Perceptions of the Conflict in South Vietnam and the Diem Coup As the U.S. advisory and military support program built up the material, personnel, and organizational strength of the Vietnamese armed forces from 1961 to 1963, many American leaders expressed guarded confidence in the allied ability to counter the Communist insurgency. Although developments in the military sphere initially gave reason for hope, the increasing weakness of the South Vietnamese political structure undermined this optimism and led to a climactic turning point in the war. At the third Secretary of Defense conference, on 19 February 1962, both General Harkins and Ambassador Nolting agreed that there was improvement in South Vietnamese internal security. The number of Viet Cong initiated incidents had declined steadily since the end of 1961, and government forces were expanding their operations against the enemy. The U.S. civilian officials, and Admiral Felt, summarized their estimation. of the situation thus: "South Vietnam had earlier been described as a country going down a steep slope to disaster. We can't say that the direction has been reversed - but for the moment the slope has leveled out a bit." CINCPAC soon afterward, however, cautioned that while Viet Cong activity had diminished, the enemy still possessed the ability to strike at will and in force in his long-term battle of attrition. The CNO reiterated the perception that the campaign to root out and destroy the insurgency would be a slow, extended process, requiring years of effort.2 'SECDEF, "Record of Third Secretary of Defense Conference, 19 Feb 1962," pp. 1-10, 1-5. 2Msg, CP 230815Z Feb 1962; memo, OP-60 to CNO, ser BM00250-62 of 26 Feb; ltr, CNO to Flag and General Officers, of 7 Mar. By mid-March 1962, U.S. civilian officials and military leaders concerned with South Vietnam began to exude a "cautious optimism." U.S. military support forces were in-country and many provisions of the plan of action to buttress the South Vietnamese counterinsurgency program were being implemented. At the fourth Secretary of Defense meeting at CINCPAC headquarters, on 21 March, General Harkins expressed gratification over the industry of U.S. military personnel and the growing enthusiasm and amenability to advice of the South Vietnamese armed forces. Citing the general's reports to him of encouraging Viet Cong-toARVN loss ratios, during the preceding weeks, Admiral Felt stated that the "pendulum seems to be swinging our way." Secretary of Defense McNamara also was encouraged by the apparent change in the situation. By the end of the conference he was questioning Ambassador Nolting "whether the fact that we are beginning to win the war was realized by the people." As a result of the confident reports given at this meeting, the Secretary of Defense cancelled the monthly gatherings and, soon after, the semi-weekly "Beef-up" reports on the status of the U.S. aid program." McNamara's perception of gradual improvement in the counterinsurgency struggle was reaffirmed during his whirlwind tour of Southeast Asia from 9 to 11 May. After inspecting various U.S. military installations and Vietnamese fortified hamlets, and talking with officials of both governments, he praised General Harkins for his leadership of the burgeoning American command." 4 Naval officers also revealed increasing satisfaction with the course of events. In late July Admiral Anderson conducted a three-day visit to the Southeast Asian trouble spot, primarily in response to Secretary of Defense McNamara's request that members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff personally evaluate the situation there. The CNO also was aware of Captain Drachnik's complaint that since the preceding December only one senior naval officer had visited South Vietnam. The captain was concerned that "there have been almost no Navy people who have [shown] an interest in what we are doing. It does get a little lonely here." 'SECDEF, "Record, Fourth Secretary of Defense Conference, 21 March 1962," pp. 1-5, 1-1. Ibid., pp. N-2, 1-5. "Ibid.; memo, OP-60 to CNO, ser BM00425-62 of 2 Apr 1962; ltr, CNO to Flag and General Officers, of 13 Apr; CINCPAC, Command History, 1962, pp. 49-50. "U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk. 12, pp. 479-80. 'Ltr, Drachnik to Anderson, of 22 May 1962 encl. in ltr, Anderson to Drachnik, of 11 Jun. Admiral Hooper, COMPHIBFOR, Seventh Fleet, at the time, has observed that the Navy generally regarded Perceptions of the Conflict in South Vietnam and the Diem Coup As the U.S. advisory and military support program built up the material, personnel, and organizational strength of the Vietnamese armed forces from 1961 to 1963, many American leaders expressed guarded confidence in the allied ability to counter the Communist insurgency. Although developments in the military sphere initially gave reason for hope, the increasing weakness of the South Vietnamese political structure undermined this optimism and led to a climactic turning point in the war. At the third Secretary of Defense conference, on 19 February 1962, both General Harkins and Ambassador Nolting agreed that there was improvement in South Vietnamese internal security. The number of Viet Cong initiated incidents had declined steadily since the end of 1961, and government forces were expanding their operations against the enemy. The U.S. civilian officials, and Admiral Felt, summarized their estimation of the situation thus: "South Vietnam had earlier been described as a country going down a steep slope to disaster. We can't say that the direction has been reversed but for the moment the slope has leveled out a bit." CINCPAC soon afterward, however, cautioned that while Viet Cong activity had diminished, the enemy still possessed the ability to strike at will and in force in his long-term battle of attrition. The CNO reiterated the perception that the campaign to root out and destroy the insurgency would be a slow, extended process, requiring years of effort.2 1 'SECDEF, "Record of Third Secretary of Defense Conference, 19 Feb 1962," pp. 1-10, 1-5. 