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General McNAUGHTON. There was great difficulty with that, but from an operational point of view the civil contract school operation was very successful in the last war, in

my opinion. Mr. ŤABER. He has not covered the money required for this yet? Mr. Mahon. I think that we can talk to General Rawlings about General RAWLINGS. I will cover that, sir. Mr. Mahon. Thank you very much for your excellent statement.

the money




Mr. MAHON. We will now take up aircraft procurement.

General RAWLINGS. The next items we have to show are the items on aircraft procurement which the Under Secretary covered briefly. I believe there is a chart that he did not use that General Shepard could quickly show you.

You may then have some further questions. General SHEPARD. I will show you very quickly the graphic effect of our acceleration in aircraft production, and also I want to show you a little on the impact.

There has been a lot of talk about whether industry could make the air planes that we are asking you to finance, and I think we have some charts that will show you just how throughly we go into the problem.

On the first chart you see a comparison between our monthly airplane acceptances as they existed before we considered the 1951 supplemental and the various colors represent the different fiscal years in which an engine was originally contemplated, or had already been provided.

Under the blue line sindicating) you see a curve to represent the way the acceptances will now occur under the accelerated program.

I call your attention particularly to the rapidity with which we accelerate monthly deliveries, and that was only possible because this committee recommended

Mr. TABER. That line represents the number of planes?
General SHEPARD. The number of planes per month, sir.

Mr. Mahon. That is by reason of the money we provided, Mr. Taber, in the Eightieth Congress.

General SHEPARD. That is right, in the supplemental 1948 program. Mr. TABER. Yes. General SHEPARD. That money enabled us to build the tooling which, being in existence, allows us to accelerate this rapid rate. We have deliberately accelerated as rapidly as we can because we thought the current situation warranted the most rapid possible acceleration, consistent with the use of existing facilities.


We are not opening a lot of new facilities. There are only one or two isolated instances where we will have to go into additional floor space. A good example is the Pratt & Whitney engine. The combined Air Force-Navy utilization of both reciprocating and jet type Pratt & Whitney engines forces to increase their floor space, but by and large these are existing facilities and on tooling already financed and built under our former appropriation.

We have deliberately peaked in order to have the best possible base for future acceleration if it becomes necessary, and we compensate for that peak after about a year by dropping back down to a relatively level figures which General Rawlings later will explain to you can be supported by the level of appropriations for a 69-group Air Force.

I think that is the most significant factor on the chart.
I want to show you briefly the impact of what we are about to do.

Mr. TABER. Do the funds presently before us in estimates cover the completion of the planes on the chart that the Under Secretary showed us?

General SHEPARD. The funds we are asking for by the planes that are illustrated in yellow. They are the supplemental fiscal year 1951 airplanes. The green line indicates the regular 1951 airplanes. Normally, based upon our lead time, which we have explained as being absolutely necessary in component fabrication, and later the airplane assembly and production, normally we would finance out to this line-December, 1952—with this fiscal year 1951 fund.

You will notice that we have an irregularity and that is the result of our rapid scheduling, and during our refining process we will bring our actual lead time very closely into line.

Mr. TABER. These items in the white block beyond are not covered as yet in the estimates that have come to us?

General SHEPARD. No, sir, and do not need to be. They will be covered later on. They will be covered next fiscal year, if necessary.

Mr. TABER. As to whether or not the rate that is indicated, in white squares is accelerated or not will depend upon the situation as it develops?

General SHEPARD. That is correct, sir. That is the picture.
Mr. TABER. That is the picture that you are presenting?
General SHEPARD. That is correct, sir.

Mr. CANNON. The number of engines and the number of aircraft varies for the reason that you must in time have replacements of aircraft?

General SHEPARD. That is correct.

To consider the number of engines required, you must consider individual items and individual situations.

General RAWLINGS. Two engines or four engines.

General SHEPARD. Two engines, four engines, or a reciprocating engine or jet engine, or an old jet engine, or a new model of the jet engine, and the replacement percentages vary under each situation.


Mr. ENGEL. What is the percentage of increase in the cost of spare engines on jets in this program?

General SHEPARD. That varies with each model, but the order of magnitude is about 175 percent spare engines for each installed engine, and that covers the maintenance of those airplanes for their life and the active inventory.

Mr. ENGEL. In other words, for every engine space that you have in this jet plane you order two and three-fourths?

General SHEPARD. That is right, sir.
Mr. ENGEL. Was that increased because of the Korean situation?
General SHEPARD. It was not increased, sir.
Mr. ENGEL. That is a peactime rate?

General SHEPARD. That is a continuation of the peacetime rate, until we have more experience in the Korean operation.

Here we have an accumulation of excesses of airplanes in the upper part of the chart, and engines in the lower part. It is interesting to point out that by changing from the old schedule on the bottom of the old chart to the new schedule in red you can see it almost immediately. Here, again, it is because we had available this tooling from the 1988 money, and we are able to get additional deliveries.

(Discussion off the record.)


Mr. ENGEL. That is by reason of the tooling you bought under the 1948 appropriation?

General SHEPARD. That is correct, sir. Mr. ENGEL. How much time did you gain on this program because of the fact that you did have that tooling provided?

