Meanwhile, the monitor, the junks, and the STCANS patrolled the banks to block escape across the Soirap River. Firing ceased at 0830, shortly after the troops had landed. The 1,100 South Vietnamese soldiers encountered a thirty-man Viet Cong platoon and, in a twenty-minute firefight, killed three of the enemy and captured three. Making no further contact, the troops reembarked at 1400.

Later in 1964, RAG units participated in the first joint army-navy-air force assault operation in the Rung Sat. The action began at dawn on 24 December with a Vietnamese Sea Force diversionary bombardment north of the target, a Viet Cong supply base near the mouth of the Soirap River. The bombardment was followed by Vietnamese Air Force strikes. Then, helicopters and River Force craft landed paramilitary forces to secure the objective. The operation resulted in the seizure of 600 kilograms of rice, 10 sampans, 1 motorized junk, and 50 rounds of Russian-made ammunition.

As in An Xuyen Province, free-fire zones were established in the Rung Sat in 1964. Sea Force ships transiting the Saigon shipping channel, ships engaged in training exercises, and ships directed to support besieged Rung Sat hamlets fired shore bombardment missions into these areas. An L-19 Cessna aircraft, assigned to the Rung Sat commander, usually spotted for the bombarding ships. The 3-inch guns on board Sea Force ships, with a range of 9,000 yards, could cover the entire zone during a five-hour cruise, while three ships stationed at predetermined locations could blanket the zone simultaneously. A typical mission took place on 24 October, when LSMs Huong Giang and Hau Giang (HQ-406) shelled Viet Cong training and staging areas. During the operation, Lieutenant Keith L. Christensen, a U.S. advisor, flew overhead in the L-19 to direct Vietnamese fire. He termed the fire of Hau Giang the most accurate he had observed from the Vietnamese Navy.53

Although the Vietnamese Army and Navy were successful in a number of operations, especially in the river mouth and Rung Sat regions, their control over much of the Mekong Delta during 1964 was lost to the enemy. The Viet Cong extended their influence throughout the area, mauling government forces and dispersing paramilitary units. In April, for

"Advisory Board, "Long Tau-Soirap River Area Security," encl. 11, p. 1-2; NAG, Historical Review, 1964, p. 14; Naval History Division, "History of U.S. Naval Operations, Vietnam, 1964," unpublished history in Naval Historical Center, 1970, p. 203.

A converted LCM monitor and three STCAN patrol craft of the Vietnamese Navy's 25th River Assault Group prepare to depart their base at Can Tho for an operation on the Bassac River.

instance, the Communists overran a district capital in Chuong Thien Province and killed over 300 South Vietnamese soldiers. Concerned by growing Viet Cong power, units of the army and navy often avoided offensive actions, indirectly surrendering control of key land areas and waterways to the enemy. With the South Vietnamese armed forces unable to reverse the course of events, by December 1964 the region around the capital of the Republic of Vietnam itself was host to regimental-size Viet Cong forces. 54

The year 1964 was a time of turmoil. The political upheaval following in the wake of the coup against Diem in November 1963 brought nationbuilding and the military effort to a standstill. The Communists seized the opportunity to attempt to deal South Vietnam a death blow. To help counter this threat, U.S. leaders strengthened the advisory effort by substantially increasing the number of advisors and the level of military aid. In addition, the Navy dispatched the Bucklew team to South Vietnam to evaluate naval operations and recommend improvements in the Vietnamese Navy. The group highlighted the primary importance of interdicting Communist coastal infiltration and securing the inland waterways of the Mekong Delta region.

The Vietnamese Navy registered some progress during 1964. Establishment of the Chief of Naval Operations billet, with its more direct access to the Joint General Staff, and actions to integrate the Coastal Force into the regular navy improved the command structure. The naval service grew in size as the United States provided more ships, craft, weapons, and equipment and supported higher personnel levels. This enabled creation of a seventh river assault group, the development of promising antimining and anti-ambush resources, and construction of the more capable Yabuta junks. Training was accelerated with the establishment of new schools for the combat and support forces and deployment to Vietnam of additional U.S. mobile training teams. The supply system was better organized and new repair facilities and parts depots were opened.

Nonetheless, by the end of the year, the Vietnamese Navy was less able than it had been to fight the war. The officer corps, disorganized by the Diem coup, was hindered further by the political intrigue, inexperience,

54Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War in Vietnam, pp. 83-95; U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk. 3, pt. IVC.1, pp. 30-46, 58-76; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp. 62-85.

and lack of motivation of many of its leaders. The combat forces were unable to deploy consistently a sizeable proportion of their units for primary missions because of diversions for secondary duties, poor preventive maintenance of vessels, and overloaded repair facilities. In addition, low recruiting and desertion caused serious personnel shortages in the Coastal Force. The Sea Force, the River Force, and the especially troubled Coastal Force, discovered little Communist infiltration into the Mekong Delta or movement on its waterways, even though the evidence now available suggests a significant enemy effort that year. Despite a number of successful actions along the An Xuyen coast, at the mouths of the Mekong River, and in the Rung Sat, the Vietnamese Army and Navy were losing control of the vital delta region. It became increasingly clear that the South Vietnamese Navy required more than U.S. advisors and material assistance to stem the rising enemy tide.

Naval Support to the
Counterinsurgency Struggle

Increasingly frustrated in attempts to revitalize the foundering politico-military effort in South Vietnam, the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson focused greater attention in late 1963 and early 1964 on the insurgency's base of aid and command control - North Vietnam. Johnson's strategists concluded that bringing war to the North Vietnamese in increasing measure would sap their will to continue the struggle. At the same time, U.S. civilian and military leaders continued the in-country programs to win the support of the South Vietnamese people for their government and to diminish the Communist threat to internal security.1

Plans for intensified covert action against Hanoi were under review for most of 1963. In May of that year, the JCS directed CINCPAC to develop a program of U.S. military support for South Vietnamese covert, hit and run actions against North Vietnam. In keeping with the guidance drawn up after the Bay of Pigs, large covert operations were controlled by the Defense Department. Hence, Admiral Felt, who also pressed for such a program, had his staff prepare Operation Plan 34, which he dispatched to Washington on 17 June. But, various difficulties, including delays in the operational employment in the Western Pacific of two fast patrol boats (PTF), to be used in the maritime phase of the plan, prevented quick approval and implementation of the proposed program. Further, the Diem government, preoccupied with internal political troubles, evinced little enthusiasm for these extraterritorial actions.

The pace quickened in the last two months of 1963. General Harkins found Diem's successors more amenable to expanded operations and on 18 November the general informed Admiral Felt that the "climate is

'Memo, OP-09A to OP-002, of 21 May 1963; JCS, History, pt. 1, pp. 7-37—7-39.