For "Storage and issue of engineer military supplies and equipment" we are asking for somewhat under 5 million dollars as against the 9.9 million dollars which we asked for in the regular 1951 budget.

For "Military surveys and maps" we are asking about $4.5 million

more.

For "Operation of engineer school" we are asking a small amount of about $300,000.

If you would like me to expand on those individual amounts, I can go into a little more detail on how they were computed.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, in examining the engineer items here I find great detail as to the items, but I do not find the numbers of the items.

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGEL. You just allocate a certain amount for each item without allocating the numbers?

General BRAGDON. No, sir; for the expanded Army and for the increment they were based on tables of organization and equipment and tables of allowances.

Mr. ENGEL. If you will pardon me, on your justification page 2, for instance, tab 15, picking up one item of a saw chain bolt, 36-inch, you have $30,000. That is more than one, is it not?

General BRAGDON. Yes; we do not show the number of units under each item.

Mr. ENGEL. You do not show the numbers, so we could not figure out the unit price?

General BRAGDON. We can get that for you right now.

Mr. ENGEL. Why did you not show the unit prices there?

General BRAGDON. I do not know. Can you answer that, Colonel? Mr. ENGEL. You have the amount you are spending on each one, but we cannot tell whether it is high or low unless we have the number. You might buy 10 or 50.

General BRAGDON. We based numbers of units on tables of organization and equipment allowances and factors of expenditure.

Mr. ENGEL. You have an item of electric arc welder, $114,400. That looks like one arc welder. Of course, it is many arc welders, I presume. Mr. MAHON. You may proceed.

General BRAGDON. That is all I have, unless you would like me to take up the individual figures on this sheet. I can give you a more detailed breakdown.

Mr. ENGEL. He has the amount. For instance, $65,000,000 on page 2. There are three or four pages of very detailed items of justification. I would not put them on the record.

Mr. MAHON. They are available to us.

General BRAGDON. They are in the detailed sheets you have.

General REEDER. The largest amount of money here is for all the engineering supply materials that General MacArthur will use when he starts moving forward again in Korea and he repairs bridges, railroads, runways, and so forth. All those supplies the engineers buy, and there is something like $170,000,000 just for that purpose.

MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL DEPARTMENT

WITNESSES

MAJ. GEN. GEORGE E. ARMSTRONG, DEPUTY SURGEON GENERAL NEPHTUNE FOGELBERG, CHIEF, FISCAL OFFICE

Mr. MAHON. We will now take up the Medical Department, the Medical and Hospital Department, Army.

GENERAL STATEMENT

General ARMSTRONG. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the Medical Department is requesting $11,445,953 under the appropriation "Medical and Hospital Department, Army" as a supplemental estimate for fiscal year 1951 as a result of operations in Korea. This amount, when added to the $54,883,000 reported by the Senate under this appropriation for fiscal year 1951, provides a revised total of $66,328,953.

The supplemental estimate of $11,445,953 is divided into three parts as follows:

Expanded Army.
Task force___

Third increment_.

$3, 508, 614

5, 949, 766 1, 987, 573

The $3,508,614 requested under "Expanded Army" represents fund requirements for medical and hospital care on a peacetime basis and increased medical activity at recruiting stations for the first element of expansion in the man-year strength of the Army. The $5,949,766 requested under "Task force" provide funds for (1) the hospitalization of Army patients as a result of battle conditions in Korea, (2) consumption of medical supplies and equipment by combat and supporting troops in Korea, (3) increased pipeline of medical supplies and equipment from zone of interior depots to combat depots in Korea, and (4) equipping to authorized allowances medical units now in Japan for Korean operations. The $1,987,573 requested under "Third increment" represents fund requirements for medical and hospital care on a peacetime basis, and increased medical activity at recruiting stations for the second element of expansion in the man-year strength of the Army. It has been determined by the Medical Director, Office of the Secretary of Defense, that the expanded Army and the Korean operations combined will necessitate an increase of 2,391 in the average number of occupied beds required for fiscal year 1951 in Army hospitals. In determining fund requirements for these additional beds, the staffing patterns, average salaries, and other factors used in the computation of the regular fiscal-year 1951 fund requirements were used.

