The Advisory Program and the Turmoil, 1964 The overthrow of the Diem government brought about a profound change in the nature of the war in Southeast Asia and each side's perception of the conflict. Although briefly hopeful that new political leadership would galvanize South Vietnam's counterinsurgency struggle, U.S. leaders soon expressed growing doubt that the country could survive its troubles. The problems were many and varied, but the lack of strong, durable leadership from the South Vietnamese government and the armed forces was the most fundamental defect. The Don-Minh-Kim regime which seized power from Diem succumbed after only several months of ineffectual and disharmonious government. On 31 January 1964 army General Nguyen Khanh ousted these leaders in a bloodless coup and established himself as the head of state. Although U.S. officials initially thought highly of Khanh, who was recognized as staunchly pro-American, his hold on power and direction of the country was tenuous. Khanh remained as the head of government until the fall, but that feat required an inordinate devotion to political intrigue, inaction on controversial but necessary policies, and greater reliance on U.S. resources. The Diem coup also did serious injury to the Vietnamese Navy's officer corps. The close association of many top officers with the old regime resulted in their replacement by more junior and often less qualified men or by those who were politically acceptable to the new government. Captain Chung Tan Cang, formerly head of the River Force and sometime antagonist of the assassinated Quyen, was appointed Naval Deputy. Cang and General Nguyen Van Thieu, one of the chief officers involved in Diem's overthrow, served together in the merchant marine in the early 1950s before the latter man joined the army. Although Cang was well thought of by some U.S. naval advisors, Captain Drachnik, a close friend of Quyen, found him "a very poor officer" who had revealed "traitorous" tendencies some time before the Diem coup. The American believed that Cang "certainly was not the kind of person you would want for a senior job in the Vietnamese Navy." Other American advisors viewed Vietnam's naval leadership with concern. For example, the new head of intelligence in the naval headquarters, a Cang loyalist, reportedly concerned himself more with politics than the war effort. Similarly, Lieutenant Frank T. Lazarchick, a Sea Force advisor, observed that "approximately one-half of the commanding officers lack the experience necessary to command" their seagoing units.2 This condition was reflected in the high number of groundings by Sea Force ships that year, especially the PGMs. In general, the development of a professional, dedicated, and cohesive officer corps was dealt a sharp blow by the Diem assassination of November 1963. As Captain Drachnik observed, the coup and the following political turmoil in South Vietnam "just eroded the two years of effort that we put in" the advisory program. The enemy clearly recognized and took advantage of the dissension in the South Vietnamese armed forces and a weakening in the war effort. Thus, the North Vietnamese leadership resolved at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party in December 1963 to significantly increase its support of the southern insurgency. As detailed in the top secret record of the meeting, later captured by American forces, Communist leaders determined that "the North must bring into fuller play its role as the revolutionary base for the whole nation." The directive specified that while being progressively strengthened, Communist forces would simultaneously destroy the Strategic Hamlets and concentrate on the regular units of the South Vietnamese armed forces. 24. 'Drachnik, Interview with Moss, pp. 14-15. See also Drachnik, Interview with Fitzgerald, pp. 23 2F. T. Lazarchick, End of Tour Report, of 1 Jun 1964. 'Drachnik, Interview with Fitzgerald, p. 52. See also Sea Force SITREP, of 9 Nov 1963; R. N. Channell, End of Tour Report, of 16 Jan 1964. The Viet-Nam Workers' Party's 1963 Decision to Escalate the War in the South," in U.S. Mission, South Vietnam, "Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes," Document No. 96 of Jul 1971, p.i. See also, msg, CP 102155Z Dec 1963; Don, Our Endless War, pp. 116-24; Felt, Interview, pp. 621-23. The Advisory Program and the Turmoil, 1964 The overthrow of the Diem government brought about a profound change in the nature of the war in Southeast Asia and each side's perception of the conflict. Although briefly hopeful that new political leadership would galvanize South Vietnam's counterinsurgency struggle, U.S. leaders soon expressed growing doubt that the country could survive its troubles. The problems were many and varied, but the lack of strong, durable leadership from the South Vietnamese government and the armed forces was the most fundamental defect. The Don-Minh-Kim regime which seized power from Diem succumbed after only several months of ineffectual and disharmonious government. On 31 January 1964 army General Nguyen Khanh ousted these leaders in a bloodless coup and established himself as the head of state. Although U.S. officials initially thought highly of Khanh, who was recognized as staunchly pro-American, his hold on power and direction of the country was tenuous. Khanh remained as the head of government until the fall, but that feat required an inordinate devotion to political intrigue, inaction on controversial but necessary policies, and greater reliance on U.S. resources. The Diem coup also did serious injury to the Vietnamese Navy's officer corps. The close association of many top officers with the old regime resulted in their replacement by more junior and often less qualified men or by those who were politically acceptable to the new government. Captain Chung Tan Cang, formerly head of the River Force and sometime antagonist of the assassinated Quyen, was appointed Naval Deputy. Cang and General Nguyen Van Thieu, one of the chief officers involved in Diem's overthrow, served together in the merchant marine in the early 1950s before the latter man joined the army. Although Cang was well thought of by some U.S. naval advisors, Captain Drachnik, a close friend of Quyen, found him "a very poor officer" who had revealed "traitorous" tendencies some time before the Diem coup. The American believed that Cang "certainly was not the kind of person you would want for a senior job in the Vietnamese Navy." Other American advisors viewed Vietnam's naval leadership with concern. For example, the new head of intelligence in the naval headquarters, a Cang loyalist, reportedly concerned himself more with politics than the war effort. Similarly, Lieutenant Frank T. Lazarchick, a Sea Force advisor, observed that “approximately one-half of the commanding officers lack the experience necessary to command" their seagoing units.2 This condition was reflected in the high number of groundings by Sea Force ships that year, especially the PGMs. In general, the development of a professional, dedicated, and cohesive officer corps was dealt a sharp blow by the Diem assassination of November 1963. As Captain Drachnik observed, the coup and the following political turmoil in South Vietnam “just eroded the two years of effort that we put in" the advisory program. The enemy clearly recognized and took advantage of the dissension in the South Vietnamese armed forces and a weakening in the war effort. Thus, the North Vietnamese leadership resolved at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party in December 1963 to significantly increase its support of the southern insurgency. As detailed in the top secret record of the meeting, later captured by American forces, Communist leaders determined that "the North must bring into fuller play its role as the revolutionary base for the whole nation." The directive specified that while being progressively strengthened, Communist forces would simultaneously destroy the Strategic Hamlets and concentrate on the regular units of the South Vietnamese armed forces. 24. 'Drachnik, Interview with Moss, pp. 14-15. See also Drachnik, Interview with Fitzgerald, pp. 23 2F. T. Lazarchick, End of Tour Report, of 1 Jun 1964. 'Drachnik, Interview with Fitzgerald, p. 52. See also Sea Force SITREP, of 9 Nov 1963; R. N. Channell, End of Tour Report, of 16 Jan 1964. The Viet-Nam Workers' Party's 1963 Decision to Escalate the War in the South," in U.S. Mission, South Vietnam, "Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes," Document No. 96 of Jul 1971, p.i. See also, msg, CP 102155Z Dec 1963; Don, Our Endless War, pp. 116-24; Felt, Interview, pp. 621-23. USN-1105769 U.S. naval advisors, including, from left to right: Captain Joseph B. Drachnik, Chief of the Naval Advisory Group, Vietnam; |