The Navy's first contingent of Nasty fast patrol boats, consisting of PTF-3 and PTF-4, proceed at high speed off Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. As the boats and their crews made the month-long transit to the Western Pacific on board Point Defiance, arriving in Subic on 22 October, the naval command also refined plans for the establishment of a forward base in South Vietnam. On 10 October CINCPACFLT detailed his proposal for establishing a shore-based mobile support team at Danang, rather than a light cargo ship (AKL) as previously suggested at the Washington level. The team would be composed of two officers and ten men, including personnel in engineman, electrician's mate, quartermaster, electronics technician, gunner's mate, shipfitter, damage controlman, machinery repairman, and storekeeper ratings, taken primarily from the PTF crews. Berthing, messing, and repair facilities would be provided by the MAAG. To enable the mobile support team to maintain and repair the boats in Vietnam, it was planned to transport a 100-ton tool and machinery package to the site from Subic. Fuel could be procured locally through the Shell Oil Company. CINCPACFLT also attempted to secure a small floating drydock and a ten-ton crane for heavier repair tasks. In addition to preferring the mobile support team to the AKL, because it was a more economical use of naval resources, Admiral Ulysses S. G. Sharp, the new Pacific Fleet commander, felt the small team would be less likely to compromise security. In that regard, he strongly recommended that the "boats be stricken (under MAP or other appropriate cover) at least for record purposes from U.S. Navy records...to preclude possible future embarrassment to the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Government."30 Action on this proposal, however, was not taken until late 1964. Although South Vietnamese personnel operated the boats when in North Vietnamese waters, they remained under U.S. register. Administrative Preparations for Counterinsurgency Warfare To better control and coordinate the Navy's counterinsurgency effort, the CNO instituted several organizational changes. In early January 1962 Admiral Anderson established a Navy-Marine Corps Cold War Advisory Panel to disseminate relevant information among the planning offices in Washington and to "conceive, develop and process ideas by which the 30Msg, CPFLT 102342Z Oct 1963. See also CP 030350Z May 1963; CNO 051937Z Jun; CPFLT 302031Z; CNO 2717592 Aug; CP 112011Z Oct. Navy and Marine Corps can better serve the United States in gaining advantage in the cold war."'31 Placed under the supervision of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy), the panel was chaired on an alternating basis by the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy) and the Director, Politico-Military Policy Division. Its members were drawn from those offices, from the Bureau of Naval Personnel, and from the Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Soon afterward, the CNO fixed responsibilities within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations for counterinsurgency matters. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Fleet Operations and Readiness) was designated the central point of contact. Within that office, the Strike Warfare Division ensured the Navy's operational readiness for the conduct of counterinsurgency actions through training, development of tactical doctrine, and determination of operational requirements. Similarly, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy) was assigned responsibility for planning as regards counterinsurgency. That office's Politico-Military Policy Division provided advice on the political ramifications of an intended operation, while the Strategic Plans Division coordinated planning so as to attain the "maximum counter-insurgency effectiveness...as may be achieved in balance with limited war and general war readiness."*32 In addition, due to the increasing number of SEAL and other units involved in unconventional warfare in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, it became apparent by the fall of 1963 that greater centralization of administrative support and control of naval special operations forces was required. Accordingly, on 10 October 1963, Naval Operations Support Groups were established in the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets. The groups assumed administrative control of fleet SEAL, beach jumper unit, underwater demolition team, and PT boat units.33 In addition to organizing commands to provide more responsive administrative support, the Navy took steps to prepare personnel for counterinsurgency warfare in the hostile Southeast Asian environment. This was especially the case after Admiral Anderson learned early in 1962 that the "President was quite emphatic...that he wanted people from all CNO, OPNAV Instruction 3410.5A, ser 9P06B1 of 2 Jan 1962. 