typical operation, in the summer of 1963, five LSMs carried ammunition from Saigon to army forces in Danang and returned with excess equipment and prisoners. The LSMs were often directed to pick up or deliver cargo to Nha Trang or Qui Nhon on these cruises, which lasted from seven to ten days.43

Vietnamese crews accepted transfer of most of the larger ships in the United States and, after receiving several weeks of training and familiarization, sailed them to Vietnam. Mobile training teams were dispatched to Southeast Asia to give instruction in the operation of smaller craft, such as the MLMSS. Mobile Training Team 3-63, commanded by Lieutenant (j.g.) Dennis McInerby, trained ninety-one Vietnamese crewmen in the operation of the MLMSS at Vung Tau between August and December 1963.44

Because high-level U.S. planners looked at Vietnam and other MAP recipients as part of the overall collective security system in Asia, these navies were intended not only to defend their own countries, but to contribute to the allied effort. Although the North Vietnamese did not have submarines, the Soviets and Chinese Communists did. Thus, Admiral Felt expressed his concern about the low priority given to antisubmarine warfare by countries in the Pacific Command. While Captain Drachnik observed that "there is insufficient evidence to support a theory of a submarine threat from the VC or the DRV, "45 broader defense needs required South Vietnamese readiness to deal with the undersea danger. Accordingly, the Force Objective Plan of April 1963, as had others before it, called for the continued development of an ASW capability in the Vietnamese Navy.

Until the policy was reviewed in 1965, PCs were required to keep their antisubmarine warfare equipment operational and from time to time to participate in exercises. Submarine chaser Van Don (HQ-06) engaged in one exercise with Bluegill (SS-242) on 6 April 1962, two days after the American submarine visited Saigon. Similarly, between 29 August and 6 September 1962, four of the Vietnamese Navy's PCs and one PCE operated with Queenfish (SS-393) about forty miles off Nha Trang. The final combined antisubmarine warfare exercise in this period occurred

43COMPHIBPAC, report, 6-S-62 of 25 Jul 1962; ONI, report, 11-S-62 of 3 Oct.

44Ltrs, OICMTT 3-63 to CHNAVSEC, of 26 Nov 1963; OICMTT 3-63 to CNO, ser 4950 of 13 Dec; Le Ba Thang, Interview, pp. 5-7.

45Ltr, CHNAVSEC to CO VNN, ser 0378 of 23 Aug 1962.

between 7 and 14 April 1963, when Capitaine (AGSS-336) trained with six Vietnamese Navy PCs and PCEs under the command of Lieutenant Commander Dinh Manh Hung. No exercises were scheduled in the latter half of 1963 and thereafter, because Captain Drachnik felt that the Sea Force ships could not be spared from the more crucial coastal patrol mission.46

A similar theater defense planning requirement motivated the Vietnamese Navy's preparation to sweep coastal waters for sophisticated magnetic and acoustic mines. Hence, in March 1962 three MSCs sailed to the Philippines to conduct degaussing (demagnetizing) operations with Surfbird (ADG-383). On board the Vietnamese ships were forty-five midshipmen from the Vietnamese Naval Academy taking their first training cruise. Then, from 20 to 22 August two of the MSCs participated with a British flotilla in a minesweeping exercise off Vietnam. In August 1963, to save time, Surfbird visited Cam Ranh Bay to provide the same services she had at Sangley. Late that year, a portable degaussing range was installed at Cam Ranh Bay, so that the Vietnamese were no longer dependent upon the United States for these services.47

More relevant to the current military situation in South Vietnam were amphibious operations, in which the Sea Force figured prominently. Throughout the period, U.S. advisors encouraged the Vietnamese to carry out landings with amphibious ships rather than use them on logistic operations. Showing initiative in this regard, the Vietnamese Navy undertook a large-scale amphibious operation on the Camau Peninsula in January 1963. The start of the operation was delayed, partly because of controversy over control of the forces. The IV Corps commander, an army general, disagreed with plans to give overall command to the navy. Nonetheless, the operation was finally placed under the direct control of Captain Quyen for both the landing and ground phases of the action. Although the command setup caused no serious problems, U.S. naval

46Msg, ALUSNA Saigon 181001Z Apr 1962; memo, SECNAV to SECDEF, of 8 Aug 1962; ltrs, CO Capitaine to CHNAVSEC, ser 028 of 18 Apr 1963; Senior Junk Force Advisor to CHNAVSEC, of 19 Apr; J.O. Richter, Jr., End of Tour Report, ser 5213 of 23 Apr 1964; ltr, CHNAVSEC to CO VNN, ser N0438-63 of 3 May 1963, CINCPACFLT, Annual Report, FY1963; Dinh Manh Hung, transcript of interview with Oscar P. Fitzgerald, Naval Historical Center, in Alexandria, VA, 19 and 21 Aug 1975, pp. 4-7.

47 Ltr, CHNAVSEC to CO VNN, ser 875 of 18 Oct 1960; memos, SECNAV to SECDEF, of 16 Nov 1962; CO Surfbird to CHMAAGVN, ser 091 of 17 Sep 1963; msg, CHNAVSEC 110053Z Apr 1963; Browne, Interview.

advisors recommended that in future operations the command arrangements follow more closely the American practice, which passed control of the operation to a Marine or Army officer once the landing force was established ashore.

