it to prevent a war, if possible, or to fight it, if it comes, over on the European front. Secretary FINLETTER. Yes. Mr. ENGEL. That is my position, and I think that is the position of the Department of the Army? General VANDENBERG. That is the position of the Air Force. POSITION OF THE AIR FORCE IN EVENT OF INVASION OF EUROPE Mr. ENGEL. I asked the question yesterday of the Army and of the Navy just what position they would be in, in the Mediterranean, for the Navy, if the 100,000 troops in eastern Germany were to come marching over into Western Germany. That is the kind of question we are confronted with, as far as this phase of preparation is concerned. And I am wondering just what the situation would be in the event such a thing should occur in western Europe, from the air point of view, taking into consideration any planes that England might have to help. Will you discuss that question, off the record? (Off the record discussion.) Mr. ENGEL. At the beginning of World War II, and incidentally for your information, Mr. Secretary, when I got on the committee we were working under the Baker Board. Secretary FINLETTER. Yes. Mr. ENGEL. We had 1,700 planes, including trainers. INCREASE IN PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY OF AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY Mr. ENGEL. And it was allocated, I think, about 60-40. When we went into production in World War II the big problem was to build up our productive capacity. In other words, to have the factories ready to produce in the shortest possible time to provide a wartime force if war should come. Now to what extent will the program now being considered, to increase the groups to 58 or 69, of whatever number, will that help us to build up the productive capacity? General VANDENBERG. Before the Secretary answers the question I would like to make one statement. May I very respectfully point out to you, Mr. Engel, that at that time they did not have the problem like Korea with a force coming over the border on some Sunday morning. That being so the productive capacity is a point entirely aside from that which is important in preventing disaster. Mr. ENGEL. That is correct. General VANDENBERG. Therefore the productive capacity, whatever it may be, must be a productive capacity over and above this force that is going to prevent any absolute disaster while the bombing is taking place. Secretary FINLETTER. I want to underline, Mr. Engel, what General Vandenberg has just said, that the situation is a little bit different than it was before World War II. It is now absolutely vital to have the force in readiness at some D-day. For a more complete answer to your question I am going to call on Mr. McCone. Mr. MCCONE. The productivity of this program calls for accelerating the delivery from approximately 100 per month to about 320 for the Air Force. As you know, the ability of industry to expand is controlled very largely by the rate at which they operate when they are called upon. Mr. ENGEL. That is correct. Mr. MCCONE. They will have greater expansibility as a result of this program. NUMBER OF WORK SHIFTS IN AIRCRAFT PLANTS Mr. ENGEL. Are they going to produce these planes on a one-shift basis or are they going to extra shifts? Mr. MCCONE. They will go to a two-shift basis, but they are going to produce under a 5-day week, 40 hour program, because that will call in a larger number of the employees and provide a greater training base. Some of the manufacturers wanted to complete the program by 10-hour shifts and by 60-hour workweek. We are opposed to that, and we have instructed them that with only a few exceptional areas, the program will be on a 40-hour-week basis. Mr. ENGEL. That is, 40-hour-week basis but two shifts? Mr. MCCONE. That is right. Mr. ENGEL. That is about the most efficient way you can operate, on a two-shift basis? Mr. MCCONE. Yes. Mr. ENGEL. How much time would be gained by putting them on a three-shift basis; how much would you increase production by expanding the force to a three-shift basis; about 2.5 times one? Mr. MCCONE. No, you cannot use a three-shift basis completely. Mr. ENGEL. In other words, if you put them on a three-shift basis you will only get about 2.5 times the production of a one-shift, because of time out for lunch, for oiling periods, and other repairs. Do you think you can get as much as 2.5? Mr. MCCONE. No; I do not think you can. Using a two-shift basis gives you about as good a type of operation as you can get, and you can improve the operation of a two-shift by putting the critical operations on three shifts. Mr. ENGEL. It is your belief that you get the best production in the area in that manner? Mr. MCCONE. Yes. Mr. ENGEL. That would give you a 10-hour or 8-hour basis? Mr. ENGEL. That means 8 hours, and that allows time for lunch periods? Mr. MCCONE. Yes. Mr. ENGEL. And for cleaning up and oiling and repairs? Mr. MCCONE. Yes. With the graveyard shift for maintenance and repairs and for critical work. Mr. ENGEL. It is your plan to put them on two 40-hour week shifts, and they could expand that activity to 50 hours. Mr. MCCONE. That is right. Mr. ENGEL. From the 40-hour week to the 50-hour. Mr. MCCONE. That is right. They can do that. Mr. ENGEL. Could you get some expansion in production by doing that? Mr. MCCONE. Oh, yes; very much so. Mr. ENGEL. That is all, Mr. Chairman. BRITISH JET AIRCRAFT Mr. TABER. I would like to ask this question for the record. I ask this of both Mr. Finletter and General Vandenberg. What do you know about the superiority of British jets over ours? (Discussion off the record.) Mr. TABER. Perhaps you could elaborate on the details off the record, but I would like to have an answer on the record. Secretary FINLETTER. I know very little, Mr. Taber, about the British jets. A group from the Air Force recently went to England and went to a show of British aircraft which was given there. They made reports to General Vandenberg and to me. The impression that I got of their impressions was that the British were making substantial progress in the development of jet planes; and that although they did find many things which were of interest and might possibly be applied to our production they did not feel there was any marked superiority in British jets which would cause us to alter our fighter program or bomber program. Mr. TABER. What can you say to that subject, General Vandenberg? General VANDENBERG. I Would like to answer this way, sir: I sent them over there to find out whether or not theirs could do a better jobs than ours. The answer came back that as far as they could tell they were suited for the particular situation