flown off Princeton to a landing zone inland. Major General Robert E. Cushman, USMC, the 3rd Marine Division commander, was in charge of the Blue Beach forces. To the north, at Red Beach, Brigadier General Ormand Simpson, USMC, commanded the assault of the 3rd Marine Regimental Landing Team. Once ground troops secured the airstrip at San Jose, where a SEABEE unit and MABS 12 elements had readied a Short Expeditionary Landing Field (SELF) before the exercise, C-130 transports airlifted the 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines from Okinawa. Air support was provided by the Hancock aircraft of Commander Carrier Division 3, Rear Admiral Paul P. Blackburn, Marine aircraft of VMA 332 from Cubi Point, and Filipino and Australian land-based aircraft. By 2400 the following day, 27 March, the off-loading of personnel, equipment, and cargo was completed, as was the airlift operation.

For the rest of the month, the expeditionary force sought their elusive foe. Perhaps as a foretaste of the later cost and frustration in bringing the Viet Cong to battle, early reports in the exercise indicated that for 6 captured "aggressors," the Marines lost 8 "killed" and 55 "wounded." Asked by a public relations representative whether this was "an indication that a handful of skilled and well-led guerrillas would win this war," General Condon replied, "no, SEATO will gain the advantage and win the war."22 Several days later the landing force still had not made solid contact with the guerrillas, as the latter withdrew "further into the back country of Tahimik." The press release stated that “undoubtedly, a strong action will be encountered as the aggressors are pushed against the wall."23 However, this had not occurred when the land operation was terminated on 31 March and the 9th Marine Expeditionary Force began reembarking in Seventh Fleet ships for return to normal stations.

One of the stated objectives of Tulungan, the development of improved coordination and cooperation among SEATO forces for contingency operations on the Southeast Asian mainland, was only partially successful, due to the limited international composition of the forces involved. But the training received by U.S. naval, land, and air forces in an undertaking of such size and complexity served the fleet well in succeeding years.

22Msg, CTF72 271445Z Mar 1962.

23 Msg, CTF72 291033Z Mar 1962.

24

24Several of the higher commanders who participated in Tulungan were in positions of importance in the later period of the Vietnam conflict. Both Generals Cushman and Simpson led Marine forces in South Vietnam, Rear Admiral Blackburn became Commander Seventh Fleet, and Rear Admiral

Shortfalls in Conventional Warfare Readiness

Although the administration and the Navy gave greater emphasis to preparation for conventional warfare and projection of power ashore during this period, progress in strengthening the fleet was not uniform. Significant deficiencies remained that threatened to hamper the successful conduct of operations. This situation resulted from a number of factors. The Kennedy administration increasingly focused on the rapid development of unique forces the special units slated for counterinsurgency

warfare sometimes to the detriment of the more traditional forces. And the conventional forces that were favored with budgetary support were primarily those of the other services. Between 1961 and mid-1964 the number of Army divisions grew from eleven to sixteen, the number of Air Force tactical air squadrons increased by half, and the Army's aircraft inventory, comprising helicopters, observation planes, and transports, rose from 5,564 to over 6,000. Marine ground forces received priority attention as well.25

Within the Navy's budget, the Polaris program continued to receive primary funding support. By the end of Fiscal Year 1964, twenty-one submarines had entered fleet service for the strategic retaliatory function, compared with only five by June 1961. The importance of the sea control mission, especially with regard to the threat from the powerful Soviet submarine fleet, also demanded concentration on resources for antisubmarine and antiaircraft warfare. Funds for the construction or reconfiguration of attack submarines and surface escort ships were a prime requirement. Arming surface ships with modern missile systems was another high

Hooper commanded the Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Exercise Director (CTF-260) and COMPHIBGRUONE, OPORD 301-62 of 13 Jan 1962; CINCPAC, Command History, 1961, p. 146; 1962, p. 131; CINCPACFLT, Annual Report, 1962, p. 34; COM7FLT "Weekly Summaries," 28 Feb-24 Apr 1962; COMPHIBGRUONE/COMPHIBFOR7FLT, Command History, 1962; Hooper, Interview with Whitlow; Hooper, Interview with Mason, pp. 324-29, 332-39; memo, CINCPACFLT to CNO, of 20 Mar 1962; msgs, CTF260 SITREPS 1 (220359Z Mar)-7(280530Z Mar); CTF72, Press Releases 1(191051Z Feb)-46(291033Z Mar); CTU261.8 111450Z Mar; ltr, CINCPACFLT to CINCPAC, ser 21/001031 of 4 Dec 1962.

