term 'stockyards owner' means any person engaged in the business of conducting or operating a stockyard. The term 'stockyard services' means services or facilities furnished by the stockyard in connection with receiving, buying or selling on a commission basis or otherwise, marketing, feeding, watering, holding, delivery, shipment, weighing or handling in commerce of livestock," etc. Now, if you will follow through the statute you will find that in other sections the stockyard owner may be mentioned under market agencies or dealers, and under some other sections you will find stockyard owner used in connection with market agencies alone. In the other sections they are all together. It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that some effect must be given, if possible, to every provision of the statute and considering that the term "market agency" as thus defined includes stockyard owner deprives the term "stockyard owner" of any meaning. It is useless to have it in there if that is That is made obvious by the fact that Congress, in framing the act, used pains to mention the stockyard owner when they meant him and to leave him out wherever they did not mean him. In my opinion the result is a market agency is not a stockyard owner and a stockyard owner is not a market agency within the meaning of the definition. There are persons who do certain stockyard services who are not owners, such as veterinarians in the yards, and other people, like the western weight inspection bureau and some others who render services and do things that are within the class of stockyard services, but they are not stockyard owners; so that both under a legal construction of the statute and under a practical operation of it there is a distinction between market agency and stockyard owner. They are not the same thing. Therefore, if the purpose of the amendment is merely to make it clear that the stockyard owner is not a market agency, I would have no objection. On the other hand, I do not see any necessity for it.

Mr. VEEDER. As a matter of fact, one of the definitions of market agency, in subdivision (c) the term "market agency" means "any person engaged in the business of furnishing stockyard services." Stockyard companies would be under that definition. Suppose section (a) were eliminated from the act altogether. Then the stockyard companies would be subject to the definition in (c), would they not?

Mr. MORRILL. But it is right there. eliminated. It is there.

You can not suppose it is

Mr. VEEDER. But, wait a minute. Suppose it were eliminated. Section (c) would then define stockyards. Of course, wherever the word "stockyard owner" is used in the act of course a market agency which was not a stockyard owner could not be included. But wherever the word "market agency" is used it covers market agencies covered by this definition (c). Therefore it would include stockyards, if they are subject to this definition wherever the word "market agency" is used. For instance, a man is running a dry goods store and he is also running a butcher shop. There is a provision under the law applicable to the butcher shop and another provision under the law applicable to the dry goods store. You do not mean to say that because he is in the dry goods business that, therefore, he does not come under the provision applicable to a butcher shop, when they are both referred to in the law? For

instance, if a stockyard company comes under the definition of (c) as a market agency, and also under (a) as a stockyard owner, which one of those are you going to say applies to him? You may say stockyard owner and the court may say market agency. If there is no objection to making the distinction clear, why not put the language in the amendment to make it clear.

⚫ Mr. MORRILL. I have no objection if the only object is to make it clear that the market agency does not include a stockyard owner. On the other hand, I fail to see the necessity for doing it. To answer your question more specifically, if there were no definition of stockyard owner, if the term "stockyard owner" were not used, it is quite true the term "market agency" would cover it. That is just the point. The stockyard owner is defined and is used wherever the statute intends that the stockyard owner shall be subject to the statute. Read section 203, on page 20, which says:

After the expiration of 30 days after the Secretary has given public notice that any stockyard is within the definition of section 302, by posting copies of such notice in the stockyards, no person shall carry on the business of a market agency or deal in such stockyard unless he has registered with the Secretary under such rules and regulations as the Secretary may prescribe his name and address, the character of business in which he is engaged and the kinds of stockyards services, if any, which he furnishes at such stockyards

and so forth. Now, under Mr. Veeder's theory the stockyard owner would have to register, notwithstanding the fact that he is already brought into the law, and section 304 says:

It shall be the duty of every stockyard owner and market agency to furnish upon reasonable request, without discrimination, reasonable stockyards services at such stockyards.

In that section they mention the stockyard owner. In section 305, "all rates or charges made for any stockyards services furnished to the stockyards by a stockyard owner or market agency shall be just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, and any unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory rate or charge is prohibited and declared to be unlawful."