As part of the estimates, you will find a detailed breakdown and justification of these funds by budget projects.

Mr. MAHON. Who made up this figure, General Armstrong? General ARMSTRONG. You are referring to the total supplemental of $11,445,953?

Mr. MAHON. Yes.

General ARMSTRONG. That figure represents the amount approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense after reviewing our supplementary requirements.

NEED FOR SUPPLEMENTAL ESTIMATES

Mr. MAHON. Give some of the reasons why there is a need for supplementary budget requirements for the Medical and Hospital Department of the Army as the result of the Korean situation.

General ARMSTRONG. Our 1951 budget, now before the Senate, was based on the normal number of patients to be expected in our hospital system based on last year's experience. Obviously, when you put military personnel into an area like Korea, under combat conditions, you not only get combat casualties but you get an increase in your disease and nonbattle injuries as well. This situation, together with an increase in the size of the Army, necessitates an increase in the estimate of average occupied beds, which serves as the basis for estimating additional fund requirements.

Secondy, medical units will have to be equipped, increased supplies and equipment will be expended in Korea as a result of combat, and pipelines will have to be established to forward-using depots.

In addition, there will be increased medical activity at recruiting stations, due principally to the operations of selective service.

Mr. MAHON. Most of the technical services seem to have considerable increases in the supplemental budget. Yours is relatively small. Did you ask for enough money to take care of the casualties that you may expect?

General ARMSTRONG. Mr. Chairman, I would like to answer that in this way: In computing the revised patient load for fiscal year 1951, in view of the Korean incident, the number of individuals that we expect to have in combat, the number and strength of supporting units, the increased military strength in Japan, and the increased military strength in the zone of the interior, we worked with the Director of Medical Services in the Office of the Secretary of Defense trying to arrive at the best possible estimate. There is a difference of opinion as to the size of the potential patient load. Our estimates, which appear sound to us, are considerably at variance with those arrived at by the Director of Medical Services-theirs are considerably lower. Future events will determine which set of figures is correct. If his figures prove correct, we are in a satisfactory position; if ours prove correct, we are in a very poor position.

Mr. MAHON. What additional funds would be required to provide the funds which you estimated might be necessary?

General ARMSTRONG. Our estimate differed from the figures which you see before you by $15,700,000.

Mr. MAHON. In other words, instead of requesting $11,000,000, you suggested possibly $27,000,000 would be required?

General ARMSTRONG. That is correct.

Mr. MAHON. That is a very wide discrepancy.

General ARMSTRONG. To show you how far apart we were in this hospital-bed figure alone, we estimated that the increase in the average number of occupied hospital beds would be slightly in excess of 6,000. To be exact, 6,280. The supplemental estimate is based upon the premise that the increase in average occupied beds will be 2,391, which is a difference of of 3,889 occupied beds.

Mr. MAHON. Did this difference of opinion grow out of a difference of opinion as to the Korean situation, or the over-all picture?

General ARMSTRONG. The difference came about as a result of two different approaches to the problem. Briefly, we approached the problem by applying last year's hospitalization rate of 1.65 percent in the zone of the interior to the increased man-year military strength planned for the zone of the interior. We did the same thing for Japan except we used 1.9 percent which was last year's experience factor for peacetime.

In Korea we took the average number of troops that were actually going to be in combat and applied an adjusted experience figure of World War II for combat divisions. The rate of battle losses for World War II was 10 percent per month. However, because of differences in the plan of action and in the utilization of combat troops, we cut the rate in half and used 5 instead of 10 percent, which we feel is perhaps too conservative. We added five-tenths of 1 percent for noncombat casualties and diseases, due to battle conditions, for the average number of troops in Japan, to provide hospitalization required above peacetime rates in Japan, and arrived at a total increase of 6,280 in the average number of occupied beds required. I am not too sure how they arrived at their figure.

