Process, Action, and Experience
Oxford University Press, Feb 22, 2018 - Philosophy - 256 pages
There has been a philosophical upheaval recently in our understanding of the metaphysics of the mind. The philosophy of mind and action has traditionally treated its subject matter as consisting of states and events, and completely ignored the category of ongoing process. So the mental things that happen - experiences and actions - have been taken to be completed events and not ongoing processes. But events by their very nature as completed wholes are never present to the agent or subject; only ongoing processes can be present to a subject in the way required for conscious experience and practical self-knowledge. This suggests that a proper understanding of processes is required to understand subjective experience and agency. This volume explores the possibility and advantages of taking processes to be the subject matter of the philosophy of mind and action. The central defining feature of the process argument is its use of the progressive (as opposed to perfective) aspect. But beyond this, philosophers working on the metaphysics of processes do not agree. The contributors to this volume take up this argument in the metaphysics of processes. Are processes continuants? Are they particulars at all, or should we rather be thinking of process activity as a kind of stuff? Process, Action, and Experience considers whether practical reasoning and practical self-knowledge require thinking of action in process terms, and it considers arguments for the processive nature of conscious experience.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Processes Activities and Actions
Processes as Patterns of Occurrence
Processes as Continuants and Process as Stuff
Experience Process Continuity and Boundary
What Is a Process? Modes of Occurrence and Forms of Dynamicity in General Process Theory
Other editions - View all
achievement activity agent analogy Anscombe argue argument Aristotle aspectual ballistic action belief category of occurrent causal claim completed events conception concrete consciousness continuants contrast countable crossing the road Davidson describe distinction Donald Davidson dynamics elementary imperatives elliptical trainer endorsement entail entities example exist experience experiential explanandum explanans explanation explanatory extended intervals fact Galton and Mizoguchi going gold Goldberg Variations happening homogeneous idea inference inferential instant intentional action involves Jennifer Hornsby kind linguistic mass nouns mental metaphysical Mourelatos naive rationalization non-countable notion object omelet ongoing processes open process Oxford particular pattern perception perdurant perfective aspect period phases Philosophical Theory philosophy of action philosophy of mind praxeological predications process ontology processes and events progressive aspect properties question realization relation relevant running Seibt sense sentence slugs Soteriou spatial specific specious present Steward Stout stuff suggest things Thompson University Press Vendler verb walking wholly present