Then, they come along in section 306, where they likewise mention the stockyard owner, and on down until we come to section 308 where it says, "If any stockyard owner, market agency, or dealer," bringing in the dealer, where he has not previously been mentioned except in the registration section. It not only makes the distinction when it defines stockyard owner, but it maintains that distinction throughout the statute.

Mr. VEEDER. But may not a stockyard company be both a stockyard owner and a market agency?

Mr. MORRILL. If it be a market agency isn't it subject to the provisions with regard to operating a market agency?

Mr. VEEDER. But because it is a market agency, not because it is a stockyard owner.

Mr. MORRILL. That is true.

Mr. VEEDER. If the same owner happens to be a market agency it is because he is a market agency and not because he is a stockyard owner. I happen to know of a certain man engaged in running a stockyard, and selling livestock on a commission and buying. He

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is all three things. But certainly because he happens to be a dealer in certain things he isn't regulated otherwise than as a dealer.

Mr. MORRILL. The definition of market agency is any person engaged in the business of furnishing stockyards services. What is the business of a stockyards company if it isn't to furnish stockyard services? It comes within that definition.

Mr. VEEDER. I agree with you on your construction; I agree with you that the use of these two terms here indicates that it was the intention of Congress in passing the law to make a distinction, but as it happens Congress has fialed to make a distinction in the sense that subdivision (a) applies to a stockyard owner and only a stockyard owner, and subdivision (c) applies only to market agencies other than stockyard owners, and the stockyard owner is brought in under subdivision (c) by reason of the definition of market agency. The only purpose in making the suggestion was to eliminate the stockyard owner from the definition of market agency, subjecting him to the provisions that are intended to affect only market agencies. Let me call your attention to H. R. 6424

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Morrill, this gentleman has yielded you 30 or 40 minutes of his time; if we are to get him in this morning he will have to be heard now.

Mr. VEEDER. Section 303, as amended by 6424, provides for the suspension of operations of a market agency that violates the act. Now, a stockyards company comes within the definition of market agency. It certainly was not the intention to suspend the activities. of a stockyard company if the stockyard company violated the act, because that would affect the entire business of the stockyards. long as a stockyards company comes within the definition of market agency it is subject to all the provisions of the act referring to market agencies, and what we want to do is simply to make that clear so that there will be no misunderstanding. Now, I see what the intention of Congress was in using the words market agency and stockyards owner. If there is a charge of violation which comes under the term market agency, and if the stockyard is brought in under that provision, do you suppose the court will say, "We will let them out, although they come under this definition?"

Mr. MORRILL. Mr. Chairman, so far as the time is concerned, it is entirely a matter of the amount of time the committee wants to give to my discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. We have given you an hour and thirty minutes; this gentleman would like to be heard now.

Mr. MORRILL. I am simply willing to discuss anything the committee wants me to discuss, and you can limit my time as much as you like, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I regret very much your time is limited this morning.

Mr. WATTS. Mr. Chairman, I came down here to appear against the Williams bill. The time yesterday was given over to the livestock exchanges, and they only touched on one or two little items in that. Now, I want to say to you that there are three lines in that bill, and there is more in those three lines than I have ever seen written in three lines in my life before. I would like to have about five minutes before I leave here to call your attention to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead; we will hear you right now.

FURTHER STATEMENT OF MR. CHARLES H. WATTS, REPRESENTING THE FARMERS' UNION LIVESTOCK COMMISSION CO., CHICAGO, ILL.

Mr. WATTS. Mr. Chairman, there is nothing serious in this bill, H. R. 5944, until you get down to the last part of the eighth line, page 5, which says:

The buying and selling of the livestock of nonmembers on a commission basis as a market agency by a "cooperative association of livestock producers shall be deemed a violation of this title.