Mr. FOGELBERG. The method used was to apply 2 percent to the combined man-year Army strength of the original and supplemental fiscal year 1951 estimates to determine the number of average occupied beds required for Army patients. It was believed, by applying a 2-percent rate to the combined man-year Army strength, that sufficient cushion would be provided to care for the battle casualties in Korea. To obtain the increment, they subtracted from the total the number of occupied beds for Army patients contained in the original estimates for fiscal year 1951 and derived a figure of 2,391. That is essentially what was done.

PLAN FOR SECURING SERVICES OF DOCTORS AND DENTISTS

Mr. SIKES. I would like to ask, General Armstrong, how you plan to secure the services of sufficient doctors and dentists to cope with increased mobilization.

General ARMSTRONG. Thus far, Mr. Sikes, we have been able to meet our commitments by taking personnel out of the professional-training program. We have had some 400 young physicians in professional training in our own hospitals, and approximately 200 in training in civilian hospitals. We have reduced the number of doctors in our military hospitals to the level required for normal operations. We have also pulled every physician out of civilian courses. We always have a few men out taking courses in public health and hospital administration, and so forth.

Next we have requested our Reserves to volunteer. As you might expect, the response to date has not been too encouraging, and I will tell you why: It is the general feeling of physicians of this country that the Reserve has given and given and given.

For instance, in Oklahoma, one-third of the physicians served in either World War I or II an average of 40 months, of which 30 months were overseas. There is a group of young men in this country, not only physicians but other professional men, who received a part or most of their professional education at Government expense, who have never done a day's duty, and until that group has been asked to fulfill

their loyal obligation, then very few physicians are going to wave the flag and come forward.

Mr. SIKES. I have encountered exactly that same feeling. How can you secure the services of that group-and I am speaking of those who have had their education paid for partially or in full?

General ARMSTRONG. I have heard so many conflicting opinions, Mr. Sikes, that I would not want to attempt to answer the question. This question came up 2 years ago when we thought the Army was going to approximate the figure we have now, plus 100,000 18-yearolds that were going to volunteer. We were in sore straits. They said at that time there is just no legal way to do it; that the contract was completely broken and legislation would be required. Many said legislation would be unconstitutional.

At present there is a group of lawyers studying this problem to see whether or not the draft can be extended to include them. You see, the current age limit affects them. Although they had an accelerated educational program and graduated earlier than most of us did when we graduated, nevertheless, they are all now at least 31 or 32 years old. Therefore, the age limit would have to be extended before the draft could breathe on their necks.

Then there are wordings in the law about interfering with health, and most of them are married men and have two or three children. There are a lot of problems I do not know the answer to. I do know that those of us in uniform and every physician that I have talked to, including these individuals themselves, feel like they should come in. They say, "I am not going to volunteer until I know that the other guy is going to have to serve some, too." They are perfectly willing, but they are waiting for somebody to say-"You are all going to have to do it"-and they are then willing to come in. I believe that is it.

Mr. SIKES. Do you feel that the need for doctors and dentists can be met without having to call in reservists against their will while this matter is being determined?

General ARMSTRONG. Unless this matter could be resolved quickly, we are going to have to ask the Army's permission to recall physicians against their will.

Mr. SIKES. In other words, you are going to need additional physicians quickly?

General ARMSTRONG. That is correct.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SIKES. Is it contemplated there will be a request of the Congress for legislation to cope with that particular situation before you call back into the service men who already have given years of their lives?

General ARMSTRONG. I am hoping that will be possible, I am assuming something now; it is my own personal opinion that if those who advise the Secretary of Defense on such matters say that it is an unsoluble proposition, then we may have to call them first, but I know they are rushing with all possible speed to try to decide whether or not this is a problem that reasonable legislation could cope with.

Mr. SIKES. In the event it is necessary to call in reservists prior to the enactment of such legislation, do you propose to use procurement boards within the various States?