mind may think of things without reasoning about them; and it may remember things without reasoning about them. We shall in this section take a view of those truths with which we become acquainted by other means than reasoning. They may be classed into truths of the senses— truths of consciousness-truths of the intellect—and truths of testimony. On these topics we shall quote Dr. Watts.

1. Truths of the senses:

"The evidence of sense is, when we frame a proposition according to the dictates of any of our senses; so we judge that grass is green; that a trumpet gives a pleasant sound; that fire burns wood; water is soft; and iron is hard; for we have seen, heard, or felt all these. It is upon this evidence of sense that we know and believe the daily occurrences in human life; and almost all the histories of mankind, that are written by eye or ear-witnesses, are built upon this principle.

"Under the evidence of sense we do not only include that knowledge which is derived to us by our outward senses of hearing, seeing, feeling, tasting, and smelling; but that also which is derived from the inward sensations and appetites of hunger, thirst, ease, pleasure, pain, weariness, rest, &c., and all those things which belong to the body; as, 'hunger is a painful appetite; light is pleasant; rest is sweet to the weary limbs.""

2. Truths of consciousness :

"As we learn what belongs to the body by the evidence of sense, so we learn what belongs to the soul by an inward consciousness, which may be called a sort of internal feeling, or spiritual sensation of what passes in the mind; as, ‘I think before I speak; I desire large knowledge; I suspect my own practice; I studied hard to-day; my conscience bears witness of my sincerity; my soul hates vain thoughts; fear is an uneasy passion; long meditation on one thing is tiresome.'

"Thus it appears that we obtain the knowledge of a multitude of propositions, as well as of single ideas, by those two principles which Mr. Locke calls sensation and reflection; one of them is a sort of consciousness of what affects the body, and the other is a consciousness of what passes in the mind."

3. Truths of the intellect :—

"Intellect relates chiefly to those abstracted propositions which carry their own evidence with them, and admit no doubt about them. Our perception of this self-evidence in any proposition is called intelligence. It is our knowledge of those first principles

of truth which are, as it were, wrought into the very nature and make of our minds: they are so evident in themselves to every man who attends to them, that they need no proof. It is the prerogative and peculiar excellence of these propositions, that they can scarce ever be proved or denied: they cannot easily be proved, because there is nothing supposed to be more clear or certain, from which an argument may be drawn to prove them. They cannot well be denied, because their own evidence is so bright and convincing, that, as soon as the terms are understood, the mind necessarily assents; such are these,—' whatsoever acted hath a being; nothing has no properties; a part is less than the whole; nothing can be the cause of itself.'

"These propositions are called axioms or maxims, or first principles; these are the very foundations of all improved knowledge and reasonings, and on that account these have been thought to be innate propositions, or truths born with us."

4. Truths of testimony :

"When we derive the evidence of any proposition from the testimony of others, it is called the evidence of faith; and this is a large part of our knowledge. Ten thousand things there are which we believe merely upon the authority or credit of those who have spoken or written of them. It is by this evidence that we know there is such a country as China, and there was such a man as Cicero, who dwelt in Rome. It is by this that most of the transactions in human life are managed: we know our parents and our kindred by this means, we know the persons and laws of our present governors, as well as things that are at a vast distance from us in foreign nations, or in ancient ages.

According as the persons that inform us of anything are many or few, or more or less wise, and faithful, and credible, so our faith is more or less firm or wavering, and the proposition believed is either certain or doubtful; but in matters of faith, an exceeding great probability is called a moral certainty."*

The truths of reasoning are distinct from all these. They are derived from these truths, or such as these, by natural and just methods of argumentation.

As logic is the art of reasoning it has nothing to do witli those truths that are self-evident, or which are known to be true without reasoning. The positive testimony of the

* Mr. Bailey observes (p. 29), "In philosophical strictness, we can be said to know only those things which we perceive, or have perceived, through our organs of sense, and those states of mind or mental events of which we are or have been conscious. Other things we believe on evidence more or less cogent; that is to say, they are matters of inference." If so, the "truths of testimony" will have to be classed under "truths of inference." But the word know is often used in a more extended sense.

senses supersedes the necessity for reasoning. If you have the tooth-ache or the gout, you want no logic to prove to you that you suffer pain. And as we know what passes without us, by the organs of hearing and seeing—and what passes in our bodies, by means of our sensations-so we know what passes in our minds, by means of consciousness. We know that we think-that we judge-that we remember. We know that we hope and we fear-we love and we hate. All these, and a variety of other operations and feelings, pass within our minds; and we want no logic to convince us of their existence. There are also many other truths that are self-evident. We know that two and two make four-that a part of anything is less than the whole—that a cause must precede the effect--and that a proposition cannot be both true and not true at the same time, and in the same respect. These are called first truths, or truths of intuition. They are wrought into our very nature, and we cannot disbelieve them, if we would. If we meet a man who denies them, we do not reason with him. We conclude either that he does not understand the meaning of the words, or that he has lost his reasoning faculties. Here logic has nothing to do.

