string, wood, and tobacco could often be identified as originating in North Vietnam.30

Another aid in separating the innocent fishermen from the Communist agents was the "Junk Blue Book," first issued in August 1962. This undertaking, sponsored by the Research and Development Field Unit of the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense, was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Marion C. Dalby, USMC, and Commander William L. Thede. Three-man field teams visited each of the twelve major population centers along the Vietnamese coast. Their research was augmented by aerial photography. Published with both English and Vietnamese texts, the book identified thirty-two distinct junk types and the areas where they were most commonly found. The book served as a training aid and identification handbook for U.S. advisors and Vietnamese officers assigned to coastal patrol duties.

Initial planning called for two-thirds of the force to be at sea while onethird was in port to rest the crews, maintain the boats, and defend the base. By the summer of 1963, when the construction program was completed, the proportion of junks on patrol averaged between 40 and 50 percent daily. The night, however, belonged to the Communists until the installation of searchlights on motorized junks resulted in some patrolling after dark. Repair and personnel problems were the main causes of the low operational figures, but poor leadership was a contributing factor. By the end of the year, the operational readiness rate remained between 40 and 45 percent.31

The quality of the coastal divisions varied. Commander Jerome L. Ashcroft reported, after a visit to Coastal Division 33 in September 1963, that it was "without qualification, the best trained and most effective division visited by the Senior Junk Force Advisor. [The commander] is a professional and his men model him."32 On the other hand, Ashcroft's unannounced visit to Coastal Division 37 about the same time found none of its junks on patrol. Somewhere in between were Coastal Divisions 15 and 16. Lieutenant (j.g.) Bruce Ryan, the 1st Coastal District advisor, reported that

30JCS, report, "Project Beef-Up," of 5 Dec 1961; Navy Section, Progress Report, "Coastal Infiltration," of Aug 1962; "Weekly Progress Report," of 28 Aug-3 Sep 1963; Senior Junk Force Advisor, report, of 4 Dec 1963; JCS, report, "Visit of Team to South Vietnam," of Jan 1963. 31Navy Section, MAAG, "Weekly Progress Reports," of Aug-Dec 1963.

32Ltrs, Ashcroft to CHNAVSEC, of 5 and 12 Sep 1963.

both 15th and 16th Divisions appear to be keeping their [sailing] junks in good condition and frequently underway; and, although the 16th's primary activities seem to be commercial fishing and woodcutting as opposed to the more routine patrol activities of Division 15, the net results of the two divisions appear the same no significant contacts.3

. 33

The work of the junkmen was monotonous, but also dangerous, as one action on 19 August 1963 revealed. At 0300 that day, eight junks set sail from Cam Ranh Bay for Vinh Hy, about twenty miles to the south. The group patrolled the seaward approach to Vinh Hy until daybreak. Then, the eight junks sailed through the inlet in column about sixty yards apart, while Nam Du (HQ-607), a motor gunboat (PGM), stood by just outside the bay. At 0745 the junks fired on a deserted village which was suspected of harboring Viet Cong agents. When there was no return fire, the junks beached and prepared to land a shore party. At that point an estimated ten to twenty Viet Cong opened up on the beach party with small arms fire. As the junks pulled away from the beach, Lieutenant Dallas W. Shawkey, the 2nd Coastal District advisor, was hit. The junks returned the fire while Vietnamese corpsmen attended Shawkey. The wounded advisor was transferred to the PGM which steamed for Nha Trang, about two hours away. There he was taken to a U.S. Army field hospital to recover from his wounds.34

During 1962 the Vietnamese Navy caught 320 enemy junks and captured 111 confirmed Viet Cong. All of the prisoners were engaged in intracoastal transport within South Vietnam. However, six Communists were captured in March 1962 carrying explosives in sampans across the Cambodian border on the Mekong and Bassac Rivers. By April 1963, when all twenty-eight coastal divisions were deployed, U.S. advisors evaluated control of the coast as 90 percent effective. In the first six months of the year, only one incident involved a North Vietnamese junk, which was captured near Hue. In 1963 only a small number of sampans was infiltrating across the Cambodian border on the Mekong River. By year's end, the Coastal Force and Sea Force had checked 127,000 junks and 353,000 fishermen. Of the 3,000 suspects detained, the Sea Force took 500 and the Coastal Force 2,500. The coastal surveillance efforts

33Ltr, 1STCDADV to CHNAVSEC, of 15 Apr 1963. See also Navy Section, Fact Sheet, of Aug 1962; ARPA, "Junk Blue Book."

