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58-GROUP PROGRAM

Mr. RABAUT. Following Mr. Taber's question, this 58-group program, as proposed before, has been changed now, has it not?

General RAWLINGS. The composition of the 58 groups is not the composition that we had in the 58 groups approved and appropriated for by this committee last year. However, this program was not changed during the period from the start of the Korean effort until the document was signed on the 5th of July. It has been firmed up.

Mr. RABAUT. So the Korean war has not had any effect on that? General RAWLINGS. No, sir, not the build-up, but it had been considered by the Chiefs of Staff in arriving at this composition. Mr. RABAUT. That is all.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Norrell?

Mr. NORRELL. In other words, to be brief, this is just carrying our your idea of last year?

General RAWLINGS. It is, with some adjustment because the composition is not the same, sir.

Mr. NORRELL. It is practically the same?

General RAWLINGS. Very close to it.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. NORRELL. With the exception of that, it is the same program? General TODD. Yes, sir.

Mr. NORRELL. All right.

EFFECT OF KOREAN WAR

Mr. ENGEL. General Rawlings, up until the Korean situation were we proceeding upon the theory that if a major war came it would be a European war or a Far East war?

(Off the record discussion.)

Mr. ENGEL. To what extent, if any, has the situation as it finally developed in Korea changed those plans?

General RAWLINGS. Off the record, sir.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. ENGEL. Of course, you know whether or not those plans have been actually changed because of the Korean situation. In other words, you are coming in here now with more tactical planes and more ground support than you had in that program?

General RAWLINGS. Sir, that was provided for in the plan that had not been approved before the Korean situation but which was in the process of development and which is on this chart. For the specific Korean situation we have utilized some units which we have that were

for other purposes. We will give you that story.

Mr. ENGEL. You are going to give the committee a complete picture of Korea?

General RAWLINGS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGEL. The ground support that you had there or should have had if you did not have it there, and just what your plans are along that line?

General RAWLINGS. Yes, sir. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. ENGEL. Would you give us the figures as to what the cost is goint to be, to bring this from 58 groups to 69 groups? Are you going to do that?

General RAWLINGS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGEL. Will you also put in the record the figure showing the cost of maintaining on a modern basis that 58 groups, and the total cost including personnel?

General RAWLINGS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGEL. And the same for the 69 groups?

General RAWLINGS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MAHON. As I understand it, you have all that ready for presentation?

General RAWLINGS. I think we have it. Yes; we do have both figures, sir.

Mr. ENGEL. That is all.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Taber?

Mr. TABER. I have asked all the questions I care to at this time. Mr. MAHON. Usually in our regular hearings we take days to go into these matters. I would like to have some information for the use of the committee as to the unit costs of the various planes that will be purchased.

General RAWLINGS. Yes, sir; we will provide that. (Discussion off the record.)

Mr. MAHON. Let us continue with the presentation, and then we shall ask questions.

FUNCTIONS OF THE AIR FORCE

General RAWLINGS. General Landon next has a series of charts designed to show the functions of the Air Force. (Discussion off the record, led by General Landon.)

RADAR FENCE

Mr. MAHON. I would like to say to the representatives of the Air Force that this committee-and I am sure this committee can speak for the Congress is determined that every means be used to expedite the completion of the radar fence or warning system.

Fiscal considerations are secondary. Speed in doing this job is the thing we demand. I hope that this message from the committee will be considered seriously by the Air Force, and I shall personally, as a representative of the committee, discuss the matter with Secretary Johnson. We have all along been interested in making all possible progress with this program, and we want to reemphasize our interest in it.

I believe the facts are that the Air Force over a period of years has been anxious to make progress on an air warning system, and various factors have been considered and discussed from time to time.

Finally, the President submitted a request for legislation, and legislation authorizing an air warning system was approved by Congress. In our off-the-record discussions you have given us much helpful information.

Will you now give us information for the record as to when the request came to Congress and as to when final action was taken? We, of course, have those records available to us here, and, if you do not have them on the tip of your tongue, will you see our record is complete?

General RAWLINGS. Yes. There is a point we would like to give the committee. Yesterday we appeared before the Armed Services

Committee, and this question was raised. They are amending, or are going to arrange to amend, the basic law.

Mr. MAHON. The authorization?

General RAWLINGS. The authorization to provide for the additional funds for construction that is contained in this appropriation bill.

Mr. MAHON Have you been provided in the past, or are you now requesting, or are you about to request, all funds that you need for the program?

General RAWLINGS. Sir, all of the funds that are needed to complete this phase of the program as we now know them are included.

Now, there is always a possibility, if we determine we need a more dense coverage, we may want an additional program, but at the moment we do not have that program.

Mr. MAHON. Then you have in being, or soon you will have, the means whereby you can carry out the program?

General RAWLINGS. Yes, sir; when this money is appropriated.

I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the Air Force will do everything within its power to get this system in operation at the earliest practical date.

Mr. MAHON. We are convinced there are many problems which have arisen and that certain ways may be necessary to carry out the program, but we do want the work to be done.

General RAWLINGS. I do want to add this: We are not going to try to do it on a wasteful basis even though we want to do it quickly. We are going to try to watch the resources so we will not waste them. Obviously, you have to pay premium prices when you expedite, but we are not going to throw this money away, even so.

Mr. MAHON. I think that is a very fine attitude and I want to thank you.

Mr. ENGEL. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. MAHON. The committee will stand adjourned until 1:30 o'clock.

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. MAHON. General, you had not completed your statement?
General LANDON. No, Mr. Chairman.

