sentatives, and other representatives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have pledged wholehearted cooperation with us in this program. The three and one-half billion dollars for North Atlantic Treaty nations will require close cooperation on their part, as well as tremendous effort on the part of recipient nations and the United States. The Council of Deputies, which is just concluding its first meeting in London, has been working out the details of each nation's participation. Their governments will probably report to the United States their views on this increased effort very shortly. There is no military estimate as to how long it will take, and how much it will cost to achieve the objectives of our North Atlantic Treaty collective defense plans. The achievement of these objectives rests on such intangible factors as: The success of the integration of NATO strategic resources; the extent of economic support of NATO military plans; and the many and complex political factors facing each nation of NATO. We are sure that this program is a step in the right direction. We are making it clear, and will continue to make it clear, that United States financial and military assistance in this program is entirely dependent upon the efforts that the North Atlantic Treaty nations themselves make for the collective security. I believed, prior to June the 25th, that western European nations generally had the will to resist Communist aggression. In the mutual understanding that we achieved on the defense levels of the North Atlantic Treaty, there was a notable and heartening upswing in the confidence and the cooperation exhibited by all of them. And I believe the United States' firm and prompt action in Korea to support the United Nations' resolution for continued peace, has given western European nations even further assurances as to our intentions, as well as a stimulus for renewed vigor and action. We do not know whether or not war is imminent-and we do not know whether or not the forces created will ever be needed to fight a war. We do know that the improvement of our collective defense will act as a greater deterrent to war. If our combined efforts are not successful as a deterrent, they will certainly improve our chances of a successful defense, if aggression marches again. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY WITNESSES MONDAY, AUGUST 7, 1950. HON. FRANCIS P. MATTHEWS, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY ADMIRAL FORREST P. SHERMAN, UNITED STATES NAVY, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS REAR ADM. H. G. HOPWOOD, UNITED STATES NAVY, DEPUTY COMPTROLLER VICE ADM. J. H. CASSADY, UNITED STATES NAVY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (AIR) REAR ADM. A. M. PRIDE, UNITED STATES NAVY, CHIEF OF BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS CAPT. J. E. DODSON, UNITED STATES NAVY, FISCAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS CAPT. W. A. SCHOECH, UNITED STATES NAVY, BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS E. J. LEWIS, DEPUTY FISCAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS CONSTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT AND RELATED PROCUREMENT Mr. MAHON. We will take up for consideration the revised estimates of appropriation involving an increase in "Construction of aircraft and related procurement," for the Department of the Navy. The total funds requested is in the amount of $1,596,269,000 for the fiscal year 1951. We have previously held hearings on a request for a portion of these funds, namely $646,269,000, which is requested in House Document No. 657. Will you proceed, Admiral, with your justification for the balance of $950,000,000, which is requested in House Document No. 677. Admiral HopwooD. Vice Admiral Cassady, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, is prepared to give his general statement, sir. STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. J. H. CASSADY Admiral CASSADY. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, in my appearance before your committee last week I discussed the increases in the naval aviation program, increases in the number and the training of aviation personnel and the deficiency which existed with respect to the availability of first line aircraft. Today I will restrict my statement to a further discussion of aircraft procurement. We have a serious deficiency of modern aircraft within the Navy. This deficiency, which totals 2,832 aircraft, is due to: (a) An increase in operating forces. (b) Increased attrition due to our commitments in Korea. (c) The vital necessity of modernizing our regular combatant forces plus the modernization of those units of the Organized Naval Air Reserve which will be recalled to active duty immediately on mobilization and will be committed to combat shortly after their recall. With respect to the total deficiency of 2,832 aircraft, certain practical aspects have led us to conclude that at this time it is not feasible to attempt to correct the total deficiency, but rather to contract for 2,377 aircraft leaving a deficiency of 455 aircraft which we would request at a later date if conditions justify and necessitate. As you have been told, the total number of operating aircraft has been increased from 6,233 to a total of 7,335. Of this total of 7,335 operating aircraft, 3,533 must be of a first line category if the Navy is to be ready and able to meet its combat responsibilities. To this figure of 3,533 operating aircraft there must be added 1,130 aircraft in logistic support making a total requirement of 4,663. Against this requirement our inventory as of June 30, 1950, was 2,707. Without an increase in procurement, over that which will result from the $750,000,000 contained in the original 1951 appropriation bill, our inventory of first line aircraft will decrease progressively. As an example, on June 30, 1951, we would have only 2,251 first line aircraft available to meet our requirement of 4,663. By December 31, 1952, our available inventory would have declined further to a figure of 1,831. This further decline in availability of aircraft can only be corrected by the procurement as early as is possible of additional aircraft. Even if we are authorized to procure the 2,377 additional aircraft which we are requesting, it will take several months before our position with respect to availability versus requirements is materially improved. During the interim, we will be in the unfortunate position of having to use outmoded types and models of aircraft in our combatant forces. In fact, even with the increased procurement which we are requesting we cannot match availability with requirements until fiscal year 1953. This illustrates the necessity for the earliest practicable build-up in the productive capability of the aircraft industry. I consider early modernization of naval aviation together with an early improvement in the productive capability of the aircraft industry to be matters of the gravest concern to national security. Prompt steps to improve our position in these two important fields are deserving of your most careful consideration. CAREFUL SCREENING OF FUNDS REQUESTED Our request for the additional $950,000,000 has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; it has been approved by the Secretary of Defense; by the Bureau of the Budget; and by the President. Our requirements figures have been carefully screened and approved by personnel from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget. Admiral Pride, the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, has the budgetary responsibility for aviation plans and is prepared to give justification for the funds which we are requesting. Mr. MAHON. Will you proceed, Admiral Pride. Then we will have questions after your statement. STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. A. M. PRIDE Admiral PRIDE. