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will be used in some way or other, but they cannot all be used immediately without causing more difficulty than they would do good. But there has been a gratifying response.
(Statement off the record.)
Mr. SIKES. I certainly do not want to minimize the help that has been offered by any nation, but may I ask again, Is the degree of response being taken into consideration in the plans for the allocation of the future shipments of war matériel from this country?
Secretary Johnson. To some extent, but it is more important to consider what they are going to do to build up defenses in their own
Mr. SIKES. My point is that if there is no evaluation of what they are doing now, compared with what they should do now, on what can we base our anticipation of their action in the future when we may need them much more.
Secretary Johnson. We said we were going to evaluate what they are doing.
(Statement off the record.)
Mr. Sikes. Of course, what I am getting at is this. There has been considerable talk-Í do not know how well based it is—that certain countries are contemplating neutrality in the event of a world struggle. Certainly if there are countries who are leaning toward neutrality, the less money and the fewer weapons we have invested in them at the time of that struggle, the better off we will be and so will the other countries be who would utilize those weapons.
Secretary Johnson. I could express my opinion in profane language.
Secretary ACHESON. I think countries talking about neutrality are not going to be very strong allies.
Mr. SIKES. I think you covered quite well the matter of monetary participation by other nations. I take it from what you say that you do feel that they will be required to put in everything that they possibly can?
Secretary JOHNSON. That is right.
USE TO BE MADE OF INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES OF OTHER NATIONS
Mr. Sikes. In that connection, do you think that we are planning to use the full facilities for military production in those nations? I can see very real advantage in building armament in other nations, aside from everything else that has been brought out, in that a tank that would cost $200,000 in this country would probably cost much less than half of that in some other nation. Are we going to use all of their facilities?
Secretary JOHNSON. I would say about all. We want to go as far as we can, considering speed, time and delivery, and preparedness and price, and to that extent, we will get them over there.
Secretary ACHESON. We want them to use all their facilities. That is what Mr. Sikes is bringing out.
Secretary JOHNSON. Oh, yes. Where they have the facilities, we are going to help them to use those facilities, even if the product collective would be sent over to an adjoining country, for the defense as a whole.
REARMING OF WEST GERMANY AND JAPAN
Mr. SIKES. Is any of this material going to rearm west Germans? You might talk about that either on the record or off the record.
(Statement off the record.)
INCREASING OF INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY OF WEST GE
Secretary ACHESON. What I should like to bring out is that the question of trying to get Germany and Japan integrated with the western world—the free world—is a matter which is of the utmost importance and is recognized as being of the utmost importance in Washington, Paris, London, Bonn, Tokyo, and all other capitals of the free world. There is no doubt about the fact that this is recognized as a very important question indeed and is receiving a great deal of thought.
So far as the productive machinery of those countries is concerned, it is possible, and that possibility will be fully explored, to use this productive machine through the placing of orders which will increase the whole productive output of the free world. They both have plants of very considerable and, in some cases, real importance. Certain end items will not be produced there. It is not necessary that they should be. They can be produced elsewhere. But the underpinning of the major effort can be vastly strengthened by using their capacity.
Whether or not these countries really become fully identified with the free world depends on the attitude of those countries and on the attitude of ourselves and of our allies. It is something which a great many people, including the people concerned, have to come to a common agreement about. It also depends on the development of real interlocking interests between those countries and the rest of the free world.
Therefore when you come to talk about the raising, and the use of military formations, you are talking about something far different indeed from the use of these productive plants. Whether that can be done or not I think is not a matter which it is useful to talk about at the present time.
Mr. TABER. Could you tell us any more off the record?
Secretary ACHESON. I think that is all I would want to say about the thing at the present time.
Mr. TABER. Either on or off the record ?
Mr. Mahon. Let me say, Mr. Secretary, that in foreign matters you and the President speak for the United States. We do not want you to have anything on the record in connection with this matter that would work to the detriment of this country or to embarrass the Secretary or the President. That is entirely up to you.
Secretary ACHESON. I understand, sir.
Mr. SIKES. Time may be running against us rapidly in this matter. In both Germany and Japan there is a great source of potential manpower and great manufacturing potential if properly directed. I hope that you can assure this committee that this matter is being studied with an idea of bringing your deliberations to a speedy conclusion.
Mr. ENGEL. Will the gentleman yield there?
Mr. ENGEL. To me it seems senseless to do in Germany what we did in Korea.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. ENGEL. When I go home, the first thing the people will ask me is, "Are we going to have a repetition in Germany of the thing we had in Korea ?”
Mr. RABAUT. We will probably get the answer here.
Mr. SIKES. I have one more question.
Because of the fact that it will have a great deal of bearing on the European industrial capacity and because of the fact that I have not seen much in the press about it recently, I wish you would bring us up to date on the proposed Schuman plan,
Secretary ACHESON. Off the record.