32CNO, OPNAV Instruction 5430.22, ser 129P60 of 27 Feb 1962. "Ltr, McDonald to Kennedy, of 21 Nov 1963; CINCPACFLT, Annual Report, FY1964, p. 34. As the boats and their crews made the month-long transit to the Western Pacific on board Point Defiance, arriving in Subic on 22 October, the naval command also refined plans for the establishment of a forward base in South Vietnam. On 10 October CINCPACFLT detailed his proposal for establishing a shore-based mobile support team at Danang, rather than a light cargo ship (AKL) as previously suggested at the Washington level. The team would be composed of two officers and ten men, including personnel in engineman, electrician's mate, quartermaster, electronics technician, gunner's mate, shipfitter, damage controlman, machinery repairman, and storekeeper ratings, taken primarily from the PTF crews. Berthing, messing, and repair facilities would be provided by the MAAG. To enable the mobile support team to maintain and repair the boats in Vietnam, it was planned to transport a 100-ton tool and machinery package to the site from Subic. Fuel could be procured locally through the Shell Oil Company. CINCPACFLT also attempted to secure a small floating drydock and a ten-ton crane for heavier repair tasks. In addition to preferring the mobile support team to the AKL, because it was a more economical use of naval resources, Admiral Ulysses S. G. Sharp, the new Pacific Fleet commander, felt the small team would be less likely to compromise security. In that regard, he strongly recommended that the "boats be stricken (under MAP or other appropriate cover) at least for record purposes from U.S. Navy records...to preclude possible future embarrassment to the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Government."30 Action on this proposal, however, was not taken until late 1964. Although South Vietnamese personnel operated the boats when in North Vietnamese waters, they remained under U.S. register. Administrative Preparations for Counterinsurgency Warfare To better control and coordinate the Navy's counterinsurgency effort, the CNO instituted several organizational changes. In early January 1962 Admiral Anderson established a Navy-Marine Corps Cold War Advisory Panel to disseminate relevant information among the planning offices in Washington and to "conceive, develop and process ideas by which the 30Msg, CPFLT 102342Z Oct 1963. See also CP 030350Z May 1963; CNO 051937Z Jun; CPFLT 302031Z; CNO 271759Z Aug; CP 112011Z Oct. Navy and Marine Corps can better serve the United States in gaining advantage in the cold war."31 Placed under the supervision of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy), the panel was chaired on an alternating basis by the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy) and the Director, Politico-Military Policy Division. Its members were drawn from those offices, from the Bureau of Naval Personnel, and from the Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Soon afterward, the CNO fixed responsibilities within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations for counterinsurgency matters. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Fleet Operations and Readiness) was designated the central point of contact. Within that office, the Strike Warfare Division ensured the Navy's operational readiness for the conduct of counterinsurgency actions through training, development of tactical doctrine, and determination of operational requirements. Similarly, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy) was assigned responsibility for planning as regards counterinsurgency. That office's Politico-Military Policy Division provided advice on the political ramifications of an intended operation, while the Strategic Plans Division coordinated planning so as to attain the "maximum counter-insurgency effectiveness...as may be achieved in balance with limited war and general war readiness.' 32 In addition, due to the increasing number of SEAL and other units involved in unconventional warfare in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, it became apparent by the fall of 1963 that greater centralization of administrative support and control of naval special operations forces was required. Accordingly, on 10 October 1963, Naval Operations Support Groups were established in the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets. The groups assumed administrative control of fleet SEAL, beach jumper unit, underwater demolition team, and PT boat units.33 In addition to organizing commands to provide more responsive administrative support, the Navy took steps to prepare personnel for counterinsurgency warfare in the hostile Southeast Asian environment. This was especially the case after Admiral Anderson learned early in 1962 that the "President was quite emphatic...that he wanted people from all "CNO, OPNAV Instruction 3410.5A, ser 9P06B1 of 2 Jan 1962. 32CNO, OPNAV Instruction 5430.22, ser 129P60 of 27 Feb 1962. "Ltr, McDonald to Kennedy, of 21 Nov 1963; CINCPACFLT, Annual Report, FY1964, p. 34. |