weekly losses of government weapons to the Communists dropped markedly from 1961 and 1962 levels.13

As a result of the general optimism over Vietnam, Secretary McNamara began to think about scaling down U.S. forces once the Viet Cong threat was further contained. Responding to a Secretary of Defense query, General Harkins estimated that this might be accomplished by the end of 1965. His estimates were accepted for planning purposes, even though the Joint Chiefs commented that it was impossible to make such a forecast with any accuracy.

Serious planning for an initial 1,000-man reduction began in the spring of 1963 and was scheduled for completion by the end of the year. Most of the personnel to be withdrawn were in support units. Only about 200 were attached to MAAG and MACV and a handful of these were naval advisors. However, Captain Drachnik was unhappy about these reductions, which he considered unjustified by the situation in Vietnam and motivated solely to show the American people that progress was being made in the conflict. Even though the proposed reduction would amount to only about 10 percent of the naval advisors, in a small unit such as the Navy Section there were few billets which could be spared. Since the Bureau of Naval Personnel had not yet filled some billets in the Navy Section, Drachnik recommended that those be the positions cut. He was told that the cuts had to come from occupied billets. A total of 1,000 men did leave Vietnam by the end of 1963, but this withdrawal process was stillborn and a general buildup immediately followed.14

Internal Turmoil

Events in South Vietnam soon began to erode the confidence of some U.S. officials in Diem's government and armed forces. In the battle of Ap Bac, on 2 January 1963, South Vietnamese regular and paramilitary forces

17.

13MACV, Summary of Highlights, of 20 Mar 1963; JCS Paper 2315/223; msgs, CP 260440Z May 1963; COMUSMACV 060556Z Jul; CP 212210Z; U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk. 3, pt. IVB.4, pp. 4, 15, 14U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk. 3, pt. IVB.4, pp. 15, 17; Drachnik, Interview with Fitzgerald; CINCPAC, Command History, 1963, pp. 204, 216-19; msgs, CP 212210Z Jul 1963; COMUSMACV 070655Z

performed unevenly and suffered heavy casualties. CINCPAC, however, described the action as atypical of most South Vietnamese operations. Admiral Felt also criticized the U.S. press for exaggerating the negative aspects of the fight. Admiral Anderson reiterated that evaluation and added that the "Ap Bach [sic.] operation is considered a success for the South Vietnamese forces." The CNO also observed that the "overall U.S. effort in Vietnam vis-a-vis the Communist[s] continues to show substantial and gratifying progress and the Vietnamese armed forces, after a year of reorganizing and training by the U.S., are only now beginning to move into high gear. "15 In June Admiral Anderson expressed an even greater confidence. He assured Captain Quyen that "all available evidence indicates that the high tide of the Viet Cong insurgency may have been reached and is now ebbing." The CNO added that “the dark days of 1961 and 1962 have given way to a more hopeful present and the bright promise of ultimate victory now looms on the horizon."'16

On the other hand, Commander Seventh Fleet's liaison officer with the MACV headquarters in Saigon reported a difference of opinion among incountry personnel over the success of the war effort. He found staff officers optimistic, but "informal and unofficial comments from personnel working with the RVN forces point more toward 'escalating stalemate.'''17

Deficiencies in the South Vietnamese armed forces, made evident during the battle of Ap Bac, were mirrored in the country's political fabric. Beginning in May, South Vietnamese Buddhists, including many monks, began active street demonstrations to protest perceived and real government abuses. The regime's reaction was swift and harsh. The crisis became increasingly widespread and violent in the summer. The selfimmolation of Buddhist monks in the streets of Saigon revealed the fervency of the religious opposition to Diem's government. Other antiDiem factions used the turmoil to advance their causes. Rumor of planned attempts to overthrow the South Vietnamese leader began to circulate freely.18

15Ltr, CNO to Flag and General Officers, of 24 Jan 1963. See also U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk. 3, pt. IVB.5, pp. 1-2; CINCPAC, Command History, 1963, p. 203; msg, CP 100910Z Jan 1963. 16Ltr, Anderson to Quyen, of 28 Jun 1963.

17Msg, COM7FLT 070938Z May 1963.

18 Memo, OP-61 to SECNAV, ser 00680P61 of 26 Jul 1963; U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk. 3, pt. IVB.5, pp. 4-12.