Now, that is what I consider what the livestock exchanges want and all they want, what is contained in those four lines. It is aimed to put the cooperative commission firms out of business. I consider it a law that would control one set of the business and let the other. set do as they like. I do not believe it is the intention of this committee to recommend any law that is class legislation. I want to call your attention to our position. We have 19,000 members belonging to our organization, and if that law should go into effect, every morning when our livestock arrives, 50 or 60 or 70 loads of stuff, we would have to go through our membership lists to see that every man is a member of our organization. We have shipments from 10 owners in one load. We have not only got to see that the shipper is a member of our organization, but we have got to go through our home sheets, where they list the man's name and the number of head of stuff that is shipped in the shipment; and we have got to see whether that individual is a member or not. If we would sell anything for a man who is not a member of our organization they would immediately report to the Secretary of Agriculture that we had violated the act.

I want to call your attention to the last four lines of that bill, because they are trying to carry that over, in my opinion, under the guise of this uniform commission rule. I want to say to you

that so far as the uniform commission proposition goes we have no objection to a uniform commission charge. We have always lived up to a uniform commission charge and have adopted the one that the Secretary of Agriculture sent his arbitrators out to decide on as a fair charge. But I do not want a law to slip through here with those four lines in it that will put our organization out of business. Mr. RUBEY. You do not mean to say the commission men would like to put you out of business? You seem to be getting along so well together.

Mr. WATTS. Oh, fine; but I tell you I have to watch these fellows like a cat watches a mouse. I have got to put a little acid on the laws they introduce and read in between the lines, and I do not think I have ever seen so much written into four lines in my life as there is in the four lines ending that bill.

Mr. JOHNSON. What objection have you to selling stock for nonmembers? What objection would there be to it?

Mr. WATTS. They want to put us out of business if we do.

Mr. JOHNSON. What objection would they have to your selling stock for other people?

Mr. WATTS. They want to report us to the Secretary of Agriculture and say that the Farmers' Union is violating this act.

Mr. JOHNSON. If they can not sell it through your firm they would have to sell it through some other firm?

Mr. WATTS. We would have to turn it over to them, I suppose. If it is necessary to have that in the bill I want these fellows put under the same provision, that they will violate the law if they sell a hoof of stock for a member of our organization.

Mr. RUMBLE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask Mr. Boyd a couple of questions?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Boyd, do you yield to questions?

Mr. BOYD. Yes, but before answering any questions I want to say to Mr. Watts that we are not seeking to put him out of business. Mr. RUMBLE. Yesterday you called attention of the committee to the fact that complaint had been issued by the Government against the Central Cooperative Commission Association.

Mr. BOYD. I did.

Mr. RUMBLE. The fact is that the complaint has been issued, answer has been filed by the Central, hearing has been had, and the matter has not yet been determined by the department?

Mr. BOYD. That is the fact.

Mr. RUMBLE. Isn't it also a fact that shortly before the issuance of the complaint, 17 complaints were issued by the department against old-line commission firms at South St. Paul?

Mr. BOYD. Practically that number.

Mr. RUMBLE. Isn't it also a fact that approximately 15 of the oldline commission firms at South St. Paul pleaded guilty to the charges contained in those complaints and waived a hearing?

Mr. BOYD. Yes; and if you would do likewise you would be excluded from the stockyards. You are guilty as the others.

STATEMENT OF MR. A. SYKES, IDA GROVE, IOWA

Mr. SYKES. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I am president of the Corn Belt Meat Producers' Association and also president of the Chicago Producers' Cooperative Commission Association, which is a cooperative organization of farmers, a selling agency, for the selling of livestock.

I do not wish to take up your time in this hearing. Mr. Watts has voiced my sentiments in regard to the Williams bill exactly. Take our own organization at Chicago, and we could not do business one day. We have had as high as 150 carloads of livestock in one day, and if we had to go over our records to find out whether every one of those shippers was a member of our organization, it would take a week for us to find out and to dispose of that one day's shipments. So you can see it would be physically impossible for us to operate under a rule of that kind.

Now, there is just one more point, and that is with regard to the docking and weighing. Long before I was interested in a cooperative commission company I advocated the theory that the Government should supervise the weighing and docking of livestock at these great terminal markets, and I have never changed my mind; I am still of that opinion. I believe that the great livestock industry in this country is entitled to that supervision. In saying that I do not wish to reflect on the interest that is at the present time doing that work, except as it refers to the docking of hogs. Of course, since I became