another twenty-man group, which carried out counterintelligence and counterespionage duties, serving with the Military Security Service. On 1 April 1962, the Joint General Staff created a separate twenty-one-man Intelligence Department (N-2) of the naval staff. Staff officers with the Sea Force, River Force, and coastal district commands were also given intelligence responsibilities as a collateral duty. In August 1962, Captain Drachnik requested that a mobile training team be dispatched to Vietnam to provide elements of the Vietnamese Navy with instruction in operational intelligence. U.S. fleet commanders objected to even the temporary loss of these key personnel. Admiral Anderson was sympathetic with their views, but he approved Captain Drachnik's request on 25 September. Consequently, Lieutenant Commander Philip B. Shepard arrived in Vietnam in October and, working with Lieutenant (j.g.) Ray B. Huttig, intelligence advisor to the Vietnamese Navy, developed a two-week course of instruction. By mid-1963, over 200 Vietnamese officers and petty officers had received this intelligence training.14

In addition, an important command reorganization improved relations between army and naval commands in the field. The reorganization was part of the National Campaign Plan, devised by MACV in mid-1962 to streamline the Vietnamese command structure and make it more responsive. On 1 January 1963, the Vietnamese Army increased from three to four the number of areas controlled by a corps headquarters. Captain Quyen immediately submitted a proposal to the Joint General Staff calling for a reorganization to facilitate coordination between the army and the navy. As adopted on 16 October 1963, the new structure established four naval zone commands to work in conjunction with the army's four corps tactical zone commands. The naval zone commanders exercised operational control over Coastal Force, River Force, and Sea Force units in their area. With a few exceptions, the Coastal Force and River Force controlled only administrative and logistic functions. The Sea Force retained operational control of its ships only when they were not operating in territorial waters.15

4U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk. 11, pp. 419-20; CINCPAC, Command History, 1961, p. 196; memo, DCNO (Logistics) to DCNO (Plans and Policy), ser 001215P401 of 5 Nov 1962; MTT 5-63, report, of 3. Dec 1962; Navy Section, MAAG, Fact Sheet, "Naval Intelligence Organization," of 16 Aug 1962; msg, CHMAAG 190039Z Sep 1962.

15Navy Section, MAAG, "Agenda Items for Conference with President Diem, Aug 63;" U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk. 3, pt. IVB.4, pp. 5-6.

Expansion of the Vietnamese Navy

The increase in the number of U.S. advisors in Vietnam reflected the growth of the Vietnamese Navy. From 3,200 men in June 1961 the navy, exclusive of its subordinate marine corps, grew to 6,000 men in February 1963. This burgeoning of the navy placed severe demands on the Vietnamese training establishment. To meet the growing need for officers, in August 1962 classes at the Vietnamese Naval Academy were increased from 50 to 100 men and the training time reduced from two years to eighteen months. The Vietnamese also set up a special petty officer training program. To assist this effort, Mobile Training Team 3-62, headed by Chief Radarman Elden Baldwin, arrived at Nha Trang in January 1962 for an eleven-month tour. These steps helped the Vietnamese Navy to fulfill the training needs of its expanding forces. 12

As the Vietnamese Navy grew, better command-control procedures were necessary, particularly at the naval headquarters in Saigon. There efficient communications were needed to replace the patchwork system left over from the French era. Briefed on the problem during his visit to Saigon in December 1961, Secretary McNamara directed that communications in the navy be modernized. Lieutenant John R. King was assigned temporarily to Vietnam on 28 December 1961 to develop plans for improving the Vietnamese system. During June and July 1962, the headquarters network, by then operated by a communications section, was completely rehabilitated, based on King's plans. Work was conducted on systems for four coastal surveillance centers and four River Force bases as well. 13

Another essential requirement for an effective Vietnamese military command was intelligence. Before 1962, Vietnamese naval intelligence responsibilities were handled by the operations department of the naval staff; by a twenty-man section, which kept current information on the North Vietnamese naval order of battle, on the Joint General Staff; and by

12Navy Section, MAAG, "Agenda Items for Conference with President Diem, Aug 63;" Navy Section, MAAG, Fact Sheet, "Training in the VNN," of Sep 1963; Navy Section, MAAG, Progress Report, "Navy Schools," Aug 1962; Thomas M. Browne, transcript of interview with Dean Allard, Naval Historical Center, in Washington, DC, 31 Jan 1964; CHNAG, memo, ser 0070 of 10 Jul 1964; Itr, Drachnik to Ricketts, of 13 Mar, p. 2; MTT 3-62, report, of 11 Jan 1963; Education and Training Advisory Team, report, of 18 Jul 1962; Drachnik, Interview with Moss.

