This Communist guerrilla activity was concentrated in the Mekong Delta region of South Vietnam, the most populous part of the country. In mid-1959, President Diem described the southern provinces as “in a state of siege."33 The MAAG agreed with the South Vietnamese conclusion that the situation in the delta was worse than it had been in 1954 or 1955. It also was evident that the Vietnamese Navy's River Force, which patrolled the waterways, and transported troops and supplies, had a critical role to play in restoring security to the area. Because few roads traversed the area, the 1,500 miles of waterway was the most important network for travel and commerce.

From his headquarters, recently moved from Saigon to the delta city of Can Tho, the River Force commander in 1959 controlled ninety-six boats and craft, organized into five river assault groups (RAGs). Each RAG could support a battalion in the field for up to fourteen days. The river assault groups, each containing approximately 2 officers and 100 men, were located at My Tho, Vinh Long, Saigon, Can Tho, and Long Xuyen. The RAGS rotated between one month of operations and one month of training. During the training period, an Underway Training Group of six officers and fourteen enlisted men from Saigon offered lectures and specialized instruction. The remainder of the training period was spent in overhauling boats. 34

Individual RAGs operated nineteen boats, mostly modified World War II U.S. landing craft. In each RAG one commandament, an LCM-6 with the bow ramp replaced by a pointed steel prow, served as a command ship and provided communications and gunfire support during operations. The RAGs also contained one monitor, which was similar to the commandament but possessed more firepower. Its armament included one 40millimeter cannon, two 20-millimeter cannons, one 50-caliber machine gun, and an 81-millimeter mortar. The troops and supplies were carried by five LCMs and twelve LCVPs and STCANS. Only the highly maneuverable STCAN, left over from the French era, was especially designed for river operations.35

33NA Saigon, report, 18-S-59 of 7 Aug 1959. 34NA Saigon, report, 113-59 of 9 May 1959.

"The STCAN also was called a vedette, the French equivalent of a patrol boat. The boat also was known as a FOM, which is the French acronym for the French shipbuilding company which designed and built the craft. Richard T. Gray et al., "Revolutionary Warfare on Inland Waterways: An Exploratory Analysis,” Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California, Jan 1965, pp. 228-40.

The main operational area of the River Force was the Mekong Delta where the RAGs and the four battalions of the Vietnamese Marine Corps sought out the enemy. At one time during 1959, for example, 6 LCMs, 4 LCVPs, 2 vedettes and several marine ground units conducted assaults in An Xuyen Province. Another 2 LCMs and 2 LCVPs patrolled the Cambodian border region near Chau Doc, while 1 LCM and 2 LCVPs operated on the Tranh Dong River in the Rung Sat swamp below Saigon. At the same time, 2 LCVPs operated near a Vietnamese Army fuel depot upriver from Saigon. Although by 1960 the Marine Corps was assigned to South Vietnam's strategic reserve with the army's airborne formations, individual battalions continued to work with the navy. In addition, the River Force mounted numerous operations with the army. In 1961, for instance, joint army-navy actions numbered twenty-seven. 36

In October 1960, the River Force assumed the added responsibility for escorting convoys laden with charcoal from Nam Can and rice from Camau, Rach Gia, Chau Doc, and Bac Lieu in the Mekong Delta to Saigon. On occasion, the Viet Cong virtually cut off Saigon from these vital staples. The River Force commander allocated 18 STCANs, 4 LCMs, and 8 LCVPs to a command which became the River Transport Escort Group. The unit escorted an average of six to eight round-trip convoys per month. During 1961, the navy assisted in transporting over one million tons of cargo from the delta. The Communists harassed the convoys a number of times, and in five instances set off mines, but none of the transports suffered appreciable damage that year.

Even before receiving the additional burden of the new convoy support assignment, the River Force suffered from a shortage of personnel to fully man its vessels. In December 1960, the manning level of boats was more than 50 percent below the requirement. For that reason, the combat effectiveness of the River Force was reduced. Commander Quyen recommended a future increase in the navy's total personnel, but in the interim he transferred men from other parts of the navy to the River Force. In 1960, the five river groups were authorized 602 men, but had only 340 on board. By March 1961, primarily through Quyen's efforts, the total rose to 422, which represented some improvement. Admiral Felt discussed the problem with President Diem during CINCPAC's 29 September 1961 visit to Vietnam. Still, in October U.S. advisors reported

36NA Saigon, reports, 113-59 of 9 May 1959; 23-S-60 of 9 Nov 1960.

that the River Force remained 30 percent under strength.37

The River Force was not used to its maximum potential. Naval advisors felt that a shortage of personnel was one explanation for this problem, but there were other reasons as well. Because the army seldom included naval officers in planning for operations, the River Force contingent often was concentrated at the last minute, which limited the number of boats available. The small group employed for the mission was thus more vulnerable to attack by even modest Viet Cong forces. And because only the landing craft, utility (LCU), LSILs, and the LCM monitors and commandaments were equipped with adequate communication equipment, calling for reinforcements sometimes was difficult.