General SHEPARD. I would estimate-and this is an estimate onlythat we gained about 6 months.

Mr. ENGEL. Six months ? General SHEPARD. Yes, sir. (Discussion off the record.)

Here we have not covered all the engines. We took only the significant engines to show you what is going on.

Are there any questions on this chart?


Now let us take a look at the impact. This represents the floor space which we consider will be required to carry out the production program that is indicated on the other charts.

I have set up for reference the floor space that was required in the airframe industry and the engine industry during World War II. You can see that we have currently been using only a small proportion of the total amount required in World War II.

To accomplish this program we are adding only slightly. The reason for that is that the production activity within the floor space being utilized was not at a saturated rate. We simply produce more airplanes in the same floor area.

(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. MAHON. What other charts do you have?

General SHEPARD. I have this one showing the effect on the floor space, and I have one showing the effect on the employment. That was about the last one, except for the dollar chart of General Rawlings.

Since it has been determined that Air Force airplane production schedules will be accelerated, there has been conjecture as to industry's ability to meet expanded requirements. The subject has been carefully explored, as indicated by these charts (pointing), showing the effect of Air Force production schedules on requirements for floor space, manpower, and selected materials.

With respect to floor space required in the airframe industry, you will notice that Air Force production schedules currently require only about one-third of the floor space devoted to airframe construction during World War II. Floor space requirements generated by the accelerated schedules previously presented will rise insignificantly since the Air Force plans to derive its additional airframes from within existing facilities utilizing basic tooling originated under supplemental 1948 funds. It is a matter of interest that in the event additional airframe manufacturing floor space were required there are readily available a number of idle reserve plants.

With reference to floor space requirements in the engine industry, the story is much the same. Existing production schedules require only slightly over 10 percent of the floor space devoted to aircraft engine manufacturing during World War II. In order to meet the accelerated production schedule, which is the subject of this hearing, it will be necessary to utilize only an inconsequentially small additional floor area. Specifically, the additional area presently being considered is a facility to augment Pratt & Whitney's capability to deliver engines to both the Air Force and the Navy. Again, as in the case of the airframe industry, there are available idle reserve plants which could be utilized in any further acceleration desired in aircraft engines.

Regarding the matter of employment, comparisons are again undertaken with the levels of employment required in the airframe and engine industries during World War II. You will note from the chart that approximately 800,000 employees were engaged in the manufacture of airframes during World War II, and that until this date Air Force production schedules have required employment of a little over 100,000 people. Peak employment on Air Force airframe orders under accelerated schedules should be in the neighborhood of 200,000 people but since time was inadequate to conduct an accurate survey these figures should be utilized as orders of magnitude only. It is significant to note that in recent weeks employment offices of all airframe companies have received a greatly accelerated number of applicants, and we are advised that available employment greatly exceeds existing demands.

In the engine industry I shall compare current requirements with approximately 300,000 employees in World War II. Our current requirements have been running in the neighborhood of 30,000. Employment under the accelerated Air Force schedules should not exceed approximately 50,000 people, but here again because of the brevity of our analysis figures should be used as orders of magnitude only.

On the subject of critical materials, it should suffice to say that studies have been conducted of the amount of material required under accelerated Air Force schedules as opposed to current industrial capacity and as opposed to World War II requirements. The latter comparison indicates that the amount of material which will be required under our accelerated schedules is of a low order of magnitude when compared with World War II production. Our requirements in relation to present industrial capacity are likewise satisfactorily low. There is an indication, however, that because of high civilian demands it will be necessary to have available the ability to allocate materials and issue priorities and this matter is being undertaken through appropriate channels.

In summary, as a check against the impact of accelerated Air Force production schedules on industry at large, the Secretary and the Under Secretary recently summoned into conference the chief executives of many of our largest suppliers. The general levels of required production were discussed and the matters of facilities, employment, and materials were analyzed. The consensus of the meeting, which conforms to numerous separate inquiries of individuals, confirmed our assertion that the accelerated program currently being proposed can and will be met. Our confidence in the matter is further reinforced by the fact that schedules were composed on the basis of limiting materials and limiting components rather than upon the ability of aircraft manufacturers to assemble airplanes.

Mr. Mahon. Thank you for your excellent presentation.

SUMMARY OF SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR FUNDS At this point in the record we will insert a breakdown of the supplemental estimates.

Department of the Air Forces budget estimates, fiscal year 1951

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Mr. MAHON. Proceed, General Rawlings.

General RAWLINGS. Sir, I would like to start at the bottom of the chart, since this is the program data upon which the dollars are built.

The presentation we have given you today was intended to show the built-up of the basic program, the philosophy back of it and these are the significant factors.

In this program you have an estimated end strength of military personnel at 548,000.

You have an active aircraft inventory of 11,000.

A total procurement of 4,428 aircraft is included in the regular and supplemental in this program.

The cost of the aircraft program (fiscal year 1951 regular and supplemental) is $4,222,000,000.

The flying-hour program totals 5,317,000 hours.

The pilot-training rate is 4,000, and' the technical training ratethat is, technicians, engine mechanics, radar experts, et cetera-32,500.

The total cost, which includes the regular 1951 appropriation as submitted to the Congress by the President and this supplemental, totals $9,308,700,000.

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