accelerated this effort. Thereafter, the Navy took steps to develop specialized SEAL and STAT units and related administrative organizations. South Vietnam would become the testing ground for these forces and the counterinsurgency warfare doctrine in general.

U.S. Military Assistance and the

Vietnamese Navy

From the end of the French Indochina War in 1954, the Republic of Vietnam received direct U.S. military aid through the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam. The MAAG's mission was to support the Vietnamese armed forces so that they could ensure internal security and offer initial resistance to a foreign invasion until the United States or the other SEATO nations came to their assistance.

The Navy Section of the MAAG had the specific task of building up the Vietnamese Navy to conduct antisubmarine warfare (ASW), coastal patrol, and harbor defense against infiltration and minor naval threats. The naval force also was to be prepared to carry out river patrols in support of counterinsurgency operations and to undertake minelaying and minesweeping measures in the country's territorial waters.' Admiral Herbert G. Hopwood, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, summarized the intended role of Southeast Asian navies, including Vietnam's, in a letter to Admiral Burke in March 1959:

My basic concept is that the small indigenous navies are not and cannot be expected to become capable of offensive type naval operations other than having a limited capability for their own amphibious lift, local escort and patrol, limited local ASW, local mine warfare, and harbor defense. In short, they should be capable of taking over those local defensive missions which will allow us to keep the Pacific Fleet free, flexible and available to conduct the offensive missions whenever and

'Memo, OP-60 to CNO, ser 253-63 of 30 Apr 1963. For information on the early years of the Navy Section, see Edwin B. Hooper, Dean C. Allard, and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The Setting of the Stage to 1959, Vol. I in series The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict (Washington: Naval History Division, 1976).

wherever they are required; thus maintaining the punch to counter local contingency actions while still retaining a ready...posture."

One of more than fifty U.S. military assistance activities throughout the world, the MAAG in Vietnam formulated the aid program for the Vietnamese, administered deliveries, and advised the recipients on the use of the equipment. The first military aid programs for Greece and Turkey after World War II were planned and implemented by the individual services under the Mutual Security Act of 1947. Subsequent changes in the program soon concentrated more and more responsibility in the hands of the Secretary of Defense. With the establishment of the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) in 1953, that office became the locus for military assistance decisionmaking. By 1959 the services merely provided the hardware and technical advice for programs which were shaped in ISA. The Joint Chiefs of Staff set the overall dollar amounts of military aid for each country and established general policy and force objectives. The MAAG drew up aid proposals and ISA gave final approval to the military part of the aid budget which then was submitted to Congress. The State Department handled economic aid, and although vested with overall responsibility for the entire aid program, generally delegated the details of military aid to the Defense Department.3

In 1958, President Eisenhower appointed a committee headed by William H. Draper, an investment banker, to study the foreign aid program, which had become increasingly controversial. Draper's committee, which included among its members Admiral Arthur W. Radford, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, detailed a number of recommendations for making the system more responsive. Their report was submitted to the President in August 1959. President Eisenhower endorsed the Draper Committee recommendations and by the end of 1960 most of them were implemented."

2Ltr, Hopwood to Burke, of 13 Mar 1959. See also CINCPAC, "Material for Discussion with the President's Committee on Military Assistance Programs (Draper Committee)," of 28 Jan 1959; msg, CP 172354Z Apr 1959. For an overview of the U.S. naval advisory effort, see Oscar P. Fitzgerald, "U.S. Naval Forces in the Vietnam War: the Advisory Mission, 1961-1965" in Robert W. Love, Jr., ed., Changing Interpretations and New Sources in Naval History (New York: Garland Publishing, 1980). 'Harold A. Hovey, United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 139-41.

*Amos A. Jordan, Jr., Foreign Aid and the Defense of Southeast Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 60.

Some of the Draper Committee's ideas were incorporated in the Foreign Military Assistance Act of 1961. The military aid budget, which previously was appropriated separately, became a part of the overall defense budget. This measure was in recognition of the fact that military aid contributed to U.S. security in the same manner as did the armed forces. Long-range planning also was required. Beginning with the Fiscal Year 1962 program, military assistance requirements were projected five years into the future. Planning for the long term was particularly important, because the services had exhausted much of the surplus World War II equipment suitable for aid programs, and longer lead times were necessary to develop new hardware."

The new act also mandated important changes in the administration of the military aid program. Responsibility for overall direction of foreign aid, both military and economic, continued to rest with the State Department. On the military side, however, the 1961 act created a Director of Military Assistance, in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, who could devote full time to the administration of the program. This subordinate office reviewed the program proposals for the Secretary of Defense.

In an attempt to make foreign aid more responsive to the needs of recipients, the task of drawing up the initial military assistance program was transferred from ISA to the unified commanders. CINCPAC, the unified commander for the Pacific theater, directed the MAAGS in his area to put together preliminary lists of these requirements. Working within Defense Department ceilings and JCS guidelines for force levels and objectives, the three service representatives attached to MAAGs in each country balanced priorities to reach agreement on a preliminary program. After approval by the ambassador, the aid requirements then were sent to CINCPAC headquarters in Hawaii where they were put into final form. At that time, Admiral Felt routinely solicited comments from each of the service representatives on his staff before reviewing the proposals himself. He then sent the program on to ISA in Washington, which obtained cost data, information on specific hardware, and delivery schedules from each of the military departments. After final approval by

"The U.S. President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, Composite Report (Washington: the Committee, 1959) (Draper Report).