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, last week when I presented our augmented 1951 naval aviation budget estimates I requested an additional $620,410,000 for the procurement of 1,067 more aircraft, with related ordnance, than were provided in the initial estimates submitted last February. These additional 1,067 aircraft are required to support the reactivated units and to replace first-line aircraft being lost through increased attrition incident to combat operations in Korea. This request was based entirely on recent changes in program factors and did not meet all of our first-line requirements. More specifically, no provision was made in the $620,410,000 estimate for existing deficiencies in aircraft procurement for squadrons scheduled for commitment to combat during the initial period of a general mobilization. It was indicated that the procurement of 1,765 additional aircraft was required to meet our total Navy first-line requirements. Of these total requirements of 1,765 additional aircraft, the procurement of 1,310 additional aircraft can be undertaken with profit at this time. This additional quantity of aircraft can be placed under contract forthwith and, if placed under contract now, would result in additional aircraft deliveries commencing almost immediately. All of these aircraft can be delivered within the same period of time contemplated in the original 1951 budget estimate. The urgent necessity of readying our combat squadrons for their combat assignments has led to an official request by the President for a further augmentation in the aircraft-procurement program. Accordingly I have amended our budget material to conform to the President's request and am prepared to present the revised program factors supporting this new request of $950,000,000. This $950,000,000 increases the total requested under the appropriation "Construction of aircraft and related procurement" to $2,386,562,000 as follows: Initial estimate___ Increase requested last week, to support augmentation in forces and to replace aircraft being lost in combat_ Total previously requested.. Additional increase, to complete the modernization of Regular forces and to partially modernize Reserve forces-- Total 1951 estimate, as amended__ $790, 293, 000 646, 269, 000 1, 436, 562, 000 950, 000, 000 2, 386, 562, 000 So that there may be no misunderstanding as to our aircraft position, I should like to emphasize that we are budgeting only for aircraft required to meet current and potential combat assignments programed at an operating level of 7,335 aircraft. Further increases in operating strength, or combat operations more extensive than are presently contemplated, would require corresponding increases in the aircraft procurement program. In all, we are requesting a supplemental aircraft-procurement program of 2,377 aircraft at a cost of $1,570,410,000, to be added to the initial $748,943,000 program, making a total aircraft-procurement program of $2,319,353,000. Related procurement budgeted under this appropriation totals $67,209,000, resulting in the total obligational request of $2,386,562,000 reflected in the confidential budget. booklets now in the hands of this subcommittee. We appreciate the consideration the members of the subcommittee are giving to the many problems confronting us in the reactivation of combatant forces and we shall be happy indeed to discuss with you, at any time, any aspects of our estimates or programs that you may desire to consider at greater length. Mr. MAHON. Thank you, gentlemen, for those very clear state ments. SUMMARY JUSTIFICATION DATA At this point we shall insert in the record the prepared justifications for "Construction of aircraft and related procurement." (The documents are as follows:) CONSTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT AND RELATED PROCUREMENT Proposed increase in program, $1,545,780,000 for replacement aircraft The increase requested under this activity covers the procurement of 2,377 firstline aircraft for the Regular Navy and the Naval Reserve. Requirements for these aircraft result largely from the increase in operating aircraft authorized for Regular Navy and Marine Corps forces and from the urgent need for equipping combat units with first-line combat aircraft, but include also provision for replacing planes currently being lost in Korean operations: Number of first-line aircraft available (including aircraft covered by previous estimates) Number of first-line aircraft required to support an operating strength of 7,335 aircraft - 4, 663 1, 831 Total deficiency in first-line aircraft--- 2, 832 -2, 377 Net deficiency in procurement carried over to fiscal year 1952__ 455 In the foregoing table, aircraft requirements have been based on the numbers of first-line aircraft needed to support on December 31, 1952, a total operating strength of 7,335 aircraft. At that date there will be available only 1,831 firstline aircraft, after allowing for normal attrition factors to that date for forces not committed to combat plus accelerated attrition for 1 year for those forces currently committed or being committed to combat in the Korean area. There thus will exist on that date a deficiency of 2,832 aircraft which should be covered by additional procurement at the earliest practicable date. Although the deficiency in first-line aircraft totals 2,832, it is not feasible at this time to contract for more than 2,377 aircraft over and above the procurement planned under the basic 1951 program. It is our considered opinion that procurement beyond this level cannot be undertaken to advantage at the present time. Accordingly the supplemental estimate herein presented has been based on meeting 2,377 of the total deficiency of 2,832 aircraft. Except for 50 transports, all of the aircraft planned for procurement from this supplemental authorization are first-line combat models for assignment to combat units of the fleet and of the Naval Reserve, which otherwise would be com |