34Msg, COMUSMACV 190450Z Aug 1963; ltr, B.D. Graham to Senior Naval Advisor, of 19 Aug

Officers and men of the South Vietnamese Coastal Force scan the coast to locate junks or other small craft carrying arms and munitions to Viet Cong forces ashore.

continued to discover mostly internal Viet Cong traffic, rather than infiltration into the country. This conclusion was indicated by the fact that, in 1963, of the 150 confirmed Viet Cong only six had come from outside the country.35

From the small number of Viet Cong taken by the junk force, it appeared that no large-scale sea infiltration from North Vietnam of men and supplies had occurred. Lieutenant Mark V. Nelson, the 1st Coastal District advisor, reported:

[The Vietnamese commander] and I, as does [MACV Intelligence] think that there is a very small chance that the VC are infiltrating by sea. Most of the VC are in the mountains and this is where the operations are going on. Resupply is highly unlikely because of the great distances that goods must be carried through government held land. It is true that Psy War personnel are operating along the coast but these people do not carry weapons and it is next to impossible to catch them except through the use of agents.

36

Communist support for their forces in the northern part of South Vietnam probably came directly across the Demilitarized Zone or over the border from Laos. Most Communist traffic along the 1,200 miles of coastline in South Vietnam consisted of infiltration of small bands of key cadre or of intracoastal movement of small amounts of men and supplies. The junk force certainly hampered such movement but by no means completely stopped it. The appearance of Communist-made heavy weapons in the Mekong Delta suggested that some equipment was brought into that area. by sea, but there was no evidence in 1963 to confirm this. Captain Drachnik later observed that "I was convinced in my mind...that during those years there was no effective infiltration by sea...and Mr. McNamara told me later when I was on his staff in the Pentagon that he too was convinced."'37

However, evidence subsequently obtained adds credence to the contention that North Vietnam stepped up the previously minor infiltration effort in 1963. Under the aegis of the North Vietnamese Navy's 125th Sea Transportation Unit (formerly Group 759), the Communists began construction in their shipyards of trawlers with a cargo capacity of

35Navy Section, Fact Sheet, "Coastal Infiltration," of 1963.

36Ltr, 1st CO Advisor to Senior Junk Force Advisor, of 16 Aug 1963. 37Drachnik, Interview with Moss, p. 8.

50 to 100 tons. During 1963, the first full year of operation, the unit conducted eight trips to the South. The small trawlers carried arms and ammunition primarily to the Camau Peninsula area, to the mouth of the Mekong River, and to the central coast of Vietnam. This latter area included delivery sites in northern Khanh Hoa, Phu Yen, and Binh Dinh Provinces. Often flying the Chinese Communist flag to conceal their identity, these ships sailed on moonless nights to a point about sixty miles offshore. This placed them beyond the effective surveillance zone of the Vietnamese Navy. At the optimum time, the ships made a run to the beach or unloaded into junks offshore. None of these trawlers was detected in 1963, much less stopped or sunk.38

In view of the unexciting patrol routine and meager results, it was not surprising that the junk commanders favored independent raiding operations. The commander of Coastal Division 33 mounted a typical operation in July 1963. He had received reports from local villagers that the 206th Viet Cong Company was headquartered at the village of Dong near the mouth of the Soirap River. The reports indicated that the Viet Cong unit planned to attack a nearby village on the 20th, leaving behind in Dong only a small garrison. Deciding to assault the lightly manned base, the division commander sortied with a command junk and a River Force. vedette from his base at Vam Lang, six miles to the north. He entered the channel to Dong about noon on 20 July. With machine guns blazing, the command junk landed the thirty-man raiding party, which started inland to Dong. Almost immediately the machine guns on both the vedette and the command junk jammed and the troops were called back to the boats, which withdrew to repair the weapons. A second landing was attempted, but then the Communists drove off the boats. Four men were wounded. In the meantime, requests for air support were turned down by the sector headquarters. The sailors faced the entire Viet Cong company, which had returned earlier than expected. Undaunted, the force mounted a second attack the next day, this time with a PGM in support. Beginning about noon on the 21st, the PGM began a two and one-half hour bombardment

38MACV, "SECDEF Conf Agenda Book, General Harkins," of 19 Dec 1963; CICV, report, "VC/ NVA Gunrunners," No. SR67-002 of 9 Aug 1966; NAVFORV, “Maritime Infiltration into the Republic of Vietnam," of 4 Mar 1967; CINCPAC, “CINCPAC/COMPONENTS Assessment of Sea Infiltration, Committee B," of Jul 1967; CINCPAC, “Infiltration Study," of 1 May 1968; DIA, “Viet Cong Use of Cambodia," No. 6028 3647 68 of 10 May 1968; CIA, report, No. FIR-311/01873-74 of 27 Jun 1974; Judith Erdheim, Market Time, study CRC 280 (Washington: Center for Naval Analyses, 1975); Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Vietnam: The Anti-U.S. Resistance War, p. 32.