"MTT 5-62, report, of 28 May 1962; NAG, Progress Report, "VNN Communications Improvement," of 23 Aug 1962; CINCPAC, Command History, 1962, pp. 164, 196.

another twenty-man group, which carried out counterintelligence and counterespionage duties, serving with the Military Security Service. On 1 April 1962, the Joint General Staff created a separate twenty-one-man Intelligence Department (N-2) of the naval staff. Staff officers with the Sea Force, River Force, and coastal district commands were also given intelligence responsibilities as a collateral duty. In August 1962, Captain Drachnik requested that a mobile training team be dispatched to Vietnam to provide elements of the Vietnamese Navy with instruction in operational intelligence. U.S. fleet commanders objected to even the temporary loss of these key personnel. Admiral Anderson was sympathetic with their views, but he approved Captain Drachnik's request on 25 September. Consequently, Lieutenant Commander Philip B. Shepard arrived in Vietnam in October and, working with Lieutenant (j.g.) Ray B. Huttig, intelligence advisor to the Vietnamese Navy, developed a two-week course of instruction. By mid-1963, over 200 Vietnamese officers and petty officers had received this intelligence training.14

In addition, an important command reorganization improved relations between army and naval commands in the field. The reorganization was part of the National Campaign Plan, devised by MACV in mid-1962 to streamline the Vietnamese command structure and make it more responsive. On 1 January 1963, the Vietnamese Army increased from three to four the number of areas controlled by a corps headquarters. Captain Quyen immediately submitted a proposal to the Joint General Staff calling for a reorganization to facilitate coordination between the army and the navy. As adopted on 16 October 1963, the new structure established four naval zone commands to work in conjunction with the army's four corps. tactical zone commands. The naval zone commanders exercised operational control over Coastal Force, River Force, and Sea Force units in their area. With a few exceptions, the Coastal Force and River Force controlled only administrative and logistic functions. The Sea Force retained operational control of its ships only when they were not operating in territorial waters.15

14U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk. 11, pp. 419-20; CINCPAC, Command History, 1961, p. 196; memo, DCNO (Logistics) to DCNO (Plans and Policy), ser 001215P401 of 5 Nov 1962; MTT 5-63, report, of 3. Dec 1962; Navy Section, MAAG, Fact Sheet, "Naval Intelligence Organization," of 16 Aug 1962; msg, CHMAAG 190039Z Sep 1962.

Navy Section, MAAG, "Agenda Items for Conference with President Diem, Aug 63;" U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk. 3, pt. IVB.4, pp. 5-6.

As the size of the navy grew, the demands on the supply system increased correspondingly. During the first six months of 1962, the advisory team at the Naval Supply Center in Saigon expanded from six to sixteen men and their efforts to streamline supply management helped the center process twice the amount of supplies handled in all of 1961. Another important accomplishment of these naval advisors was the publication of a supply manual designed to speed up the system, although the Vietnamese were slow to accept it."

16

Steps also were taken to upgrade the Vietnamese Navy's ship and boat repair facilities. In order to ease the workload at the Saigon Naval Shipyard, Mobile Training Team 7A, consisting of eleven U.S. naval officers, arrived in Saigon in February 1962. During the next three months, the team reactivated an abandoned French repair yard at Cuu Long, adjacent to the shipyard, and placed its two marine railways back in operation. The new yard, named the Eastern Repair Facility, serviced the boats of three River Force groups stationed in the Saigon area. No longer would these units be forced to use the distant Western Repair Facility at Can Tho for repair work. 17

At the shipyard itself, naval advisors concentrated on improving repair support through better long-range planning, work scheduling, and waterfront operations and strengthening the technical proficiency of the 1,500-man civilian work force through training. Partly as a result of this assistance, the number of boat overhauls undertaken increased from an average of fourteen per month in 1961 to fifty-six per month in 1962, and most of them were completed on time. The shipyard additionally was able to take on the construction of fiberglass swimmer support boats, for use by army troops in the delta, and to do conversion work on newly arrived LCMs and LCVPs. 18

16Browne, Interview; Navy Section, MAAG, Progress Report, "Naval Material Center," of 30 Aug

1962.

"Navy Section, MAAG, Fact Sheet, "Development of the Eastern Repair Facility," of 16 Dec 1963; COMPHIBPAC, report, 2-S-62 of 22 Jun 1962; Navy Section, MAAG, "Agenda Items for Conference with President Diem."

18 Evenson M. Burtis, End of Tour Report, of Jun 1964; H.H. Reichert, End of Tour Report, of 6 Apr 1964; Navy Section, MAAG, Progress Report.