A naval task force of 1 LST and 4 LSMs, carrying two marine battalions and their American Marine advisors, later joined by 2 LSILs, and 1 LSSL, sailed on 1 January 1963 to begin the largest naval and amphibious operation ever mounted by the Vietnamese. A second LSSL, plus units of the 22nd RAG and two junk divisions, also participated. Because of the shallow depth of the water off the Camau Peninsula, the marines landed in small assault boats. They met no resistance and in fact found the intended objective stripped of military material. Apparently, the Viet Cong had expected the attack and fled. On the 8th both marine battalions were picked up and transported to Tan An by an LST and an LSM in order to begin Phase II of the operation. Meanwhile, RAG units patrolled inland waterways to cut off food shipments to Communist troops and provide troop lift and gunfire support if the need arose. 48

By the end of the month the Vietnamese encountered only light resistance, but they accomplished their mission of expanding government control in an area which long had been a Communist stronghold. Casualties stood at 5 killed and 28 wounded, while Communist losses were estimated as 40 killed and many more wounded. During the rest of January Vietnamese engineers also constructed several strategic hamlets and resettled 3,000 people in the vicinity of Nam Can. In February Communist opposition to government inroads into their territory intensified. The land phase of the operation was terminated on 4 March 1963. Not until the mid-1960s would regular government troops return here in strength.49

Even though the marines departed in March, the Sea Force continued to patrol the area in support of the Civil Guard-manned outposts at Nam Can, Ong Trang, and Tan An. The seven-day patrol of LSSL Linh Kiem (HQ-226) on the Bo De and Cua Lon Rivers in mid-1963 was typical. Beginning on 27 August, the ship escorted an LSM to Tan An,

48 Navy Section, "Weekly Progress Reports," of 28 Dec 1962-3 Jan 1963; 4-10 Jan; 11-17 Jan; ltrs, CHNAVSEC, ser 1100-63 of 23 Apr 1963; CINCPAC, ser 00394 of 29 Apr.

49Naval History Division, "History of Naval Operations in Vietnam, 1946-1963," pp. 224-27.

Linh Kiem (HQ-226), an LSSL of the Vietnamese Navy's Sea Force, patrols one of South Vietnam's innumerable inland waterways.

transported Viet Cong prisoners to Ong Trang, and fired shore bombardment exercises along the river banks. After observing the operation of the LSSL, an American advisor, Lieutenant Jon A. Askland, stated that "of the seven day patrol, few tangible results can be reported. [But] the LSSL is on patrol primarily as a deterrent, and as a deterrent, the ship was effective." The Viet Cong chose not to risk exposure to the LSSL's one 3inch, four 40-millimeter, and four 20-millimeter guns.50

The River Force

As with the other components of the Vietnamese Navy, the River Force expanded as a result of the U.S. government's decision of November 1961 to give added support to the Vietnamese. During 1962 a sixth RAG, with nineteen boats and about 250 men, was activated. One LCM arrived from the United States in February and seven LCVPs in April to fill the unit's complement. The other eleven boats were former derelicts reconditioned at the Saigon Naval Shipyard. The new RAG was conceived as a mobile group which would operate from a mother ship, an LCU, in the Saigon River and the Rung Sat in support of Vietnamese Army forces."1 The new RAG, designated the 22nd River Assault Group, became operational on 1 September 1962. Less than two weeks later, the unit sailed for the Rung Sat, with one company of marines embarked, to test the new mobile concept during the thirty-day deployment. The unit landed small parties of marines dressed in civilian clothes to gather intelligence and then transported larger units to the area to take advantage of the information collected. The operation was concluded on 8 October with the following results: 26 enemy soldiers killed and 1 arms factory, 1 hospital, 1 training camp, and 1 sector headquarters destroyed, at a cost of 1 sailor killed and 3 wounded. A captured Communist document bemoaned the success of the operation: "Disruption of traffic lines and shortage of food stuffs is critical. All units and elements send inventory of anti-boat weapons for coordination of counter-action."52

In addition to the boats for the new RAG, the River Force received twenty-four monitors, LCVPs, and other craft. The River Force controlled a total of 208 boats at the end of 1963, almost twice the number in the force in 1959. However, only 157 of the 208 boats were armed and armored. The remaining craft, consisting of LCUs and LCVPs, provided local transportation at Danang, Nha Trang, Cam Ranh, Vung Tau, Phu Quoc, Can Tho, and Saigon.

As the River Force grew in size, its primary mission remained the same: to support army operations in the Mekong Delta. Other than occasional efforts during army operations, the River Force did not attempt significant

Navy Section, Progress Report, "22nd River Assault Group," of 18 Jul 1962. 52Navy Section, Progress Report, "Status of VNN River Force," of 6 Sep 1962. See also Undated Brief, "Activation of 22nd River Assault Group;" msg, ALUSNA Saigon 172210Z Oct 1962.