concerning both military and civil activity of the Asiatic Communist bloc." In addition, the restriction that U.S. ships approach no closer than twenty miles from Communist territory was eased to allow patrol vessels to sail as near as twelve miles offshore. Aerial intelligence collection aircraft continued to form part of the Desoto team. The following information was sought:

A. Seaward defense posture: disposition of forces and capability. Deployment and operations of naval units, particularly submarines.

2Msg, ADMINO COM7FLT 080250Z Dec 1962.

'H.E. Fitzwater, JRC (JCS), memo for record, of 13 Aug 1964. See also CINCPAC, Command History, 1962, pp. 44-45; 1963, pp. 55-57; 1964, p. 367; CINCPACFLT, Annual Report, FY 1962, p. 12; msgs, CP 172231Z Mar 1962; COM7FLT 080250Z Dec; John R. Craig 151020Z Dec 1963.

B. Air defense posture: disposition and capability. Response to unexpected surface and air contacts.

C. Merchant shipping activity.

D. [Electronic] intelligence collection in support of objectives above.

E. Photography and visual identification in support of objectives above.

F. Hydrographic and meteorological observations.

G. Such additional recurring or nonrecurring collection as may be directed by higher authority.*

The potential value of the operation to U.S. actions in Southeast Asia was recognized by key leaders. In mid-January 1964, COMUSMACV requested that the Desoto Patrol scheduled for February be designed to provide the forthcoming 34A program with critical intelligence. CINCPAC informed the JCS that there was a "continuing requirement for obtaining INTEL on DRV forces capable [of resisting] projected operations in conjunction with OPLAN 34A. Desoto platform offers excellent means for obtaining this INTEL." Accordingly, Admiral Moorer, the Seventh Fleet commander, scheduled a patrol by Radford (DD-446) for the first week in February. The destroyer was to steam along a designated track off the North Vietnamese coast, orbiting in certain areas for up to twenty-four hours. For the first time, a Desoto Patrol ship was authorized to close up to four nautical miles to Communist territory. In addition to satisfying existing needs, Radford had orders to photograph items of interest on the coast and offshore islands, to locate and identify coastal radar transmitters, to monitor junk activity, and to provide "information on Viet Cong supply routes to fulfill long standing requirement this area. ." To ensure that General Harkins received intelligence specifically suited to the maritime operation based in Danang, a MACV officer would be embarked in Radford. Shortly afterward, however, the patrol was postponed until after mid-February in order not to interfere with 34A missions planned for the first two weeks of the month.'

*Msg, COM7FLT 070524Z Jan 1964. See also msg, COM7FLT 151741Z Aug 1963. 'Msg, CP 240124Z Jan 1964.

"Msg, COM7FLT 220602Z Jan 1964.

'Msgs, COM7FLT 151741Z Aug 1963; CP 290100Z Jan 1964; COM7FLT 300300Z.

As a result of this delay, John R. Craig (DD-885) replaced Radford as the patrol ship. At the end of January 1964, Admiral Sharp, the Pacific Fleet commander, directed Commander James H. Doyle, the commanding officer of John R. Craig, to conduct the postponed mission from 25 February to 12 March. The closest point of approach to Communist China remained twelve nautical miles, while that to North Vietnam was more precisely defined as eight miles to the mainland and four miles to the offshore islands. Because the State Department had no record of a specific North Vietnamese assertion regarding their territorial waters, U.S. officials concluded that international waters extended to three miles offshore, which was the limit established by the French when they controlled Indochina. Only on 1 September, after the August incidents, did the North Vietnamese state a claim to a twelve-mile limit. In addition to standing requirements, General Harkins requested that the Desoto Patrol provide him with radarscope photography of the North Vietnamese littoral. Assessing the threat from the Communists as minimal, Admiral Sharp decided not to provide carrier air support. He observed that "CHICOM air attack on Desoto ship highly unlikely and North Vietnam air capability for attack almost non-existent." Ingersoll (DD-652), however, was ordered to the entrance of the Gulf of Tonkin prepared to assist John R. Craig with on-call surface support against destroyers and smaller naval vessels and antiaircraft protection.

9

On 25 February, John R. Craig steamed from Keelung, Taiwan, with Captain Edward A. Williams, Commander Destroyer Division 12, and several intelligence collection equipment vans embarked for the first Desoto Patrol of 1964. A MACV representative, Lieutenant Commander Donald P. Darnell, accompanied the ship during part of the patrol. John R. Craig conducted the surveillance operations for eleven days in international waters near the Chinese and North Vietnamese coasts without eliciting a significant reaction from either Communist nation. Aside from shadowing John R. Craig with a Kronstadt class patrol vessel and an aircraft, both from considerable distances, the Chinese restricted their response to issuing a "serious warning," one of many in a long series. No North Vietnamese reaction was detected. By 9 March, the American destroyer

Memo, Office of the Judge Advocate General to SECNAV, of 1 Feb 1968; msg, CPFLT 140203Z Jul 1964; COM7FLT, OPORD 201-64, Ann. D, app. XI.

'Msg, CPFLT 311834Z Jan 1964.