to do, and, in the present case, declined to undertake. Our conclusion is that, acting in good faith, of which there is every presumption in favor of the conduct of so important a department of the Government, the Postmaster General may, as was done in this case, discontinue the service, and thereby put an end to the contract when the public interest, of which he is the sole judge, authorizes such action.

This view of the contract renders it unnecessary to consider at length the provisions of section 817 of the Postal Laws and Regulations, above quoted. It is urged that this section applies more particularly to star route and steamboat service, but the provisions of the law are broad and comprehensive, and not limited by the terms of the act to such specific service, but the power is given the Postmaster General whenever, in his judgment, the public interest shall require, to discontinue or curtail the same, giving the contractor as indemnity one month's extra pay. Speaking of the action, authorized under section 263 of the former rules and regulations, this court, in Garfielde v. United States, 93 U. S. 242, 246, said:

"There was reserved to the Postmaster General the power to annul the contract when his judgment advised that it should be done, and the compensation to the contractor was specified. An indemnity agreed upon as the amount to be paid for cancelling a contract, must, we think, afford the measure of damages for illegally refusing to award it."

And upon similar contract stipulations this court in Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. v. United States, 104 U. S. 680, 684, said:

"It is true, that under this reservation the Postmaster General would be authorized to discontinue the entire service contemplated by the contract, and the practical effect of that would be to terminate the contract itself, on making the indemnity specified."

As to the other claim for extra services: In the stipulation of the contracts, it appears that the contractor was required to perform all new or additional or changed covered wagon

mail station service that the Postmaster General should order, without additional compensation, whether caused by change of location of post office, stations or landings, or by the establishment of others than those existing at the time of the contract, or rendered necessary in the judgment of the Postmaster General from any cause, and that officer has the right to change the schedule, vary the routes, increase, decrease or extend the service without change of pay. It is insisted that these stipulations, properly construed, permit the Postmaster General to require only additional service of the same kind as that stipulated for, and that the carrying of the mails from street cars, where the same might be ordered to be met at crossings, was a new and different kind of service, and was not a change caused by a different location of a post office, station or landing within the meaning of the contract. But we think this is too narrow a construction of the terms of the agreement. Strictly speaking, the carrying of the mails from the street cars at the crossings is not taking them from the stations, but it practically amounts to the same thing. It imposes no additional burden upon the contractor; indeed, the findings of fact show that it greatly decreased his burden by lessening the number of miles of carrying required. We think this change of service was fairly within the power reserved to the Postmaster General, and the right given to him to designate such changes in the service as the public interest might require in the performance of this contract. It is true that if these services were not within the terms of the contract, and if they were of a different character, the fact that they greatly decrease the burden of the contractor might not require a disallowance of the claim for extra services. But we think the services were within the contract, fairly construed, and do not entitle the contractor to extra compensation.

In reference to the services rendered in Boston, required by the postmaster, between Back Bay station, in Boston, and the Brookline post office outside the limits of the city of Boston and not within the terms of the contract, it does not appear

that the requirement of such service was made, except by the postmaster of the city of Boston, who had no authority, so far as we can discover, to require such service. When the claimant protested to the Postmaster General he was promptly relieved from the service, and another contract was made for the performance of the same.

It is said that this claim is in all respects like the one sustained by this court in United States v. Otis, 120 U. S. 115, where the contractor was allowed extra compensation for carrying the mails across the Hudson River from the Pennsylvania Railway depot at the foot of Cortlandt street, New York, to the depot of the same line in Jersey City, N. J., when the contract required him to carry the mails only to and from the depots in New York. In the opinion in that case Mr. Justice Blatchford pointed out that the United States directed the performance of the service. Presumably this was done by some one having authority of the United States. In this case the Court of Claims has held, as we think rightly, that the postmaster, having no power or authority to contract in respect to the mail messenger service, was not the agent of the Government for such service, and could not bind the Government by his knowledge or acts in respect thereto. Roberts v. United States, 92 U. S. 41, 48; Hume v. United States, 132 U. S. 406; Whitsell v. United States, 34 C. Cl. 5. As the additional service in this case was not required by the authorized agent of the Government, we think the contractor is not entitled to extra compensation therefor.

Finding no error in the proceedings of the Court of Claims, its decision is

Affirmed.

196 U. S.

Syllabus.

TRAVIS v. UNITED STATES.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.

No. 84. Argued December 7, 8, 1904.-Decided January 9, 1905.

Slavens v. United States, p. 229, ante, followed.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. A. A. Hoehling, Jr., for appellant.

Mr. Special Attorney Joseph Stewart, with whom Mr. Assistant Attorney General Pradt was on the brief, for the United States.

MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the court.

This case was argued with Slavens v. United States, No. 228, just decided. It involves the same question as to the right of the Postmaster General to terminate a mail contract. The Court of Claims dismissed the petition. 38 C. Cl. 590. For the reasons stated in the opinion in the Slavens case, the judgment of the Court of Claims is

Affirmed.

MADISONVILLE TRACTION COMPANY v. SAINT BERNARD MINING COMPANY.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY.

No. 362. Submitted November 28, 1904.-Decided January 16, 1905.

In regard to the removal of cases the following principles have been settled: If the case be a removable one, that is, if the suit, in its nature, be one of which the Circuit Court could rightfully take jurisdiction, then

upon the filing of a petition for removal, in due time, with a sufficient bond, the case is, in law, removed, and the state court in which it is pending will lose jurisdiction to proceed further, and all subsequent proceedings in that court will be void.

After the presentation of a sufficient petition and bond to the state court in a removable case, it is competent for the Circuit Court, by a proceeding ancillary in its nature-without violating § 720, Rev. Stat., forbidding a court of the United States from enjoining proceedings in a state court-to restrain the party against whom a cause has been legally removed from taking further steps in the state court.

If upon the face of the record, including the petition for removal, a suit does not appear to be a removable one, then the state court is not bound to surrender its jurisdiction, and may proceed as if no application for removal had been made.

Under the judiciary act of 1887, 1888, a suit cannot be removed from a state court unless it could originally have been brought in the Circuit Court of the United States.

A State cannot by any statutory provisions withdraw a suit in which there is a controversy between citizens of different States from the cognizance of the Federal courts.

A proceeding brought by a Kentucky railroad company in the County Court under §§ 835-839, Kentucky Statutes, to condemn lands for a public use, valued at over $2,000, belonging to a corporation which is a citizen of another State, is a suit involving a controversy to which the judicial power of the United States extends within the meaning of the judiciary clauses of the Constitution and of which the Circuit Court has original cognizance under § 1 of the judiciary act of 1887 and may be removed to the Circuit Court of the United States.

In the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it of controversies between citizens of different States, a Circuit Court of the United States is for every practical purpose a court of the State in which it sits and will enforce the rights of the parties according to the law of that State taking care, as a state court must, not to infringe any right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States. And in a case of condemnation it would proceed under the sanction of, and enforce, the state law so far as it was not unconstitutional.

It is fundamental in American jurisprudence that private property cannot be taken by the Government, National or state, except for purposes which are of a public character, although such taking be accompanied by compensation to the owner.

It is for the State, primarily and exclusively, to declare for what local public purposes private property, within its limits, may be taken upon compensation to the owner, as well as to prescribe a mode in which it may be condemned and taken. But the State may not prescribe any mode of taking private property for a public purpose and of ascertaining the compensation to be made therefor, which would exclude from the