Many remarkable events of the present age may be confidered as the consequences of a philofophy-without having the least claim to that dignified name—which undermines the pillars of every useful institution, but rears no fabric; which leaves man in a state of indolence and indifference with respect to his most important concerns; and which converts him into a fenfual and selfish being, that is determined folely by time, accident, and circumftances; and that is toffed, to and fro, on this fea of life, without a rudder or compass, without a fure rule for his conduct or belief, without any fixed object, to which his future profpects and hopes can be rationally di rected. Placed on this ifthmus of a middle state, ELEMENTARY VIEW OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT. Preparatory Remarks. BEFORE we enter upon this arduous tafk, it may be of fome importance to premise a few neceffary obfervations on the method which has been adopted in the execution of it; and on the various obftacles which the ftudent of every new Syftem, particularly of Ethics, must unavoidably encounter. It appeared to me, at a very early period of my studies, that the principal diffenfions, and fubfequent divifions in philofophy, have arisen chiefly from the following obvious fources. -Every fyftematic writer on fubjects, which, from their nature, do not admit of demonftrative certainty, nor of any fuch proofs as are manifest from objective reality, is almost involuntarily led to employ new terms and phrases, in order to exprefs the different opinions he broaches among his cotemporaries. It is of little confequence to him, whether the ideas, which gave rife to thefe opinions, be alfo new. For, though the latter may be already germinating in the feeds fown by his great predeceffors, or may only have been differently explained, he is equally certain of finding fome adherents, who pride themselves upon difcovering a new fenfe, or perhaps a new application of the fenfe, in which his terms, the definitions of them, or the fcientific divifions, are now more clearly, or more bfcurely, understood. This has uniformly h. ppened, I could almoft almoft fay, fince the beginning of philofophical fpeculations : hence the abfolute neceffity of giving, in every instance, the clearest poffible definitions of words, must be obvious to every novice in philosophy. But this I confider as a task, the strict performance of which, from the very imperfect state of language, has been (and probably will never cease to be) one of the many human defiderata. Hence, the immortal BACON, when the fame, or at least a similar idea pervaded his comprehenfive mind, was induced to express himself upon this fubject, in the following excellent words: "Præterea ut bene fperent, Inftaurationem noftram ut quiddam infinitum et ultra mortale fingant, et animo concipiant; cum revera fit infiniti erroris finis et terminus legitimus." Were it, however, poffible to define all philofophical terms with that degree of precifion which we, fometimes, observe in the works of a BACON, a. NEWTON, and a KANT; yet we could also fuggeft the remark-a remark which is by no means in favour of human perfection-that even these illuftrious characters, in their own elementary works, not rarely deviate from the original, or primary, definitions of terms. Those, who are converfant in fpeculative inquiries, will readily, and within proper limits, understand this affertion; and fuch readers as might extend the meaning of it further than I am inclined to admit, I only remind of the logical difficulties attending every long demonftration. It would, therefore, be rafh in the extreme to charge these eminent characters with incongruity of thought, or reafoning; as the more minute deviations, in terms, are chiefly owing to the unfettled ftate of language in general; and as the very term, perfection, when speaking of human beings provided with human organs, is only rela tive. A long and dear-bought experience in teaching has first induced me to entertain thoughts upon this important theme, which may not find many fupporters. Yet I think myself justified in asserting, that the most, if not all, Systems of Grammar and Rhetoric, as well as the Dictionaries of languages, are compiled upon mechanical, wavering and untenable principles; for they are, more or lefs, liable to the following serious objections : * ift. That the rules contained in Grammars, generally admit of a greater number of exceptions, than of pofitive deter minations. 2d. That the inflections of nouns and verbs are not accommodated to the etymology of words, but are chiefly taken from analogy-a circumftance productive of endless mistakes and confufion in the grammars of modern languages. 3d. That so far from improving the phrafes and idioms of languages, grammarians feem to labour hard to render them, if poffible, more perplexed and inconfiftent; t-by daily adopting new idioms in one language, which are borrowed from another; by ufing words in a figurative fenfe, which cannot be thus employed without impropriety; by transferring words from the phyfical to the moral fenfe, and vice versa, when there is no other neceflity for this outrage upon good fenfe, *Whether the Elementary Grammar of the German Language, which I propose to publish, together with an Identical Dictionary of the German, English, French and Latin languages, will be liable to the charges which my predeceffors have incurred, I am not confident enough to aver. The short specimen given of the latter at the end of this work) which accompanies the third “ Effay, On the merits and demerits of JOHNSON's English Dictionary, on language in general, &c. by ADELUNG," will ferve as a tolerable criterion of the execution of the whole. + If it be objected, that this is no fault of Grammarians, fince language is formed and modelled by a whole people, I fhall briefly anfwer; that tradition and custom alone do not appear to have any fuch tendency, as to make a whole nation fpeak and write jargon, or nonsense, for ever; and confequently, that errors and mistakes ought not to be perpetuated in elementary books of instruction, 丁室 fenfe, than the fancy or caprice of the speaker, and subsequently, that of the writer * 4th. That instead of giving a syntax of speech, or sentences arranged in the moft natural order, and ftill conformable to the premises, as well as to the fubfequent conclufions, they adhere to the oppofite extreme; by neglecting the general, and giving the Special construction of the individual parts.— This, indeed, is of itself a useful piece of labour, if the rules were not too much crowded upon the tyro; but it by no means deserves the name of a syntax, for its object is merely the inflection of nouns and verbs, as preparatory to a General Syntax t. 5th. That no Grammarian, or Lexicographer, excepting perhaps ADELUNG, has accurately and uniformly distinguished, both the moral and phyfical fenfe of words-however eafy this may appear at first fight-nor the objective and fubjective application of terms and phrafes ‡. As *This charge cannot, in juftice, be levelled at the captivating effufions of Poetry; an art which, from its nature, and the frequent good effects it produces in rousing, like mufic, the palfied organs of mortals, deferves more deference, than any of the liberal arts; as it is likewife understood to poffefs a much greater latitude, than all the fifter-arts. +Upon accurate investigation, it must strike even the novice in grammar, that there can be only two parts in the nature of fpeech, which being the regulators of all the Data involved in the reft, produce that change of place, or fituation, which we express by the term Syntax: these two unquestionably are the nominative of the Noun, with its correfponding Verb.-All other parts of speech are, in my opinion, liable to the fame modifications, or changes, which characterize a numerous progeny, whose father and mother alone are stable and fixed. The immortal author of the " Critique of Pure Reafon" was, among the Germans, without exception the first, who perceived the abfolute neceffity of this diftinction in philofophical inquiries -In juftice to the high rank held by the English and French philofophers, however, I must frankly own, (what I have, in part, already declared in the Preface) that I have not been fo happily fituated as to examine, with critical accuracy, their respective nomenclatures. But if I may rely |