Nonetheless, some U.S. officials considered the situation manageable. At the end of July Rear Admiral Henry L. Miller, Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans on the CINCPAC staff, reported:

In regard to the COMUSMACV business, it is all going exceptionally well. As a matter of fact, we have a comprehensive plan for South Vietnam which wraps up the whole counterinsurgency effort by 13 December 1965. However, if we can settle the Buddhist problem and get the "coup" scares settled down, and continue the Phase II Campaign Plan wherein the ARVN troops in all four areas push as hard as they have since 1 July of this year, Harkins believes that it can be over by 1 January 1964.19

Other U.S. leaders were less optimistic at this point, as it was becoming increasingly clear that Diem's hold on the government, and consequently the war effort, was loosening.

The Kennedy administration, not wanting to instigate action against Diem by moving away from him, but uncertain of his longevity as head of the government, adopted a "wait and see" policy. Public demonstration of close association between the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments was avoided. In this regard, routine ship visits took on added significance. Providence (CLG-6), flagship of the Seventh Fleet, was scheduled to visit Saigon for the traditional South Vietnamese Independence Day celebration on 26 October. Admiral Felt, citing the gravity of the situation in Saigon, postponed the annual port call.

The possibility of having to protect or even evacuate Americans from South Vietnam, in the event of a coup, was now deemed real. Planning for such an eventuality was undertaken. By late August the internal situation had grown so serious that U.S. leaders took steps to ensure the safety of non-combatant Americans. Late on 25 August CINCPAC directed the Pacific Fleet commander to station naval forces off the South Vietnamese coast prepared to evacuate 4,600 U.S. nationals. Captain John Boyum's Amphibious Ready Group sortied from Subic Bay the next day and proceeded to a point within one day's sailing time from the mouth of the Saigon River. Princeton, Noble (APA-218), and Thomaston carried the Marine Special Landing Force. The group was escorted by DeHaven (DD

19Ltr, Miller to Stroh, of 30 Jul 1963. The view that the military struggle was still favorable to the South Vietnamese was shared by other U.S. military leaders. See msgs, JCS 112003Z Sep 1963; CP 122055Z.

727) and Lyman K. Swenson (DD-729). Also on the 26th, Rear Admiral Daniel F. Smith was ordered to sail his Attack Carrier Task Group 77.5 to within 200 miles of Boyum's force in order to provide air cover for the possible evacuation. Hancock, in company with three destroyers, quickly made for the designated operating area.

These preparatory steps shortened transit time when, on 28 August, the JCS directed the evacuation force to concentrate off Vung Tau. At the same time, CINCPACFLT readied two Marine battalion landing teams on Okinawa and Marine transport aircraft in Japan for movement to Saigon. By 30 August, with a naval task force close off shore and transport aircraft ready on Okinawa, Admiral Felt possessed the resources to land three Marine BLTs almost simultaneously, covered by naval aviation. And that same day a fourth Marine battalion was embarked in attack transport Lenawee, which promptly put to sea bound for the Southeast Asian coast.

To avoid precipitating a panic in the South Vietnamese capital, the movement of U.S. naval forces in the South China Sea was publicly described as a routine training exercise. This discretion paid off when the internal crisis temporarily eased. Accordingly, on 3 September, Admiral Felt returned the transport aircraft to normal activities. The rest of the alerted evacuation and protection force remained in readiness for another week as the situation in Saigon was assessed by U.S. leaders. Then, on 11 September CINCPAC returned all naval forces to normal operations, although a carrier task group and the Amphibious Ready Group were retained in the South China Sea on twenty-four hours notice.20

This deployment proved to be the first of several in the worsening South Vietnamese internal crisis. Buddhist protest demonstrations subsided during September and October 1963, but the government appeared leaderless and disoriented to the Kennedy administration. U.S. leaders increasingly feared that the Diem regime was incapable of uniting the fractious South Vietnamese body politic and that the Communists would

20CNO Flag Plot, WESTPAC Situation Charts, 26 Aug-13 Sep 1963; CINCPAC, Command History, 1963, pp. 230-32; COM7FLT, "RVN SITREPS 1 (011018Z Sep)-12 (121210Z Sep); ltrs, Miller to Moorer, encl. in memo, CINCPAC to COM7FLT, ser 00684-63 of 8 Jul 1963; Moorer to Anderson, of 26 Jul 1963; memo, OP-61 to SECNAV, ser 00680P61 of 26 Jul; msgs, ALUSNA Saigon, COMUSMACV, AMEMB Saigon, CP, AMCONSUL Hue, COM7FLT, CTF76, CPFLT 5 Aug-11 Sep 1963; COM7FLT, Command History, 1963, p. 7; CPFLT, Preparatory Actions RVN SITREPS 1 (300032Z Aug)-7 (130244Z Sep); CINCPACFLT, Annual Report, FY 1963 Supplement, ser 15/00838 of 30 Sep; U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk. 3, pt. IVB.5, pp. 12-36; bk. 12, pp. 526-35, 546-47. 554-73.