54. Higher education student loan program (title II, National Defense Education Act, U.S.C. 421-429).

55. Health professions school student loan program (title VII, Part C, Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 294; sec. 822-828, Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 297 a-g).

56. Land-grant college aid (7 U.S.C. 301–329).

57. Language and area centers (title VI, National Defense Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 511-513).

58. American Printing House for the Blind (20 U.S.C. 101-105).

59. Future Farmers of America (36 U.S.C. 271-291) and similar programs. 60. Science Clubs (20 U.S.C. 2 (note)).

61. Howard University (20 U.S.C. 121–131).

62. Gallaudet College (31 D.C. Code, Ch. 10).

63. Hawaii leprosy payments (sec. 331, Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 255).

64. Grants to schools of public health for provision of comprehensive training and specialized services and assistance (sec. 314 (c), Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 246 (c)).

65. Grants to agencies and organizations under Cuban Refugee program (22 U.S.C. 2601 (b) (4)).

66. Grants for construction of hospitals serving Indians (P.L. 85-151, 42 U.S.C. 2005).

67. Indian Sanitation Facilities (P.L. 86-121, 42 U.S.C. 2004a).

68. Areawide planning of health facilities (sec. 318, Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 247c).

69. Training institutes under sec. 511 of the National Defense Education Act of 1958, as amended (20 U.S.C. 491) and under title XI of such Act as added by P.L. 88-665 (20 U.S.C. 591-592).

Part 2. State-administered continuing programs.

1. Grants to States for control of venereal disease, tuberculosis, and for public health services (heart, cancer, mental health, radiological health, etc.) (sec. 314, Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 246), and current appropriation act). 2. Grants to States for water pollution control (sec. 5, Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 466d).

3. Grants to States for vocational rehabilitation services (sec. 2, Vocational Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 32).

4. Grants to States for projects to extend and improve vocational rehabilitation services (sec. 3, Vocational Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 33).

5. Designation of State licensing agency for blind operators of vending stands (Randolph-Sheppard Vending Stand Act, 20 U.S.C. 107–107f).

6. Grants to States for old-age assistance and medical assistance for the aged (title I, Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301-306).

7. Grants to States for aid and services to needy families with children (title IV, Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 601-609).

8. Grants to States for aid to the blind (title X, Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1201-1206).

9. Grants to States for aid to the permanently and totally disabled (title XIV, Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1351-1355).

10. Grants to States for aid to the aged, blind or disabled or for such aid and medical assistance for the aged (title XVI, Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 13811385).

11. Grants to States for maternal and child health services (title V, part 1, Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 701-705).

12. Grants to States for services for crippled children (title V, part 2, Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 711–715).

13. Grants to States for special projects for maternity and infant care (sec. 531, Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 729).

14. Grants to States for child welfare services (title V, part 3, Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 721-725, 727, 728).

15. Grants to States for public library services and construction (20 U.S.C. sec. 351-358; P.L. 88-269).

16. Grants to States for strengthening science, mathematics, and modern foreign language instruction (title III, National Defense Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 441-444).

17. Grants to States for guidance, counseling and testing of students (title V-A, National Defense Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 481-484).

18. Grants to States for educational statistics services (sec. 1009, National Defense Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 589).

19. Surplus personal property disposal donations for health and educational purposes through State agencies (40 U.S.C. 484 (j)).

20. Grants to States for hospital and medical facilities (title VI, Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 291-291z).

21. Grants to States for community mental health centers construction (Community Mental Health Centers Act, 42 U.S.C. 2681–2688).

22. Grants to States for vocational education (Smith-Hughes Act, 20 U.S.C. 11-15, 16-28; George-Barden Act, 20 U.S.C. 15i-15q, 15aa-15jj, 15aaa-15ggg; Supplementary Acts, 20 U.S.C. 30-34).

23. Grants to States for mental retardation facilities (Part C, Mental Retardation Facilities Construction Act, 42 U.S.C. 2671–2677).

24. Arrangements with State vocational education agencies for training under the Area Redevelopment Act and the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 (42 U.S.C. 2513(c), 2601, 2602).

25. Grants to States for comprehensive planning for mental retardation (title XVII, Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1391-1394).

[F.R. Doc. 64-12539; Filed, Dec. 3, 1964; 4:23 p.m.]

AUTHORITY FOR THE 1966 SCHOOL DESEGREGATION GUIDELINES

I

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires the absence of discrimination against persons on the ground of race as a condition for the receipt of Federal financial assistance. Section 601 of the Act states:

No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of. or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.

Section 602 of the Act directs each department which extends Federal assistance to issue regulations to carry out the provisions of Section 601. Section 602 of the Act states in part:

Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of Section 601 with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken. No such rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless and until approved by the President

As required by Section 602, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has issued its Regulation. It was approved by the President on December 3, 1964, and on December 4, 1964, published in the Federal Register. (29 Federal Register 16298; 45 C.F.R., Subtitle A, part 80)

Section 80.4 of that Regulation provides that recipients of Federal assistance shall submit an assurance that its program will be conducted without discrimination based on race. Section 80.4(a) states in part:

...