that confronted England. (Discussion off the record.) BRITISH COOPERATION IN AIRCRAFT FIELD Mr. TABER. I would also like to have this on the record, if possible. What would you say as to whether or not the British have made available to you such information as you have asked them for with reference to these items? General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir; I would be very glad to answer that. The British have been extremely cooperative, and I know of no instance where any of their new aircraft or their new engines have been denied us. Mr. TABER. I am wondering if there was any evidence that was given before the Armed Services Committee that was in any way different from that which has been or will be presented to us. Secretary FINLETTER. The answer is no, sir. COORDINATION BETWEEN MILITARY SERVICES Mr. TABER. Is there any coordination of orders between the Air Force and the Navy, where that can be done? You might get the same thing a little bit cheaper by pulling together or something of that kind. Secretary FINLETTER. If I may, I will ask Mr. McCone to answer that. 69887-50-pt. 2-16 Mr. MCCONE. Yes, there is where we use a common item. An example would be an engine used both by the Navy and the Air Force. One service or the other is assigned the responsibility for the procurement of all the engines used by both services and for the allocation of the deliveries of the requirements of the two services. That is carried out in all instances where both services use like items. SUITABILITY OF PRESENTLY DEVELOPED PLANES Mr. TABER. Would you say that the Air Force has proven designs available so that it is prepared to say to us that it believes that the planes that are being asked for here are of a suitable type for the present needs of the Air Force? Secretary FINLETTER. In general, Mr. Taber, the answer is yes. What happens is that we go along with a production airplane, a proven airplane, and at the same time are working on other planes; we carry the newly developed planes up through the various prototype stages and into the test periods until such time as the decision is made that this airplane is a better airplane than what is already there; and is the kind of airplane which is so test-proven that we can then afford, without wasting money, to go into production on the newer type. We have here, in case you want Mr. McCone to explain it, a rather elaborate chart showing that phasing in and out, if you want to go into detail, sir. Mr. TABER. Well, what I did not want to do was to provide funds for embarking upon the construction of a considerable quantity of planes that had not been proven far enough so that there was reasonable ground to believe that they would be a success. Secretary FINLETTER. If the chairman would give us 3 minutes I think it might be worth while to show you something specific. Mr. TABER. I would like to see that, if I might, I think. Secretary FINLETTER. Will Mr. McCone explain this to the committee? Mr. MCCONE. Yes, sir. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. TABER. The designs, in your opinion and the opinion of the Air Force, are far enough along so that you feel confident that you can get a good serviceable plane out of your order? Mr. MCCONE. Yes, we feel confident of that. We are not unmindful of the fact that these planes are very complicated machines. Mr. TABER. And that construction may have to be changed as you progress and as events demonstrate that something else might be better? Mr. MCCONE. That is correct, sir. Even though a plane is in production it is subject, as you know, to continual improvement and modification as its use in combat demonstrates desired improvements, or frailties in the plane. That is a process which I think will go on as long as we have airplanes. It went on all through the last war, and I guess it will go on forever. A plane just cannot be frozen. Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Secretary, you have always had that. You had the old P-38, A, B, C, D, E, and F. Mr. MCCONE. That is right. Mr. ENGEL. Every time you give another letter to the number it means improvements have been made? Mr. MCCONE. That is right. Mr. ENGEL. I want to ask this one question, Mr. Chairman, if you will bear with me for a minute. At the beginning of World War II one of the big problems was to try to make changes in the planes we had, which the Air Force asked for and in fact the planes which were asked for by pilots and the people who were operating the planes in battle. I recall, I think, one of the Detroit plants which was making fuselages, which had 180 changes on the board at one time. Of course, so far as the 51 is concerned we are not building any orders, so that we are not going to get the benefit there. IMPROVEMENTS OF JET PLANES What about your jet planes? Are you getting many suggested changes in the jet planes by reason of your operation in Korea, or is the operation so limited that you do not get many? General VANDENBERG. Sir, I would not consider the operation to be so limited that we would not get them. The pilots I talked to, all of them, were very enthusiastic about the performance of the F-80. However, as you know, the F-80 is being phased out, also. Mr. ENGEL. That is right. General VANDENBERG. But it is a good, dependable plane. Mr. ENGEL. Are they making many suggestions as to changes? General VANDENBERG. No, sir; the only suggestion was a larger wing tank. Mr. SIKES. What is taking the place of the F-80? General VANDENBERG. The F-84 and F-86. Mr. ENGEL. They are not using the F-84 there? Mr. ENGEL. So the experience you are getting there, so far as the improvement of planes is concerned, is very limited? General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir; but it also indicates, I think, that what we learned from World War II is paying dividends now, with our technical engineers and our evaluation boards. Mr. ENGEL. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.) General VANDENBERG. I have stopped some of those things, which I believe has accomplished some economy. Some of the pilots would prefer to have one instrument on one side, and some other pilots would prefer to have it in some different position. We have frozen that. When these evaluation boards or pilots put in unsatisfactory reports for changes, they come in to Washington to a senior board. Unless the change is really going to benefit, we have stopped it. That has saved money and time. Mr. ENGEL. The change of punching a little hole in the side of a plane might require the relocation of an entire wiring system? General VANDENBERG. That is right. Mr. ENGEL. That is all, Mr. Chairman. |