The supplemental estimate includes $3,063,000,000 for the Army, $2,649,000,000 for the Navy, $4,535,000,000 for the Air Force, and $240,000,000 for establishment-wide activities of the Defense Department. Mr. McNeil will break that down in detail.

About 59 percent of the supplemental request, or 6.2 billion dollars, has been included for guns, tanks, ships, aircraft, ammunition, and other major procurement items. (Of this total about $3,344,000,000 is for aircraft-$40,000,000 for the Army, $620,000,000 for the Navy, $2,684,000,000 for the Air Force and $185,000,000 is for shipbuilding.)

About 24 percent, or 2.5 billion dollars, would go for the operation and maintenance of the facilities and equipment for the regular operations of the Armed Forces, including the sharply increased demands for consumption-type matériel in the Korean campaign. (About onehalf of the 2.5 billion dollars would go for consumption-type matériel.)

About 13 percent, or 1.35 billion dollars, would go for the pay and allowances of military personnel, including their food, subsistence, and travel.

Of the balance, $174,000,000 is for military construction-$4,000,000 for the Army and $170,000,000 for the Air Force.

Exclusive of costs for guardsmen and Reserves on active duty, $33,000,000 has been provided for the National Guard, Officers' Reserve Corps, and the ROTC program of the Army.

$120,000,000 has been included for research and development, $70,000,000 for industrial mobilization, and $50,000,000 has been allocated for contingencies.

As the President stated in his message transmitting the supplemental request, certain program changes will undoubtedly be necessary in order properly to prosecute the campaign in Korea. For this reason authority is being requested to adjust by 10 percent any single appropriation by transfer from other appropriations. This would permit the necessary adjustments either in the Korean support or in the build-up phase contemplated by these estimates. I have instructed Assistant Secretary McNeil to keep this committee currently informed of all such actions which we find necessary.

I want to emphasize that this is not a call for full mobilization. It is a call to increase our strength in being, in order to enable us to support the United Nations' action in Korea and to build up our strength elsewhere to meet the threat to world peace.

The supplemental request before you rests on two principal factors: First, the requirements for land, naval, and air forces needed by General MacArthur successfully to prosecute the campaign in Korea ; and second, the need to build up the strength of our forces over and above those committed to the Korean campaign.

The plans covering the build-up of our forces are based upon studies which began immediately after the President's announcement of the Soviet atomic explosion last September. You will recall that I discussed these studies when I testified here on April 26.

Because of the events in Korea the minimum desired forces which these studies showed to be required-normally a matter that would have been provided for in next year's budget-are being requested at this time.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in complete agreement and fully support the forces planned for the build-up in our strength, and are also in complete agreement as to the forces to be provided in support of the Korean campaign.

The action in Korea is a battle of supply and the distances involved are great. As a result, we must expect difficult problems and slow progress. The military establishment which we are asking you to expand, however, is a sounder mobilization base than the United States has ever had before.

Secretary JOHNSON. By reason of the groundwork laid by my predecessor and the efforts of officers and civilians in all the agencies of the Department of Defense-the spirit of teamwork within the Department has grown tremendously. We have today a closely knit team of land, naval, and air forces. The swift decisions during the past 4 weeks to coordinate the combat efforts of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the Far East are striknig examples of the benefits of unification in an emergency.

Our military establishment has been geared to provide a sound mobilization base and a swift striking force in case of a Third World War. In addition, we have had to be prepared to meet, to the extent that we could, the first shock of an act of calculated local aggression. The latter test has been met with unprecedented speed in Korea. We are now in the process of backing our shock troops with the necessary reinforcements. We are asking you to supply the men and equipment to replace those being used in the Far East and additional strengths to prepare for the possibility of future emergencies. I am sure that all of us will meet the challenge of the aggressor with the same undaunted spirit as that shown by our fighting men in Korea.

The witnesses who follow me will give the details of the program we recommend. It is a program designed to bring the action in Korea to a successful conclusion; it is also a program designed to promote world peace by deterring further aggression. It is the sort of program to which I referred on April 12 this year when I gave the Founder's Day speech at my alma mater, the University of Virginia. Speaking in Charlottesville that day, I said:

I have every confidence in our ultimate success. We shall face facts as they are and shall fit our defense plans and our manpower and munitions requirements to meet them. Our defense plans, however, are not rigid. They are not the laws of Medes and Persians. They are flexible and adaptable to changing conditions. They are under constant study and review. If we become convinced that our present means are insufficient to meet the exigencies of the day and the probable threats of tomorrow, we shall not be too humble to ask for more; and if we find them more than adequate we shall not be too proud to ask for less. We shall always seek for truth and we shall take fitting means to meet the truth.

Gentlemen, I shall be glad to attempt to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. MAHON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your statement. It has been very interesting and very illuminating.

Secretary JOHNSON. Mr. McNeil says the press wants to know if you are releasing this statement. That is up to you.

Mr. MAHON. It is not our custom to release statements that are made here until the hearings are printed.

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. MAHON. I want to keep this on strictly a high-policy level, and I am not going to ask you many questions.

SUFFICIENCY OF SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDS REQUESTED

There are two questions very much in my mind, and I know that those questions will arise when this bill is taken to the floor. Those questions will more or less come as one. First, is this enough money to meet the emergency which faces our Nation; and, second, is this the beginning of world war III?

The latter part, "Is this the beginning of world war III?" should perhaps be discussed in part, at least, off the record, but whatever is appropriate to put on the record in connection with the fiscal requirements we would, of course, like to have on the record.

Sometimes, when we get what we want but do not want to be caught short in the event it develops that more should have been asked for, we have a way of saying, "That is perhaps a step in the right direction." There will be those in the country and in the Congress who will question the sufficiency of the funds requested. I wish to question the sufficiency of the funds requested.