(a) General. (1) Every application for Federal financial assistance to carry out a program to which this part applies, . . . and every application for Federal financial assistance to provide a facility shall, as a condition to its approval and the extension of any Federal financial assistance pursuant to the application, contain or be accompanied by an assurance that the program will be conducted or the facility operated in compliance with all requirements imposed by or pursuant to this Regulation. Under this provision, applicants can qualify for Federal financial assistance only if all racial discrimination in their programs is eliminated.

Under the Regulation, however, an exception is made for elementary and secondary school systems because of the special problems in desegregation which they present. They may qualify for Federal assistance if they submit to the U.S. Commissioner of Education a plan for desegregation which the Commissioner determines to be adequate to accomplish the purpose of Title VI. The relevant part of the Regulation (Section 80.4 (c)) states:

(c) Elementary and Secondary schools. The requirements of paragraph (a) . . . of this section with respect to any elementary or secondary school or school system shall be deemed to be satisfied if such school or school system. . . (2) submits a plan for the desegregation of such school or school system which the Commissioner of Education determines is adequate to accomplish the purposes of the Act and this Regulation and provides reasonable assurance that it will carry out such plan;

In order to inform school officials of the standards which a desegregation plan must meet in order to be determined adequate by the Commissioner, the Commissioner has issued school desegregation guidelines. The first guidelines, (General Statement of Policies under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Respecting Desegregation of Elementary and Secondary Schools) were issued in April 1965. Revised guidelines were issued in March 1966 (Revised Statement of Policies for School Desegregation Plans under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).

The standards for desegregation plans stated in the guidelines follow closely the provisions of Federal court decisions ordering the desegregation of separate schools maintained for Negro and white children.

II

Many persons, including some school superintendents and school board members, have an erroneous view of the connection between the requirement of Title VI, as explained in the guidelines, and the law as stated in the school desegregation cases decided by the Federal courts. These persons argue that Title VI, by its terms, applies only to discrimination, but not to desegregation, which, according to this view, is a different matter. Accordingly they insist that they may properly maintain separate schools for whites and Negroes, with all-white and all-Negro faculties, as long as any requests by Negro children for admission to a white school are granted. They maintain that any provisions of the guidelines which require further desegregation are a usurpation of power by the Office of Education. These persons also argue that the guidelines are improper because they make no provision for the particular conditions and opinions which may be found in individual school districts. They believe that school officials should be able to shape their desegregation plans so as to be more in accord with the sentiments of their community.

These views, which are incorrect, have been the source of much of the misunderstanding about the propriety of the guidelines, and the responsibility of every school system to establish one system of schools for all its children.

III

Title VI was proposed to the Congress as part of the Civil Rights Act because Federally supported programs and activities, such as schools and hospitals, were still being run on a segregated basis, in defiance of the Supreme Court holding that "separate but equal" facilities were unconstitutional. In the debates on Title VI in both the House and Senate, the chief spokesmen for Title VI made it clear that Title VI applied to programs and activities which were unconstitutionally segregated. In the House debate on February 7, 1964, Representative Celler, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, and the manager of the bill in the House stated:

In general, it seems rather anomalous that the Federal Government should aid and abet discrimination on the basis of race, color or national origin by granting money and other kinds of financial aid. It seems rather shocking, moreover, that while we have on the one hand the 14th amendment, which is supposed to do away with discrimination since it provides for equal protection of the laws, on the other hand, we have the Federal Government aiding and abetting those who persist in practicing racial discrimination.

It is for these reasons that we bring forth title VI. The enactment of title VI, will serve to override specific provisions of law which contemplate Federal assistance to racially segregated institutions. (110 Congressional Record, Part 2, 2467)

On April 7, 1964, Senator Pastore, principal spokesman in the Senate for Title VI, said much the same thing in the Senate debate.

Speaking of congressional debate, I should now like to consider a number of objections which have been offered to title VI.

In the House, a concerted attack was made on title VI as "punitive" or "vindictive." These charges are undeserved. These characterizations appear to result from the belief that title VI is intended to deny the South the benefit of social-welfare programs-that it would punish entire States for any act of discrimination committed within them. This argument merely befogs the issues. It ignores both the purposes of title VI and all of the limitations that have carefully been written into its langauge.

As is clear, the purpose of title VI is to make sure that funds of the United States are not used to support racial discrimination. In many instances, the practices of segregation and discrimination, which title VI seeks to end, are unconstitutional.

This is clearly so wherever Federal funds go to a State agency which engages in racial discrimination. It may also be so where Federal funds go to support private, segregated institutions, as the decision in the Simkins case teaches. In all cases, racial discrimination is contrary to the national policy and to the moral sensibilities of the people of this Nation. Thus, title VI is simply designed to insure that Federal funds are spent in accordance with the Constitution and our public policy. (110 Congressional Record, Part 6, 7062)

Against this background, it is clear that it would be a gross violation of the Congressional intent to interpret Title VI to permit practices declared unconstitutional by the United States courts.

