hampered operations, as did the absence of adequate shipboard mainte

nance.

The Vietnamese Navy registered some selective improvement in administration, organization, training, logistic support, and operational performance during this period, partly as a result of the work of U.S. naval advisors. Still, much remained to be done before the naval arm could be considered ready to accomplish its mission in the rivers and coastal waters of South Vietnam.

The Seventh Fleet's Contribution

to the Limited Partnership,

1961-1963

In late 1961, the United States increased the scope and magnitude of the effort to preserve the struggling South Vietnamese government. Largely as a result of General Taylor's fact-finding mission to Vietnam, President Kennedy directed his policymakers to implement a program of additional naval, military, economic, and financial assistance. Reflecting the high priority accorded this program, Secretary of Defense McNamara took personal and close interest in its execution. From December 1961 to March 1962, he attended monthly conferences at CINCPAC headquarters in Hawaii to monitor and maintain the momentum of the project. Thereafter, he visited Hawaii or South Vietnam periodically to assess the course of events.

In December, McNamara was apprised by Admiral Felt, Ambassador Nolting, and General Harkins that the Viet Cong were making considerable inroads in South Vietnam and that Diem's government was not meeting the threat adequately. Admiral Felt concluded pessimistically that the "situation in Southeast Asia has never been more favorable for advancement of Communist aims.... In South Vietnam, VC making good progress in field. . . . Although various US/SVN actions may slow down VC somewhat, Communists still hold edge in the countryside."

1

U.S. military and civilian leaders regarded one of the greatest obstacles to a reversal of South Vietnamese fortunes as President Diem himself. Throughout the year Diem resisted implementing various provisions of the U.S.-conceived Counterinsurgency Plan and the Presidential Program of May, and greater popular support for his regime was not in evidence.

'Msg, CP 232035Z Dec 1961. See also U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk. 3, p. 3.

Admiral Anderson, the CNO, informed his flag officers that "unfortunately, it is clear that Diem is strongly opposed to taking any action which might tend to undermine his one-man rule, and he resents American advice as to the necessity for military and political reforms."? Indeed, Rear Admiral William E. Gentner, Jr., director of the Strategic Plans Division, proposed advising Diem that unless changes were made, he would have to "accept the real possibility that the United States will stand aside while Vietnamese select a new Chief of State."3 At the first conference in Hawaii, on 16 December 1961, however, the Secretary of Defense stated that U.S. officials would have to assume that "Diem is going to continue to be Diem" and "since he is all that we have, we must work with him."4

McNamara went on to stress that the survival of South Vietnam was the first priority of the administration and that money would be no object in the provision of military assistance. Everything short of combat troops would be offered. Nevertheless, the use of U.S. ground units in Vietnam was not ruled out. As the Director, Politico-Military Policy Division, Rear Admiral Arnold F. Schade, noted in a briefing to Vice Admiral Schoech, Commander Seventh Fleet, "if we get by short of introducing U.S. or SEATO troops, it will be a long hard pull.” He added that “we can't see any light at the other end of the tunnel yet.

5

The Combined U.S.-South Vietnamese Coastal Patrol

While this was short of full-scale intervention, units of the U.S. Armed Forces, for the first time in the Asian conflict, were ordered to provide the Vietnamese with direct support. Army light helicopter units were quickly dispatched to South Vietnam, as were other U.S.-manned transport aircraft. On 11 December 1961, Core, an aircraft ferry operated by the MSTS, arrived in Saigon and offloaded the Army's 8th and 57th

2Ltr, CNO to Flag and General Officers, of 4 Dec 1961. See also memo, OP-60 to CNO, ser BM1330-61 of 29 Dec; U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk. 3, pp. 6, 19; bk. 12, pp. 439-41. 'Memo, OP-60 to OP-06, ser BM00011-62 of 3 Jan 1962.

*CINCPAC, "Record of the Secretary of Defense Conference held 16 December 1961 at Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief Pacific," ser 000300 of 18 Dec 1961, pp. 4-6. See also CINCPAC, Command History, 1962, pp. 149-53.

'Ltr, OP-61 to COM7FLT, ser 00225P61 of 22 Dec 1961. See also CINCPAC, secdef Conference, of 16 Dec 1961, pp. 1-2; ltr, CNO to Flag and General Officers, of 4 Jan 1962; msg, JCS 171615Z Jan.

Transportation Companies (Light Helicopter). In addition, as its role in the new strategy of “limited partnership," the Navy was called upon to help establish a coastal patrol. On 27 November, Secretary of Defense McNamara implemented one provision of a presidential directive that the South Vietnamese be provided with "small craft, including such United States uniformed advisors and operating personnel as may be necessary for operations in effecting surveillance and control over coastal waters and inland waterways." Several days later, this instruction was amplified to state that the proposed U.S. patrol would be conducted until the South Vietnamese Navy had the capability to unilaterally carry out the coastal control mission. This addition obviously reflected the perception that the South Vietnamese Navy's Sea Force was then unable to provide an adequate patrol force.

Under these circumstances, Admiral Felt did not oppose the use of U.S. ships or aircraft in a coastal patrol, as he did earlier in 1961. He hoped that the presence of U.S. ships on patrol would infuse the Vietnamese with the "can do" spirit, provide needed training in conducting a multi-ship operation, and demonstrate the value of coordination between air, sea, and coastal forces. Admiral Felt stated that the employment of the U.S. units was to "augment [Vietnamese Navy] capability temporarily and for the purpose of working with and assisting in training SVN Sea Force."8 Captain Joseph B. Drachnik, newly assigned Chief of the MAAG's Navy Section, stated that the object was to get the Vietnamese Navy's "ships in such condition that they could operate for extended periods of time, convince the sailors that they could go to sea for more than three days without everybody getting seasick or running out of water or food, and developing incentives and showing them procedures whereby they could do this." Additionally, there was a need to determine the extent and nature of seaborne infiltration from North Vietnam. CINCPAC specifically wanted to know if the upsurge of Communist activity in South Vietnam during the latter part of the year "had been preceded or accompanied by increased junk traffic."'10

"U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk. 3, p. 7; pt. IVB.3, pp. ii-iii.

'Memo, SECDEF to SECARM/SECNAV/SECAF/Chairman JCS/ASD (ISA) of 27 Nov 1961. Msg, CP 010340Z Dec 1961.

'Joseph B. Drachnik, transcript of interview with William W. Moss, John F. Kennedy Library, in Norfolk, VA, 27 Jul 1970, p. 3.

10Msg, CP 292316Z Nov 1961.

Because the coastal patrol mission was requested on an urgent basis, the naval command met the requirement for U.S. vessels with the most suitable ships then in the Southeast Asian area. These were the five 165foot ocean minesweepers (MSO) of Minesweeping Division 73, that had just recently completed an exercise in the Gulf of Siam and were due to call at Saigon on 8 December 1961. Admiral Sides, the Pacific Fleet commander, directed Vice Admiral Schoech to organize a meeting in the South Vietnamese capital to work out the details of the proposed patrol. Prior to the conference, it was thought that the areas of responsibility would include the sea around Phu Quoc Island and Cape Camau, although