Services trained in antiguerrilla warfare, including the Attaches."'34 As a result, on 6 January the CNO informed his fleet commanders in chief that "all U.S. Navy personnel now in Vietnam or sent to Vietnam or such places in the future should receive sufficient training in the use of small arms and other appropriate weapons for individual protection should they become involved in combat with guerrilla-type adversaries."'35

To implement this directive, the Bureau of Naval Personnel established at fleet training activities indoctrination courses in small arms use and selfdefense to qualify individuals for Southeast Asian duty. For the next six months, naval training programs and courses of instruction in subjects related to counterinsurgency were increased significantly. Both the U.S. Naval Academy and the Naval War College intensified their teaching efforts. At the same time naval personnel, in growing numbers, received relevant instruction at non-Navy schools, such as the Armed Forces Staff College, the National War College, and the Army's Special Warfare Center. In addition, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the technical bureaus concerned with unconventional and Cold War military activities dispatched key personnel to selected areas of the world. Admiral Anderson explained to his flag officers that the "broad objective of the overall [counterinsurgency training] program is to prepare officers for command, staff, country team and departmental positions involved in planning and conducting counterinsurgency operations, with emphasis on improving U.S. capability for countering subversive insurgency in emerging nations."'36

On 19 July 1962, the Chief of Naval Operations issued a formal instruction establishing the Navy's "Counterinsurgency Education and Training Program." This comprehensive effort was designed to "familiarize officers of all grades with the history of insurgency movements, in order that they will understand the problems, characteristics, tactics and

34CNO, Minutes of Meeting of 5 Jan 1962. President Kennedy also expressed his desire that training in and knowledge of counterinsurgency operations be a prerequisite for selection to flag and general officer rank. See OP-09A, memo for record, ser 0037P09 of 9 Mar 1962. See also memo, OP-601C to OP-06, ser BM0269-62 of 10 Mar; U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk. 12, pp. 457-59.

Msg, CNO 061353Z Jan 1962. See also BUPERS 021323Z Feb.

36Ltr, CNO to Flag and General Officers, of 15 May 1962. See also memos, OP-60 to Joint Staff, ser 001193P60 of 8 Dec 1961; OSD to CNO, of 19 Mar 1962; OP-60 to OP-01P, ser 0513-62 of 20 Apr 1962.

techniques of these movements."37 Under the guidance of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, the General Line and Naval Science School, Officer Candidate School, Navy Supply Corps School, Civil Engineer Corps Officer School, U.S. Naval School, Pre-Flight, and various Navy Medical Corps schools were directed to provide ten-hour academic orientation courses in such subjects as "Communist Exploits in Revolutionary Change," "Functions of Guerrilla Warfare," "Civil-Military Relationships," and "Problems of Cross-Cultural Communications." There were plans for the U.S. Naval Academy and the General Line and Naval Science School to conduct a minimum of eight hours of "study of the social, economic, political and psychological aspects of the revolutionary process including insurgency movements and counterinsurgency operations, guerrilla warfare, psychological warfare and legal aspects of insurgency.'

38

For the middle and senior level officers at the Naval War College, an understanding of the role of U.S. government organizations and country team counterinsurgency efforts was deemed essential. This would be coupled with teaching in the capabilities of U.S. naval forces to carry out counterinsurgency operations and in the related weapons, training, supply, transportation, medical, engineering, psychological, intelligence, civil affairs, communications, political, and planning areas.

Responsibility for functional training rested with the fleet commanders in chief. In addition to specialized training for SEALS and STATS, CINCPACFLT and CINCLANTFLT were to instruct MAAG naval mission officers, selected fleet staff officers, and personnel assigned to certain mobile training teams and overseas duty stations. The military assistance advisors would receive comprehensive instruction at the Special Warfare Center in countering guerrillas and the spread of insurgency. This training was augmented by a two-week course conducted by area fleet amphibious commands in small arms use, self-defense, evasion and escape, and orientation in the functions of SEAL, STAT, boat, and mobile training teams. The mobile training team personnel also received this indoctrination. Staff officer training consisted of preparation for planning the organization, employment, and logistic support of friendly counter

37CNO, OPNAV Instruction 01500.17, ser 01666P10 of 19 Jul 1962; OPNAV Instruction 01500.17A ser 0187P34 of 12 Mar 1965, which superseded 01500.17, was modified to include enlisted personnel in the general training program.

38CNO, OPNAV Instruction 01500.17.

guerrilla forces. 39

A third element in the naval instruction of July 1962 was the suggestion that personnel conduct self-orientation programs in counterinsurgency matters. Because of the forward positioning of naval forces near troubled areas of the world, it was altogether likely that the Navy would be called upon to undertake activities in these regions. The Chief of Naval Operations apprised the service that "at this point in conflict, the role may shift from a show of force (i.e., port visits, goodwill, civic action, and MAP assistance) to one of participation in counterinsurgency operations."'40 Hence, naval personnel were instructed to enhance their awareness and understanding of insurgency movements, including their causes, characteristics, and solutions. In addition to academic preparation, individuals were advised to acquire knowledge of endangered countries through simple observation. Officers and men stationed in foreign lands, passing through, or attached to ships on port calls, were requested to analyze what they saw and to pass on that knowledge to other personnel.