IV

The landmark school desegregation case, Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954) established the principle that the maintenance of separate schools for children of different races is unconstitutional. After discussing the importance of education today and the role of state and local government in providing education, the court reached the question of whether or not segregation of children on the basis of race deprived the minority group children of equal educational opportunities. The court concluded that it did, stating:

To separate [Negro grade and high school children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone..

We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. (347 U.S. at pages 494 495)

The Supreme Court then heard further arguments on the implementation of its decision and in its second opinion, one year later, left no doubt that it equated segregation in schools with discrimination. The court stated that the first Brown decision declared:

the fundamental principle that racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional . . . All provisions of Federal, State, or local law requiring or permitting such discrimination must yield to this principle. (349 U.S. at page 298)

The court held that there must be a prompt start in the elimination of separate schools and that the burden of justifying any delays in complying with the law was upon the school system.

These principles have been reaffirmed in a number of recent Federal court decisions. For example, in a January 1966 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concerning the Jackson, Mississippi school system. (Singleton v. Jackson Municipal School District, 355 F. 2d 865, 869 (C.A. 5th, Jan. 26, 1966)), the Court stated:

The Constitution forbids unconstitutional state action in the form of segregated facilities, including segregated public schools. School authorities, therefore, are under the constitutional compulsion of furnishing a single integrated school system. Administrative problems may justify an orderly transitionary period during which the system may be desegregated several grades at a time. . .

This has been the law since Brown v. Board of Education. Misunderstanding of this principle is perhaps due to the popularity of an over-simplified dictum that the Constitution "does not require integration." (Citation omitted)

And in Kemp v. Beasley, 352 F. 2d 14, 21 (C.A. 8th, 1965), a case concerning the desegregation of the El Dorado, Arkansas schools, the school board argued in support of its plan that "as long as the Negro is not required to attend the Negro school, his constitutional rights have not been violated.” The Court stated that it could not "accept the position advanced by the Board," pointing out that it was "logically inconsistent with Brown and subsequent decisional law on this subject."

A similar idea is stated in Brown v. County School Board of Frederick County, Virginia, 245 F. Supp, 549, 560 (W.D. Va., 1965)

The ideal to which a freedom of choice plan must ultimately aspire, as well as any other desegregation plan, is that school boards will operate "schools," not "Negro schools" or "white schools."

The recent Federal decisions also show that the courts are looking with increasing disfavor on delay in school desegregation. In Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 382 U.S. 103, 105 (1965) the Supreme Court declared that: ... more than a decade has passed since we directed desegregation of public school facilities "with all deliberate speed." Delays in desegregation of school systems are no longer tolerable. (Citation omitted)

And in an earlier opinion (June 22, 1965) in the Jackson, Mississippi case (348 F. 2d 729 (C.A. 5th, 1965)), the Fifth Circuit stated:

The time has come for footdragging public school boards to move with celerity toward desegregation. Since May 17, 1954, public school boards throughout the country have known that they must desegregate their schools. And as the law moved with rising tempo to meet changing conditions, school boards might have foreseen that further delays would pile up rather than spread their nettlesome problems. This Court has urged school authorities to grasp the nettle now. We have put them on notice that, "the rule has become the later the start, the shorter the time allowed for transition. (Footnotes omitted) (348 F. 2d at page 730)

In the second Brown decision in 1955, the Supreme Court made it clear that Federal district courts may take local problems and conditions into account when framing school desegregation decrees, except that opposition to desegregation may not be a ground for delay. The Court declared:

But it should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them. (349 U.S. at page 300)

The principle has been reaffirmed by the Federal courts, most recently in the 1965 El Dorado, Arkansas and Jackson, Mississippi cases. In the El Dorado case the court stated:

The first basic issue to be determined is whether or not the plan is moving forward with appropriate speed. We feel it is not. It is our opinion that the Board has not affirmatively performed its duty to provide a system of non-segregated schools as required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment with "good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date" and with "all deliberate speed" as required by the second Brown decision.

The Supreme Court in refusing to countenance delay in the Little Rock, Arkansas school desegregation matter because of tension, bedlam, chaos, and turmoil in the schools, in Cooper v. Aaron over seven years ago used the following significant language:

** Of course, in many locations obedience to the duty of desegregation would require immediate general admission of Negro children, otherwise qualified as students for their appropriate classes, at particular schools. On the other hand, a District Court, after analysis of the relevant factors (which of course, excludes hostility to racial desegregation) might conclude that justification existed for not requiring the present nonsegregated admission of all qualified Negro children. In such circumstances, however, the courts should scrutinize the program of the school authorities to make sure that they had developed arrangements pointed toward the earliest practicable completion of desegregation, and had taken appropriate steps to put their program into effective operation. It was made plain that delay of any guise in order to deny the constitutional rights of Negro children could not be countenanced and that only a prompt start, diligently and earnestly pursued, to eliminate racial segregation from the public schools