As logic is merely the art of reasoning, it follows that logic has nothing to do with those mental operations in which we do not reason. The mere giving or receiving of information is not reasoning. If you say to a friend, "It is a cold day," there is no logic in that. But if you say, “I think we shall have rain in the course of the day," that is a logical conclusion; and if asked to do so, you should be prepared to give reasons for your opinion. So the acquisition of knowledge by reading or hearing is not reasoning. You may possibly read history or biography, learn several languages, and become acquainted with botany, natural history, and several sciences, without reasoning. All this requires nothing more than a good memory. And hence it is possible to become a very learned man and yet not be a logician. But if you begin to reason about anything you learn, you immediately become a logician. Take, for illustration, a case in history. You have read the life of Napoleon Bonaparte, and you remember all the events recorded, and also the opinions of the historian. You are no logician

here. But if you stop to ask if any particular event be true-if you inquire whether in certain actions he evinced sagacity or courage-and consider what were the effects of his course on the state of Europe-as soon as you commence to discuss these or any similar questions, you become a logician.

As logic has nothing to do with receiving or retaining information, so also it has nothing to do with imparting information, or with the giving of advice or commands. There is no logical process in the following words—" Be not wise in your own conceit-Recompense to no man evil for evil-Provide things honest in the sight of all menIf it be possible, as much as in you lieth, live peaceably with all men-Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good."-But sometimes the terms, though simply the language of advice or command, will imply a logical process: thus-"Go to the ant, thou sluggard; consider her ways and be wise," which implies that there is some connexion between going to the ant and becoming wise; and thus it denotes a logical process in the mind of the speaker. So also, if a motive is added, this brings the command or advice within the province of logic: thus-"Honour thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long in the land" -"Honour the Lord with thy substance, and with the first-fruits of all thine increase; so shall thy barns be filled with plenty, and thy presses shall burst out with new wine.'

Logic has no province of its own. If you reason at all, you must reason about something, and that something may belong to any one of the arts or sciences. There is no object in nature, nor any fact in history, but what may become a subject of argument. Thus, while logic as an art has no domain of its own, it has a province in every other domain-or rather, it is called in whenever necessary to settle disputes and exercise supremacy in all the other departments of human knowledge. A judge on Circuit has no property in the county in which he administers justice, nor any authority over its population. But should. any estates in the county become the subject of litigation, or any person become a party in a civil or criminal proceeding, then are they immediately brought under his

jurisdiction. So whenever any difference in opinion arises either in the arts and sciences or in ordinary life, it is the province of logic to adjust the dispute. Thus every object in nature, every feeling of the mind, and every event in history, may become connected with a logical process. We will illustrate this by a few examples.

Take a flower :

"Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin: and yet I say unto you, that even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these. Wherefore, if God so clothe the grass of the field, which to-day is, and tomorrow is cast into the oven, shall he not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith?"-Matt. vi. 28-30.

Take social relations :

"If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father which is in heaven give good things to them that ask him?"-Matt. vii. 11.

"He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?"-1 John iv. 20.

Take historical events :

"Now these things were our examples, to the intent we should not lust after evil things, as they also lusted. Neither be ye idolaters, as were some of them; as it is written, The people sat down to eat and drink, and rose up to play. Neither let us commit fornication, as some of them committed, and fell in one day three and twenty thousand. Neither let us tempt Christ, as some of them also tempted, and were destroyed of serpents. Neither murmur ye, as some of them also murmured, and were destroyed of the destroyer. Now all these things happened unto them for ensamples and they are written for our admonition, upon whom the ends of the world are come. Wherefore let him that thinketh Le standeth take heed lest he fall."-1 Cor. x. 6-12

:

SECTION III,

THE UTILITY OF THE ART OF REASONING.

ALL men and women reason from their infancy. 'Tis as natural for them to do so as it is for dogs to bark or birds to sing. And when they reason about things they under