In connection with that I want to turn to page 13 of your statement, where you say:

As this committee knows, all of the top officials of the Department of Defense, both civilian and military, have been seriously concerned lest even the increased strengths I have been describing should be inadequate to meet the needs of world conditions.

On page 16 you say:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in complete agreement and fully support the forces planned for the build-up in our strength, and are also in complete agreement as to the forces to be provided in support of the Korean campaign.

Now, I do not want any vacillating on this question as to the adequacy of the funds requested. In my own mind I expect to be heavily influenced by the President and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the Secretary of Defense and the other Secretaries.

Is this enough money?

Mr. MAHON. Let us have your statement, and I would like to have amplification by each of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I know it is easy for one to say, "Well, maybe I would like a little more money in order to be protected in the event it should be shown later that more is required." We want the information straight from the shoulder and right from the heart.

وو

Secretary JOHNSON. I think the question should be answered off the record.

Mr. MAHON. All right.

(Discussion off the record.)

Secretary JOHNSON. This request covers all of the items about which I have any knowledge other than two.

I think we will have to come back with a supplemental request involving naval aircraft procurement. In this bill there is $170,000,000 for Air Force public works and only $4,000,000 for public works for the Army.

In the changing world conditions, about which we can tell more later, the Army and the Navy will then be able to give you a fair

estimate of the amount needed for public works in those services, something that cannot be done intelligently today.

The other imponderable is that this money for the Korean operation is based on its running the normal course of what it might take for us (1) to stabilize, (2) to build up the necessary equipment to go forward, and going forward, in accordance with the planning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur, to the thirty-eighth parallel.

There is more money than we need in Korea if these troops from North Korea should now or at an early date withdraw to the thirtyeighth parallel. If there should be perchance misadventures and if the campaign should not move according to the best estimates of General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we might need more money.

The third imponderable is that this may be but the beginning of larger things.

These figures are the soundest that all the men in the Pentagon can arrive at and, with the exceptions which I mentioned, have been unanimously agreed upon. I hope you will check with each of them, because all the services are here represented, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MAHON. Can you say for the present that this is really the amount of money that the President wants at this time as Commander in Chief and as President of the United States?

Secretary JOHNSON. May I answer off the record first? (Discussion off the record.)

Secretary JOHNSON. This amount does have the approval of the President, and the stories that have been in the press of $1,000,000,000, $2,000,000,000, $5,000,000,000, or $6,000,000,000 have no substance whatever. This is the estimate arrived at on the basis of the requirements as fixed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. MAHON. Is it proper for us to presume, Mr. Secretary, that if the President had wanted additional funds he would have requested more funds than are embodied in this request before us today?

Secretary JOHNSON. I have an abiding confidence that if the secretaries, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and myself had indicated to the President that more money was needed in their judgment at this time, that would have been the amount put in the message.

SUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS REQUESTED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Mr. MAHON. I would like to have a comment from you, Mr. Pace, and from you, General Collins, with respect to this question of whether or not in your opinion the amount requested of the Congress at this time is all that we should appropriate at this time. If you need. twice as much money now as you are asking for, I want you to say so. We can go to the floor of the House, and the other body can take action over there, and I think we can get additional funds if you need them for the defense of this country.

Secretary PACE. Mr. Chairman, if I may speak to that point first, I will let General Collins speak in terms of specifics.

The sum that has been submitted by the President to this committee represents the sum that was agreed upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all the Secretaries sitting together. It represents, one,

what we anticipate will be the responsibilities in Korea; and, two, necessary build-up that was planned on the basis of planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the period of time that preceded the Korean operation.

I would like to point out that from the Army's standpoint we carry probably the major responsibility in the Korean operation. Therefore, the imponderables, so far as the Army is concerned, are the largest.

This represents our best judgment at the present time as to what is needed in that area to do the job. It is possible that events may change. If General MacArthur's requests vary by reason of circumstances that are not currently within our competence to know this amount may not be sufficient. It is likewise true that if for some unknown reason there were a termination of hostilities this might exceed what is necessary.

I want to emphasize two things: One, that we seek to take the money we have asked for and train the men as rapidly as possible. In terms of seeking that training as rapidly as possible it may be that what we have asked for may not be enough. It is likewise true that in terms of demands that are made upon us in the Korean venture this might not be enough. However, based upon the best judgment of ourselves and our entire staff in the Army, that represents the proper figure to request of the Congress on behalf of the Army and the Department of Defense at this time.

Would you amplify that, General Collins?

General COLLINS. I wholly agree with what Mr. Pace just said. There are perhaps one or two additional thoughts that might be worth while adding.

This represents an orderly and an efficient manner of expanding the Army.

As Mr. Johnson pointed out, we are still going to try to apply rules of efficiency and not simply be profligate in this expansion. That applies both to manpower and to procurement.

The estimates of personnel strength have necessarily had to be done day by day as we have gotten requests from General MacArthur. Frankly, right now there are indications that we are going to need some additional forces in certain categories. It is possible that under the 10-percent flexibility provision, which is provided here, we may be able to meet those. If not, then definitely we will later on have to come in for a deficiency appropriation.

Mr. MAHON. We are not speaking so much of what may be required later on as what is required now.

General COLLINS. Now, I fully support the request as made for the Army in this appropriation.

SUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS REQUESTED FOR DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Mr. MAHON. I would like to have Secretary Matthews and Admiral Sherman comment on this problem which we are here discussing, and make any supplementary suggestions you think should be made. There is no use engaging in a lot of repetition, but give us any views you think might be helpful.