USE OF INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES OF ATLANTIC PACT COUNTRIES
Mr. RABAUT. I just wanted to ask one question on this financing of supplies to be manufactured in Europe. How safe will it be over there? Suppose, for instance, after we go into all this program we find that we have supplied the materials for the opposition?
Secretary Johnson. That is one of the problems that has to be worked out by General Bradley and the military as we go along. This will be a military operation, and the delivery and control of those supplies will be tied in with the build-up in manpower and safety.
Secretary ACHESON. The underlying question which Mr. Rabaut raised, Mr. Secretary, is one, I think, with respect to which we took a calculated risk when we went into the Marshall plan, and this whole program.
Secretary JOHNSON. If some country is going sour our matériel support is not going in unless the situation is such that it appears to be a good calculated risk.
Mr. RABAUT. Of course, it does help out against the U-boat situation a lot. You do not have to move so far. That is a very good point.
How much of this $4,000,000,000 will go into that over there? What is the over-all that will probably go into that manufacturing?
Secretary JOHNSON. I cannot answer that for you. It depends on the factors I listed. We requested $400,000,000, and we will use that as a yardstick in doing it. I want to remind you that it is the best guess we can now make.
Mr. Mahon. I might say, Mr. Rabaut, that when we discuss the details of the types of procurement we can probably come to some
better conclusion as to the capacity of other countries to produce the specific types of things we will talk about later.
Mr. RABAUT. All right.
I did not quite understand the one statement you made about the percentage of their own effort. You talked about their own effort in this manufacturing, and at their own expense, at the expense of each of the countries, did you not?
Secretary JOHNSON. Yes, I did.
Mr. RABAUT. What percentage did you put that at, or was it just an X amount?
Secretary JOHNSON. That is off the record.
Mr. RABAUT. All right.
Mr. RABAUT. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. NORRELL. There is just one point, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to ask a question about. This is addressed to Mr. Acheson, the Secretary of State.
NEED TO ACCELERATE DEFENSE EFFORTS
In the next to the last paragraph of your statement, Mr. Secretary, you say:
The immediate urgent need is for all of us to step up our defenses. I am sure that is correct. I am wondering if you care to elaborate to the committee regarding the activity of our potential enemy, on which that statement was based, especially since I notice that 3.5 billion dollars of the money is to be used in the North Atlantic area. I guess you would want this off the record. I do not care, but I think the American people want to know what is going on by our potential enemies. They should have as much information as is possible to give them.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. NORRELL. The evidence you have is that we are going to need the total, or that as it looks today we will need the total, or probably more?
Secretary ACHESON. I think we will need the total of all the effort we can all put into it.
Mr. NORRELL. That is all.
DIVISION OF KOREA AT THE THIRTY-EIGHTH PARALLEL
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Acheson, when the Japanese Army surrendered in China, Manchuria, and the thirty-eighth parallel was set as a dividing line, that part of the Japanese Army which was north of the thirtyeighth parallel surrendered to Russia, and that part of the Japanese Army which was below surrendered to the Chinese; is that correct?
Secretary ACHESON. Those below surrendered to the Americans.
Mr. ENGEL. Was that a military decision or agreement, or was that a State Department agreement, or a joint military-state agreement?
Secretary ACHESON. That was a joint military-state recommendation which went to the President and was approved by him.
Mr. ENGEL. It was approved by him and adopted and accepted by the Russians?
Secretary ACHESON. Accepted by the Russians at the time.
Mr. ENGEL. That was construed as defining zones of occupation of Russia and the United States?
Secretary ACHESON. It was intended to be purely a military line for the purposes of accepting surrender, but it solidified itself.
Mr. TABER. It developed into that?
Secretary ACHESON. It developed into zones of occupation. It was intended to be purely a line of convenience for the acceptance of surrender of the Japanese forces. The Russians were north of the thirty-eighth parallel; we were south.
SURRENDER OF JAPANESE TROOPS IN KOREA, CHINA, AND MANCHURIA
Mr. ENGEL. How many Japanese troops surrendered to Russia, with their equipment, and how many to the United States? Do you have that figure?
Secretary ACHESON. I do not have that, but we can get it.
Secretary Johnson. We will supply it, but it involves some information which is secret.
(The information was supplied to the committee off the record.)
Secretary ACHESON. Do you want the total number of Japanese troops everywhere, or just south of the thirty-eighth parallel?
Mr. ENGEL. I want the total number of Japanese troops who surrendered to the United States.
Secretary ACHESON. South of the parallel, or everywhere?
Off the record.
Secretary ACHESON. There were three areas of surrender, Mr. Engel.
Mr. ENGEL. That is right. Secretary ACHESON. The Japanese troops in Manchuria and in Korea north of the thirty-eighth parallel surrendered to the Russians. The Japanese troops in China and on Formosa surrendered to ChiangKai-shek. The Japanese troops elsewhere surrendered to the United States.
Mr. ENGEL. So we got very few of them?
Secretary ACHESON. No. We got a very great number of them, through the islands and on the mainlands. Mr. ENGEL. The various islands where they were fighting and so on? Secretary ACHESON. Yes.