(Off the record discussion.)

ROLE OF THE AIR FORCE IN KOREA

WITNESS

HON. THOMAS K. FINLETTER, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE GEN. HOYT S. VANDENBERG, CHIEF OF STAFF HON. JOHN A. M'CONE, UNDERSECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE Mr. MAHON. Mr. Secretary and General Vandenberg, we are confronted here with the problem of appropriating for the Air Force about 4.5 billion dollars which we have been discussing with your able assistants, General Rawlings and others, as to many of the details of the program, and they have been very helpful to us. We wanted to ask a few policy questions of you.

We do not want to misdirect our program and spend money that would later prove to have been unwisely spent. We do not want the Korean fighting to warp and misdirect our over-all program, yet if

there are any lessons to be learned from the Korean situation we want to take them into account in making our appropriations.

It has been suggested that in the event of a major all-out war a 70-group Air Force could at the beginning do a major task in our defense effort, with what implementation might be required after such an all-out war began.

In the fighting in Korea we are not confronted with a major power, up to this point, but we are confronted with North Korea, which is a very small place geographically speaking and populationwise, and insofar as their armed might is concerned. For all practical purposes they have no air force, and they have no navy.

I would like to have you and General Vandenberg give us a statement of the Air Force feeling with respect to the place of the Air Force in this Korean war. What have you done to date and what do you think you can do?

Secretary FINLETTER. Mr. Chairman, I was very glad to hear you say that we must not look at the Korean happenings and make conclusions from them.

Mr. MAHON. We can make some conclusions.

Secretary FINLETTER. We can make some conclusions, but we must be very careful to have them in the perspective in which they should be. First, let me talk a little about Korea.

Mr. MAHON. You may talk off the record whenever you want to. Just indicate when you desire to.

Secretary FINLETTER. Yes.

Korea is a very special situation. The western world has a very large periphery which fronts on Soviet Russia. In my opinion, it cannot defend that whole periphery with armed force. The real basic might of the western world, of which the United States is the center, is the capacity and will, if absolutely driven to it, to make war on anybody who attacks.

The reason why we got involved in this periphery war, which is not a part of our global strategy, is that the enemy came down right under our noses, where we had the greatest concentration of American military power outside the United States. This is a cardinal fact about Korea.

But the fact that this American power was so small is also another point to be borne in mind. We had only four divisions-by no means war-strength divisions-there. We had a very large concentration of air power; more than was necessary to support these four divisions. The combat zone is 5,000 miles away. It is an extremely difficult operation to sustain. It is not at all the sort of operation in which we would be engaged if we got into a general war. This is also a cardinal fact.

Now, as to how we are doing out there: In the first place, the number of divisions of North Koreans, and their equipment, was very substantial. They had obviously been very well prepared. We, opposing them, had about one-third of their strength, or something of that kind, in terms of American ground forces. It was, therefore, quite natural that our ground forces should not be able to sustain the brunt of attack by forces of such numerical superiority. Indeed, if you will look at the number of miles of battlefront which there were in the beginning, 250 miles, or something like that, and consider that at first we had only one American division and then had only two American

divisions in the front lines, it is quite natural that what has happened should have happened.

If you want me to guess as to what is going to happen out there I should say the line is going to contract; additional American forces are going to get in there fairly soon; and all the best advice we get from the Ground Force men is that they are going to hold that contracted line.

Now, let us look at the air power for a minute. Tactical air power must be in relationship to Ground Forces. Tactical air power alone cannot win a war-any more than Ground Forces alone could win a war. There has to be the proper combination of the two. Therefore, anybody who looks with surprise and dismay at the fact that tactical air power alone was not able to drive out the North Koreans, simply is not facing up to the facts.

Mr. MAHON. I do not want to interrupt, but Ground Forces are up to date winning a war on the part of the North Koreans.

Secretary FINLETTER. Because the North Koreans are overwhelming in numbers. A force of ground troops is a kind of composite power of ground elements and air elements which support them. If they are at all even, air superiority will decide the outcome, because the force which has the air superiority will ultimately win. However, where there is such gross disproportion as there is and has been in Korea between the ground elements, tactical air superiority of its own cannot win the immediate battle. Here we must make a differentiation between strategic air and tactical air.

Strategic air is a slower operation because it hits the enemy strength at its source. Strategic air, as it has been used in this operation, has weakened these people enormously; but the point I am making is that tactical air and ground troops must be in some sort of balance. That I think, is the explanation of what has happened in Korea today. The tactical air has, in effect, been used as a kind of artillery to compensate insofar as possible for the lack of numbers which our ground forces had.

(Off the record discussion.)

SUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS REQUESTED FOR 1951

Mr. MAHON. In the light of these many things which we have discussed off the record here, and in the light of the discussion on the record, and in light of other discussions of recent date, I would like to have a good answer as to whether or not the money requested in this bill is going to be used to point our defense program, Air Force-wise, in the right direction? Is there any reasonable likelihood that we are spending dollars in one direction whereas later on it will be said-Well, this is a very special situation and our defense plans could not meet it?

Secretary FINLETTER. If I may have a moment, I can answer that in a word.

ADEQUACY OF PROGRAM FOR 1951

I would say in general we are satisfied with the program as it is presented to you, and for the following reasons:

In the first place, it has been a program which has been established in an orderly fashion. As you know, it is a program that was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is a program which was later approved by the Secretaries and submitted to the Secretary of Defense as the basis for a proper build-up in our basic strength.

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