2Msg, CP 230815Z Feb 1962; memo, OP-60 to CNO, ser BM00250-62 of 26 Feb; ltr, CNO to Flag and General Officers, of 7 Mar. 3 By mid-March 1962, U.S. civilian officials and military leaders concerned with South Vietnam began to exude a "cautious optimism." U.S. military support forces were in-country and many provisions of the plan of action to buttress the South Vietnamese counterinsurgency program were being implemented. At the fourth Secretary of Defense meeting at CINCPAC headquarters, on 21 March, General Harkins expressed gratification over the industry of U.S. military personnel and the growing enthusiasm and amenability to advice of the South Vietnamese armed forces. Citing the general's reports to him of encouraging Viet Cong-toARVN loss ratios, during the preceding weeks, Admiral Felt stated that the "pendulum seems to be swinging our way." Secretary of Defense McNamara also was encouraged by the apparent change in the situation. By the end of the conference he was questioning Ambassador Nolting "whether the fact that we are beginning to win the war was realized by the people."4 As a result of the confident reports given at this meeting, the Secretary of Defense cancelled the monthly gatherings and, soon after, the semi-weekly "Beef-up" reports on the status of the U.S. aid program." McNamara's perception of gradual improvement in the counterinsurgency struggle was reaffirmed during his whirlwind tour of Southeast Asia from 9 to 11 May. After inspecting various U.S. military installations and Vietnamese fortified hamlets, and talking with officials of both governments, he praised General Harkins for his leadership of the burgeoning American command." Naval officers also revealed increasing satisfaction with the course of events. In late July Admiral Anderson conducted a three-day visit to the Southeast Asian trouble spot, primarily in response to Secretary of Defense McNamara's request that members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff personally evaluate the situation there. The CNO also was aware of Captain Drachnik's complaint that since the preceding December only one senior naval officer had visited South Vietnam. The captain was concerned that "there have been almost no Navy people who have [shown] an interest in what we are doing. It does get a little lonely here."? 'SECDEF, "Record, Fourth Secretary of Defense Conference, 21 March 1962," pp. 1-5, 1-1. Ibid., pp. N-2, 1-5. Ibid., memo, OP-60 to CNO, ser BM00425-62 of 2 Apr 1962; ltr, CNO to Flag and General Officers, of 13 Apr; CINCPAC, Command History, 1962, pp. 49-50. "U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk. 12, pp. 479-80. 'Ltr, Drachnik to Anderson, of 22 May 1962 encl. in ltr, Anderson to Drachnik, of 11 Jun. Admiral Hooper, COMPHIBFOR, Seventh Fleet, at the time, has observed that the Navy generally regarded 8 From 27 to 29 July, Admiral Anderson toured U.S. and South Vietnamese military installations in Saigon, Soc Trang, Tuy Hoa, and Nha Trang and held discussions with military and civilian leaders. The CNO was impressed that President Diem "appeared knowledgeable and seemed to be coming around to ideas of decentralizing." The admiral also observed that General Harkins, Captain Drachnik, and the other U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam were doing an outstanding job. Admiral Anderson recorded that "what we saw is a sound basis for cautious optimism," while pointing out that "of course, we have not yet received the full impact of the communist reaction." At the same time in Washington, Captain Donald N. Clay, who headed the Special Operations Section in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, informed highlevel conferees at a Defense Department staff meeting that the Communists had been stopped in South Vietnam, "for here our efforts to train and equip the small Vietnamese navy have paid off."10 Similarly, Commander Everett A. Parke, who served as Naval Attache, Saigon, from August 1960 to August 1962, observed on his return to Washington that he felt "somewhat cautiously optimistic at this point." However, he tempered his evaluation: 11 I think there is some hope, but we must not expect to see a sudden dramatic improvement. We are up against people who are capable of outsitting us and outwaiting us, and unless we make our minds up to try and get this thing put into long-term perspective, I think we will be deluding ourselves. 12 Nonetheless, key indicators continued to reflect a favorable trend. A MACV analysis of the military situation in March 1963 showed that Viet Cong incidents were below the 1962 average, and the rate of company and battalion-size Viet Cong attacks also had fallen. Further, the rate of the conflict there as a land effort. See Hooper, Interview, p. 353. See also memos, OP-60 to Persons/ Needham, ser 0608P60 of 14 May 1962; OSD, of 26 Jul. 8 Anderson Diary of 6 Aug 1962. See also CNO, Itinerary of Pacific Tour, Anderson Diary. 'OP-09, memo, ser 00133P09 of 10 Aug 1962. See also Anderson Diary, of 6 Aug. 19OSD, memo, of 26 Jul 1962, p. 4-1. "Everett A. Parke, "Report From Vietnam," ONI Review (Oct 1962), p. 441. 12 Ibid. p. 441. See also Itr, Anderson to Nolting, of 28 Dec 1962; CINCPAC, Command History, 1962, pp. 147-49; U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk. 12, pp. 487-89, 504-05. |