41

Thus, the Navy prepared its personnel to cope with and to counter the perceived threat of Communist insurgencies worldwide, and particularly in Southeast Asia. By mid-1962, the naval training program in counterinsurgency warfare was fully underway. Within a year, most of the personnel in the Pacific Fleet received basic instruction in counterinsurgency at the ship or unit level. Over 400 personnel assigned to commands in the Western Pacific experienced more intensive training by Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. And 1,200 officers completed programs of self-orientation. Similarly, most amphibious exercises included special warfare training."

42

The Navy's Adaptation to the Counterinsurgency Doctrine

Although the Navy accommodated the administration's stress on counterinsurgency, principally with the establishment of the SEALS and STATS, there was a continuing effort by Defense Department officials to encourage additional measures. At one point, Admiral Anderson privately

39CNO, OPNAV Instruction 01500.17. 40CNO, OPNAV Instruction 01500.17.

41CNO, OPNAV Instruction 01500.17.

42CINCPACFLT, Annual Report, FY1963, pp. 19, 29, 35.

complained to his Pacific Fleet commander that "we are constantly besieged with inquiries as to what the Navy is doing in this realm."'43 This focus continued throughout the period, as President Kennedy, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and subordinate officials worked to reorient U.S. conventional forces for the conflict in Southeast Asia.

At the same time, a number of naval staff officers and commanders in the field also called for the restructuring of forces to fight the Communist guerrilla. In one example, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Amphibious Warfare Readiness Branch, with the assistance of the Navy Plans Branch, prepared a study based on the assumption that “U.S. national policy will permit the use of effective military means short of open warfare to combat Communist expansion" and that the "U.S. Navy will be called upon to conduct sublimited warfare in restricted waters, rivers, maritime areas, and on the high seas."44 This document, whose principal author was Captain Harry S. Warren of the Amphibious Warfare Readiness Branch, concluded that "expansion beyond the SEAL team concept is considered necessary to provide a truly effective capability."45 Captain Raymond S. Osterhoudt, the Navy Plans Branch representative on the project, also called for a “new look" regarding naval participation in special warfare and added that

some degradation of readiness for limited war and/or general war is a factor which must be recognized and accepted prior to employment for sub-limited war purposes. ... It is reasonable to assume that some specialized sub-limited war forces would be necessary to augment existing forces. Such forces would provide capabilities complementary to limited war and general war forces, rather than adding one more mission to existing forces.

Both captains recommended the creation of a special operations group, as first suggested in a CINCLANTFLT study, to exercise operational control of SEAL teams, "Restricted Waters Units," and "River Operations Units," and to train personnel in the requisite skills. The group also would

43Ltr, Anderson to Sides, of 30 Jan 1962. See also memo, OP-60 to OP-06, ser BM0033-62 of 11 Jan 1962.

*Memo, OP-03 to OP-09, ser 00111P34 of 5 Dec 1961. See also CNO, memo for record, ser 00020-61 of 28 Aug 1961; memos, BUWEPS to CNO, ser 06430 of 21 Nov; OP-09 to OP-03, ser 053P09 of 25 Nov; OP-60 to Joint Staff, JCS, ser 001193P60 of 8 Dec.

45Memo, OP-03 to OP-09, ser 00111P34 of 5 Dec 1961.

46Memo, OP-06 to OP-03, ser BM001238-61 of 9 Dec 1961.

contain a support element possessing aircraft, transport submarines, helicopter carriers, amphibious ships, and other boats and craft. The force would be manned by 200 officers and 1,300 men.

In another instance, in August 1962, Captain Drachnik, head of the MAAG Vietnam Navy Section, forwarded to Washington a concept for a U.S. "River Warfare Force." The unit would consist of several river groups, each composed of a Marine rifle company, fifteen river craft (LCVP type), thirty swimmer support boats, a UH-1B helicopter, a mother ship (LSM), and a major support ship (an LSM, LSD, LPD, or APA). Air support would be furnished by carrier and shore-based aircraft. Captain Drachnik envisioned positioning the major support ship at a river mouth or nearby port and the mother ship thirty to thirty-five miles from the area of operations. From the latter floating base the naval group would sortie into the rivers to "locate, harass, and destroy guerrilla-type insurgency units in order to assist a friendly government to resist covert aggression."47

However, a number of naval leaders resisted the creation of additional special purpose units. In the words of Rear Admiral Waldemar F.A. Wendt, Director of the Strategic Plans Division, it was "uneconomical in manpower, equipment, and money to develop specialized units and forces solely for counterinsurgency operations"48 when traditional naval forces possessed the requisite characteristics. Admiral Wendt further observed that "within current resources, improvement of naval cold war/counterinsurgency activities world-wide is desirable and should continue to be stimulated." But, he concluded that "such activities should be secondary to considerations of readiness for limited and general war. 49 Noting that the Navy's prompt and forceful response to the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated the need for optimum strength at sea, the admiral also pointed out that while the service could "contribute significantly to meeting cold war/counterinsurgency requirements, these activities are primarily land oriented and properly a primary responsibility of the Army."50

47U.S. River Warfare Force," encl. in ltr, Drachnik to Anderson, of 17 Aug 1962. See also Charles N. Crandall, Jr., "Naval Warfare On Inland Waterways," unpublished thesis for U.S. Army War College, 1962.

48 Memo, OP-60 to OP-93, ser 0338-63 of 19 Apr 1963. See also Bucklew, Interview with Mason, pp. 338-39, 358.

49Memo, OP-60 to OP-34, ser 00337-63 of 16 Apr 1963. 50Memo, OP-60 to OP-34, ser 00337-63 of 16 Apr 1963.