25 Memos, SECNAV to Chairman, JCS, of 25 Apr 1961; OP-601C7 to CNO, BM000251-61 of May; SECNAV, "Annual Report" in DOD, Annual Report, FY1964, pp. 3-4, 21-22; Kaufman, McNamara Strategy, pp. 98, 100; Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? (New York: Evanston, 1971), pp. 223, 268-69; McNamara, Essence of Security, pp. 80-84; Edward A. Kolodziej, The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945-1963 (Athens: Ohio Univ. Press, 1966), pp. 40608; Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, and Doctrine, pp. 361-63, 378-82; Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age, p. 78; Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment, pp. 7-9, 15, 20-21.

priority item. But, with the exception of the favorable treatment accorded the LPH, LPD, AOE, and AFS building programs, the fleet's projection forces and the logistic units needed to support them generally received lean support. At the end of 1962, CINCPACFLT complained that "lack of sufficient personnel and money are the causes of all our worries and the continued shortage of both are causing a gradual but sure degradation of our overseas readiness."26

The competition for funding support also adversely affected the Navy's budding motor gunboat (PGM) project. U.S. participation during 1962 in the coastal patrol off South Vietnam clearly revealed that the Navy required craft more suitable to this mission than ocean minesweepers and destroyer escorts. This deficiency had long been recognized by naval leaders, but plans and funds for the development of prototype coastal patrol craft were consistently deferred for higher priority construction. This pattern was repeated in late 1961 when Secretary of Defense McNamara changed from sixteen to two the number of motor gunboats scheduled for construction in the Fiscal Year 1963 building program. Only two more ships subsequently were approved for the Fiscal Year 1964 plan.

Despite their limited number, the Navy felt the PGM a promising vessel for coastal warfare. As a result, on 5 March 1962, the Chief of Naval Operations directed that the PGM prototypes be designed with "good seakeeping abilities and an adequate endurance suitable for patrol, blockade or surveillance missions in waters other than the open seas and rivers."27 The characteristics of the PGM included a 165-foot length, 23.5-foot beam, and a 230-ton displacement fully loaded. Powered by both diesel engines and gas turbines, the motor gunboat would be capable of attaining a speed of 30 knots and a range of 1,700 miles. Armament included one 3-inch/50-caliber gun mounted forward, one 40-millimeter gun mounted aft, two 50-caliber machine guns, two 81-millimeter mortars, and twelve Redeye antiaircraft missiles. For close-in coastal work,

26Ltr, Sides to Ricketts, of 21 Dec 1962.

27CNO, OPNAV Instruction 09010.175, ser 0184P42 of 5 Mar 1962. See also memos, OP-34, ser 8-62 of 12 Jan 1962; OP-93 to OP-42, ser 09P93 of 12 Jan; msg, CLFLT, 232344Z Jan; Itrs, CINCPAC to CNO, ser 057 of 29 Jan; CINCPACFLT to CNO, ser 61/00116 of 6 Feb; memos, OP93 to OP-03, ser 031P93 of 1 Mar; OP-34 to OP-03, ser 0541-62 of 9 Aug; Itr, Griffin to Burke, of 12 Jul 1961 encl. in ltr, Burke to Griffin, of 27 Jul 1961.

USN-1116783

the PGM was thought to be a good amalgam of weapons, hull design, and power plant. 28

Naval aviation experienced a similar constraint on its full development. In the first half of 1961, the CNO observed that the procurement of aircraft was not keeping pace with losses through wear, obsolescence, accidents, and other causes. He added that the fleet required 7,200 operating aircraft. More capable planes, such as the Phantom II which joined the fleet in 1961, were not compensation enough for the overall shortage. Admiral Burke advised Secretary of the Navy John B. Connally, Jr., that "the Navy has the best tactical aircraft and the best close air support aircraft in existence in the world but we don't have very many of them."29 As late as July 1962 CINCPACFLT identified another problem: "The continued evolution of the attack aircraft toward a special purpose, supersonic, nuclear weapon delivery aircraft has seriously impaired its effectiveness in the Close Air and Helicopter Support roles."'30 Significant progress was made, however, by June 1964, in adapting strike aircraft, such as the A-5 Vigilante and the A-3 Skywarrior, to conventional roles, primarily in the photographic reconnaissance configuration.

The lack of required numbers in the Navy's inventory was not reversed. During the period from 1961 to mid-1964 the total number of operating aircraft rose by 167, but because of a low production rate, the overall inventory decreased by 1,168 to 10,274 aircraft. And while several categories of aircraft registered gains, the critical fighter, attack, and transport type planes were 197 fewer in number in June 1964 than three years earlier. As a result, one naval and two Marine attack-fighter squadrons were deactivated during this period.31

The dearth of adequate amphibious shipping and sealift resources for the provision of troops, reinforcements, and their logistic support continued to plague naval planners. The new LPHS and LPDs were not able to fully compensate for the advancing age of the World War II amphibious fleet. Rather than institute a large-scale shipbuilding program,

28CNO, OPNAV Instruction 09010.175, ser 0184P42 of 5 Mar 1962; Rowe and Morison, Ships and Aircraft, p. 62.

29 Memo, CNO to SECNAV, ser 00359-61 of 18 Jul 1961. See also CNO, Statement before House Armed Services Committee, of 8 Mar 1961.

30Ltr, CINCPACFLT to CNO, ser 32/00606 of 19 Jul 1962.

"OP-508, "Naval Forces Summary," of May 1980; Itrs, SECNAV to SECDEF, ser 00121 of 31 Aug 1962; CINCPACFLT to COMNAVAIRPAC, ser 32/00894 of 24 Oct; CNO, "Naval Aviation Summary," of 1 Oct 1964.