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several cases, HSAS flatly refused to employ some of the more suspect firms. Military policemen were assigned to ride trucks from the port to the warehouse and officers at the port carefully checked manifests as the cargo was unloaded. On the other hand, Captain Friedman felt that, in many cases, goods were missing even before the ship reached Saigon and were probably lost in the Philippines.

Terrorist attacks on U.S. facilities ashore also increased in 1964. The first serious incident occurred at Pershing Field, an athletic facility run by HSAS. During a baseball game in February, a Viet Cong device exploded in the bleachers, killing two Americans and wounding twenty-five other persons. Witnesses noted that the Vietnamese children who usually played around the field disappeared before the blast. Because it was impossible to provide future security for such a large open area, HSAS reluctantly closed the facility. Not more than a week after the Pershing Field attack, a Viet Cong suicide squad gunned down a military policeman guarding the door of the Capital Kin Do Theater and placed a bomb in the lobby, while Vietnamese and Americans watched a Sunday afternoon movie. Alerted by the attack, Captain Donald E. Koelper, USMC, leaped to the stage to warn the audience to take cover. He was still there when the bomb blast killed him and wounded thirty-six others.46

Logistic Support of a Growing Conflict

The increase of U.S. military activities in South Vietnam, which placed great demands for support on the Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon, emphasized the need for a larger logistic establishment. HSAS, staffed by with 600 officers and men at the end of the year, was barely able to cope the deployment into Vietnam of more and more U.S. units and resources. All departments of HSAS experienced an increased workload. Even at the beginning of the year, the Port Terminal Division handled thirty ships and 30,000 to 40,000 measurement tons.of cargo each month. To prevent a backlog of ships in port awaiting offloading, the division took extraordinary measures. Port personnel were placed on a twelve-hour day, seven

46Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports; Malcolm Browne, The New Face of War (New York: BobbsMerrill, 1965), pp. 258-59; MACV, Command History, 1964, p. 189; New York Times, of 2 Feb

1964; msg, COMUSMACV 161540Z Feb; Friedman, Interview.

day work-week schedule and Cargo Handling Battalion 2, of the Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, was deployed to Saigon to augment the HSAS personnel. Efforts also were made to acquire additional warehouse space near the docks. To ease the problem, the Public Works Department approved acquisition of 57,000 square feet of new warehouse space and seven 6,800 cubic foot, advanced base refrigerators in the port area. By the end of 1964, HSAS open storage capacity totaled 127,000 square feet, warehouse space 186,000 square feet, and cold storage 201,000 cubic feet.

Much of the increase in port operations was attributed to the expansion of the exchange and commissary system operated by HSAS. In May 1964 Navy Exchange sales topped $1 million and this figure reached $1.7 million at the end of the year. Construction of a new exchange building, scheduled for completion by April 1965, was begun. The field exchange system grew from 12 branches to over 100. To supply these field exchanges, the chartered private fleet of vessels was replaced by two Japanese-manned MSTS LSTS early in 1964. By the end of the year, these LSTS numbered seven and hauled 12,000 tons of supplies monthly.

As with the other departments, the workload of the Fiscal and Supply Departments expanded dramatically. By July the fiscal branch was disbursing about $3 million in pay and allowances each month. There were corresponding increases in the supply workload. The main logistic source was located at the Naval Supply Center, Oakland, California, but urgent requests were sent to the Naval Supply Depots at Subic, Yokosuka, or Sangley Point. An inter-service support agreement allowed the Navy to use the Army Support Command for assistance, but according to Commander Lennus B. Urquhart (SC), who headed the Supply Department in 1964, "this proved very frustrating and we finally gave up trying and went Navy all the way." Even the Navy's support was sometimes insufficient, however. Urquhart stated that "of all the activities in the U.S., only Oakland seemed to understand our problems and did their best to meet our requirements."47

By mid-year, the adequacy of medical facilities in South Vietnam became an additional concern. The anticipated increase in American personnel pointed to the need for greater resources. In addition, General

47 Ltr, Urquhart to Kuntze, of 29 Dec 1965. See also HSAS, Draft History; CINCPACFLT, Annual Report, 26 Jun 1964 - 30 Mar 1965, pp. 65-66.

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A Military Sea Transportation Service tank landing ship, operated by Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon, loads supplies at Saigon for delivery to outlying ports along the coast of South Vietnam.

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Westmoreland was dissatisfied with the fire security and physical layout of the Saigon Station Hospital. An alternate building was considered but rejected when Rear Admiral James R. Davis, the Commander Pacific Division, Bureau of Yards and Docks, found it unsatisfactory as well. Thought was given to activation of a hospital ship, but because of the poor security situation in the port of Saigon, and the limited berthing space available, this proposal too was dropped. The issue was closed when Admiral Ulysses S. G. Sharp, shortly after becoming CINCPAC on 30 June 1964, reaffirmed an earlier decision to expand the existing facility. In the meantime, despite the crowded conditions, the Saigon Station Hospital continued to serve the American community. Its staff of 10 medical officers, 2 medical service officers, 16 nurses, and 90 hospital corpsmen, the great majority of whom were naval personnel, performed admirably, especially after each major attack by the Viet Cong against U.S. installations during 1964.48

HSAS had been established in 1962 to support a maximum of 9,000 men. By the end of 1964 the activity supported 23,000 U.S. military personnel and 2,700 U.S. government civilians in 240 scattered locations. With the exception of fuel provision and construction assistance, accomplished by large U.S. corporations under contract to U.S. government agencies in Saigon, HSAS provided the major common-item support to all U.S. forces in Vietnam.

In July 1964, CINCPAC sought ways to increase the efficiency of the logistic organizations in Vietnam. Specifically, Admiral Sharp recommended that the Army establish a major logistic command which could take over from HSAS if contingency plans were implemented for a major U.S. and allied buildup in Vietnam, as anticipated. General Westmoreland agreed with Admiral Sharp's assessment and in late October completed his own study of the logistic situation. He concluded that an Army logistic command should be introduced immediately into Vietnam to prepare for the likely transition. The proposed new command would accommodate any increase in U.S. or SEATO troops.

48CINCPAC, Command History, 1964, pp. 341-44; CINCPACFLT, Annual Report, 26 Jun 196430 Mar 1965, pp. 65-98; MACV, Command History, 1964, p. 141; CINCPACFLT, Annual Report, 10 Oct 1963-26 Jun 1964, p. 107; F. O. McClendon, Jr., "Doctors and Dentists, Nurses and Corpsmen in Vietnam," U.S. Naval Institute Naval Review (May 1970), pp. 278-79; msgs, CP 150206Z Jul 1964; CPFLT 290421Z Sep; CP 210348Z Nov; COMUSMACV 091022Z Dec; CP 160457Z; 160459Z; Marolda, "Saigon" in United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Overseas, pp. 287-91.

USN-1108881

A Military Sea Transportation Service tank landing ship, operated by Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon, loads supplies at Saigon for delivery to outlying ports along the coast of South Vietnam.

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