in an elementary treatise, defigned chiefly for academical inftructions, and has even declared himself in favour of this mode of thinking in general, with respect to all philofophical fubjects. Would not a well understood fcepticism," fays he among other things, "be the most natural way to a"void all metaphyfical controversy, and at the fame time the "most rational means for calming all dogmatical and critical "paffions? What can be our aim under the titles of Logic, Metaphyfics, Critic of Reafon; what else can be our object " under the general title of Philofophy than, after admitting "the unquestionable reality of our representations, to sketch "faithfully the history of them; and then to prove what "is true and certain with respect to them; and what in the "human mind (whether it be the lower, or more exalted part of it) carries the conviction of truth and certainty along "with it?"-This philofopher wishes the whole of his work to be confidered merely as the subjective conviction of a Sceptic, and describes the sceptical mode of thinking more accurately than has been done by any of his predeceffors. In opposition to the Critique of Kant, he has started a number of questions, fome of which are completely in the spirit of the old Pyrrhonists. -Upon these doubtful points, likewise, answers have already been published by the friends of the Critical System. However conclufive fuch refutations may appear to the party, on whose behalf they were attempted, it ftill remains to be wifhed, though there is now little hope left for this prospect, that the aged Father of Rational and Critical Dogmatifm may deign to defend himself against the attacks of Plattner, and those of the New Aenefidemus.

66

With pleasure I proceed, by oppofing to these sceptical writings a work written with noble intentions. Although it deviate in some respects from the principles of Kant, yet it supports, with energy, the truth and certainty of human

A

knowledge,

knowledge, and at the same time places the interefting nature of these questions in a clear point of view. The treatise, here alluded to, is "On Truth and moral perfection; by ADAM WEISHAUPT, 1793.”

All the writings of Sceptics, it is fincerely to be hoped, will never totally deprive man of the belief in objective truth; and the Sceptic himself will never be capable of abandoning it completely. For it is of the utmost importance, that we should admit fomething objective, for the fake of morality and religion, both of which must lose their value, and their existence, as foon as they are confidered merely as fomething fubjective and relative. Philofophers ought, therefore, rather to justify the belief in objective reality, than represent to us, that there is no other but fubjective conviction, which they hold out as the highest step of philofophical and confiftent thought.--We cannot, indeed, proceed beyond the power of comprehenfion, and all conviction merely refts on our state of mind; but could it be otherwife?It is fufficient that, in our consciousnefs, clear traces are given us of objective truth; that it is in our power to distinguish objective and fubjective truth from one another; and that from the whole mode of our thought and action, and from the ideas of duty exalted above all neceffity, we must reasonably admit fomething objectively true.

Philofophical Scepticism, which is not merely pretended, or affected, and which does not flow from an impure fource, has as yet found, and ever will find, but a few genuine fupporters: but when it is taught and extolled in writings, and in public places of inftruction, it may, in a great number of individuals, gradually produce a fhallow mode of fceptical reasoning, deftroy the spirit of inquiry, and ultimately promote immorality. Perhaps, Philofophy would foon fall into disrepute, and the public spirit among mankind, as well as the general utility of the learned, would fuffer extremely, were our attention con

fined merely to the description of the phenomena that occur in the mind, and to the limited confideration of what is fubjective alone, without placing any value upon what is objective. It would be rash and irrational, to obtrude our maxims, opinions, and convictions upon others; though every one wishes to cultivate what alone is ftable in us, our reafon; and to try by gentle and fuitable means, to bring to the clear consciousness and conviction of others, what our fair and candid examination teaches us to be uniformly true and good. We wish not, individually, to confider ourselves as infulated creatures that live, each of us, in our own world of ideas; but to believe, that we all have a claim upon a certain number of truths, and that it depends upon our own exertions, to get poffeffion of these.