Similarly, the army feared the devastating effect on their units of a successful Viet Cong mining attack. Mining assaults usually followed the tactics used by the enemy during the French Indochina War. A commanddetonated mine would stop the lead boat dead in the channel and then the enemy would rake the stalled convoy from the banks of the waterway. The River Force attempted to counter these tactics with crude but effective minesweeping devices, which consisted of grapnels dragged behind LCVPs, or cables strung between two LCVPs, to cut the detonation wires.

No minesweeping precautions were taken on 25 November 1960, however, when an LCM was mined near the village of Hau My in Dinh Tuong Province. This operation began when the army regional commander, without soliciting naval advice, ordered the River Force to transport an army battalion from Tay Ninh to a position on the edge of the Plain of Reeds. About 1800, as the three LCMs, loaded with 150 men each, approached Hau My on the Hai Muoi Tam Canal, an explosion rent the air. Its force lifted the lead LCM out of the water, stove in the bulkheads near the bow ramp, and caved in the roof over the tank deck. The men seated in the tank deck were thrown against the overhead, their gun muzzles punching holes through the wooden planking. Gunfire from both sides of the canal struck the force. The LCMs replied with their 20millimeter guns. The boats then beached on the left bank and disembarked their troops. More firing came from a strong enemy force 100 meters from the canal. After a ten-minute firefight, the enemy withdrew

37NA Saigon, report, 20-S-60 of 21 Sep 1960; msg, CHMAAGVN 260347Z Oct 1961; ltr, NAVSEC to CHMAAGVN, ser 001 of 6 Jan 1961; memo, Taylor to Craig, of 24 Oct; Chung Tan Cang, transcript of interview with Oscar P. Fitzgerald, Naval Historical Center, in Arlington, VA, 31 Jul 1975, pp. 42, 46.

and the South Vietnamese counted their casualties. Eight men were killed and twenty-three seriously wounded, mostly by gunfire.38

In July 1961 the River Force played a more successful role in the largest and most productive operation against the Communists since 1954. The operation, named Dong Tien, took place in Kien Phong Province in a marshy area of My An District. It was bordered on the north by the Dong Tien Canal, on the south by the Thap Muoi Canal, on the east by the Tu Moi Canal, and on the west by the Mekong River. The area long had been a Viet Cong stronghold. On the morning of 14 July, river craft and army artillery units took up positions along the Thap Muoi and Tu Moi Canals and began blasting enemy camps. During that night other River Force units landed a paratroop battalion along the Dong Tien Canal, and at dawn the troops began to advance south to the village of My Qui. When the surrounded Communists tried to escape north, they ran into the paratroopers. The enemy force finally was crushed in a six-hour battle on the morning of the 16th. The 502nd Viet Cong Battalion and a company from the 504th Battalion sustained 167 men killed, 11 captured, and 85 weapons lost. After the operation, the forces involved returned to Saigon for a hero's welcome. General McGarr, the MAAG chief, later commented:

The operations in the delta area which were successful were preplanned set-piece operations. Plenty of time was given to their planning and moving into position and tactical surprise together with superiority of force was gained. Even though the planning, movement to contact and actual operations were surprisingly well done, errors were committed which could have caused failure. In these operations, the Viet Cong in some instances were either cooperative enough or forced by encirclement to stand and fight in larger groups against stiff opposition — which is not their tactic. The reorganization of the Armed Forces with the single chain of command and the progress we have made in our training over the past ten months in developing joint operations gave these divisions the capability to fight the set-piece battle.39

38 Ltrs, NAVSEC to CHMAAGVN, ser 001 of 6 Jan 1961; CINCPACFLT to CINCPAC, ser 32/ 00693 of 9 Aug 1963.

39 The Times of Viet Nam Magazine, Vol. III, No. 28 (22 Jul 1961), encl. in NA Saigon, report, 16861 of 3 Aug 1961. See also NAVSEC Joint Weekly Analysis, 29 of 16 Jul 1960; ltr, McGarr to Lemnitzer, of 12 Oct 1961.

At the beginning of 1959, the Sea Force, headquartered in Saigon, consisted of 5 PCs, 4 LSMs, 7 LSILS or landing support ships, large (LSSL), 3 auxiliary motor minesweepers (YMS), and 1 light cargo ship (AKL). These ships were divided into three groups plus a reserve group, with theoretically one group in upkeep, another in training, and the third in operations. In practice, however, because of delays in overhaul completions and routine upkeep, plus lack of initiative on the part of Sea Force commanders, some two-thirds of the ships were out of commission.