In our times, it might be more dangerous than many imagine, to represent the Scepticism of Hume as incontrovertible, or incapable of folution; for the greater number of fuperficial readers might thus be induced to furrender their weak minds to the most dangerous apathy, to fhun every mental exertion, to fearch for no further difcoveries in the department of philofophy, and-by gradually returning to the age of barbarismto leave every thing in this deplorable fituation, in which they themselves ultimately fall victims to infidelity, or fanaticism.

There prevails at prefent, in almoft every civilized country, a very shallow and dangerous fcepticism, extending its influence over the most important objects. It has affumed a systematic form, to which people readily subscribe; because it is more discreet, and less intolerable, than the profeffed mode of thinking, which characterizes almost every philofophic fe&t. This fpecies of fcepticism, in the greater number of individuals, affumes the appearance of an indolent and irrefolute difpofition of mind; and in many, that of a wild, fanatical

fickleness; a fickleness, with which one party, by way of retaliation, ufually reproaches the other.

The causes of this fingular propenfity, it is not difficult to trace: an inclination for fenfual indulgence is every where manifeft; the interest in pure intellectual truth is univerfally weakened; the old philofophical and theological systems have been fhaken in their foundations, while the new ones have as yet been able to procure but little public reputation.

Prof. STAUDLIN diftinguishes with accuracy the different fpecies of scepticism, and he endeavours to ascertain their true origin. As a fpecimen of his masterly method of inquiry, I conclude this Introduction, with a faithful extract from his Treatife "On the Sources and Origin of Scepticism."

“There is,” says he, " a certain kind of scepticism which deferves to be filed the philofophical, and which arifes nearly in the following manner. Men of vigorous minds, in whom a lively interest for every important truth is joined to an uncommon degree of penetration and activity, begin to think, and to inquire for themselves: fuch men diveft themfelves of their juvenile opinions and prejudices, at a much earlier period of life, than others. Their propenfity to peculiar and original ideas exhibits every thing in a fufpicious light, which formerly, either from mere cuftom or authority, had formed a part of their creed. The conftant defire of difcovering truth; the ftrong consciousness of their own powers to fearch for it; the bold profpect of opening, perhaps, new views in philofophy, continually induce them to inquire into every fource, from which truth may be derived:-thus they are impelled by a kind of philofophic enthufiafm."

"That remarkable epoch of human life, in which fometimes the painter, fometimes the poet, as if by inspiration, feels in himself the genius of his art; this epocha has been frequently obferved by men whom nature had defigned for ce

lebrity.

lebrity. The philofophic genius, not unfrequently, discovers a fimilar period, in which the views he directs to his intellectual nature, the manner in which he reflects upon the whole created fabric, and the researches he makes into the writings of the ancient philofophers, fill his mind with a pleafing anxiety, with a lively energy, and lead him to augur his future destiny but this exertion of evolving talents not rarely terminates in scepticism. His mind trespasses upon regions unknown, and far remote from human conception; he is first induced, and that most frequently, to start questions which, to men, are altogether unanswerable. Unfortunately, too, he begins with the most difficult fubjects of inquiry; for the more easy pro- pofitions appear to him beneath his dignity. The latter he treats with contempt; and grasping principally at the が former, he is continually disappointed by the tranfient hopes of discovering myfteries, which lie concealed behind an impenetrable gloom. The unfuccefsful efforts made upon that which is difficult, foon render him fufpicious of what is both easy, and within his horizon. He wanders from one fyftem to another in order to find the philofopher's stone; (or, as it is very forcibly expreffed in the original) to folve the riddle of the world. He alternately pays homage to the different fyftems, which engage his attention; fo that at one time the adherents of LOCKE, at another thofe of LEIBNITZ, at another thofe of DESCARTES, and at length thofe of ROUSSEAU are, with him, the reprefentatives of truth. Sometimes, he creates fyftems of his own; but they are as quickly destroyed, as they were erected."

"He is, finally, led to investigate the foundation of all human knowledge and evidence, as well as to inquire into the poffibility of an objective truth. Here, where he was in fearch of a certain refting point, a boisterous ocean of uncertainties, at once, appears in view. In vain he attempts, af