are we doing the right kind of planning, or what have we learned from the Korean episode.

A newspaper reporter said to me something like this: "I suppose you have revised your opinion in connection with your support of the 70-group air program." ." I said, "No." But there is a tendency on the part of people to reevaluate air power in the light of recent developments. If 70 groups equals the defeat of the major potential enemy, for instance, one group may equal the defeat of a very small segment of some country, and 48 groups which we now have would be the equivalent of defeat of X country.

I had understood that we had 48 rather effective groups, or at least 46?

General RAWLINGS. That is right.

Mr. MAHON. Those are some of the largest things that we may like to discuss in this hearing, but I do not know whether now is the time to do it.

General RAWLINGS. The Secretary and Chief of Staff will be available and they will answer such questions.

Mr. MAHON. We will probably call them later.

TWO MAJOR PROGRAMS INCLUDED IN SUPPLEMENTAL ESTIMATE General RAWLINGS. We are appearing before you today in support of the Air Force supplemental budget estimates for fiscal year 1951 which total $4,535,000,000. These dollars represent the Air Force requirements for: (1) all costs (as we now estimate them) directly chargeable to the Korean emergency as projected for the fiscal year 1951 totaling $1,443,000,000; and, (2) the costs incident to the build-up of the Air Force from its present 48-group structure to a 58-group level by the end of fiscal year 1951, which total $3,092,000,000. Details of the dollar requirements associated with these two major programs can be given as each appropriation and program is discussed.

In order that the committee may have a proper basis of understanding of this supplemental estimate and of the dollar requirements incident thereto, it is believed appropriate to lead off with a presentation of the supplemental Air Force program for fiscal year 1951. I would like at this time to introduce Maj. Gen. W. E. Todd, assistant for programming, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations. He will give you a statement which he has for the record.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. W. E. TODD

General TODD. This statement is designed to provide general background information, and to set the stage for the more detailed presentation of the program.

I am going to outline to you briefly the actions which have been taken to date to support Air Force operations in Korea and additional actions which we are planning to take to carry out recent recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As you know, in peacetime, military units are maintained normally at strength below that which is necessary for sustained military operations. Therefore, when South Korea was invaded on June 25, our first action was to increase selected units in the Far Eastern Air Force to war strength in personnal and equipment. Simultaneously, we

took steps to provide a pipeline flow of aircraft, other supplies required, and personnel to support these units at war operating rates. In this connection, the Navy rushed a considerable number of Air Force fighter aircraft to Japan by means of carrier transportation in only 8 days' cruising time from the west coast. Concurrent action has been taken to provide additional support in zone of interior commands and the Military Air Transport Service in the Pacific to support the operations in Korea.

It soon became apparent that reenforcements of major combat units in that area would be required. On approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you will recall, several additional combat units were dispatched from the United States and have been engaged in operations against North Korea for the past 10 days.

In addition to the activities which are in direct support of the Korean operations, the Air Force has already started implementing certain programs at a faster rate than was provided in the fiscal year 1951 budget, which, of course, had been prepared prior to recent changes in the general situation. These actions are all pointed toward improving the over-all readiness of the Air Force and include the following program increases:

(1) Increased and accelerated rates of aircraft procurement.

(2) Unit training of combat units has been stepped up to replace trained personnel sent to FEAF.

(3) The Training Command has put on more steam to turn out trained pilot and technical personnel ahead of former schedules.

(4) Some construction needs to meet operational requirements have been planned, including completion of the radar fence in the United States in fiscal year 1951; and, finally.

(5) Active measures are being taken to improve our air defense capabilities by certain changes in the deployment of interceptor fighters in critical areas of the United States.

Apart from the foregoing actions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended that the Armed Forces start at once on an augmentation of combat forces. In carrying out the Air Force portion of this general increase, we hope to build up from our current strength of 48 groups to a level of 58 groups by the end of fiscal year 1951. We are working out the necessary plans so that when the final authority to go ahead with the build-up is received, we can proceed toward this augmentation in as orderly a manner as possible.

The Air Force program increases attributable to the Korean operations as well as the acceleration of our expansion to 58 combat wings can best be expressed in the following comparison between the earlier goals for fiscal year 1951 and these new objectives.

Before going any further, I would like to emphasize the tentative nature of many of the program figures which we will give you. It has been impossible within the time available to work out a detailed, thoroughly checked program for all the thousands of items which must be considered.

That detailed work is being undertaken concurrently as fast as the pressure of events will permit but it will be at least several weeks before we can refine the program to the point where we would like to have it before presentation to a committee like yours.

(Off record discussion.)

69887-50-pt. 2- -15

General RAWLINGS. We will move right on to the program charts. Mr. MAHON. Are there any questions on the general statements that have been presented? |

MEANING OF TERM "WINGS"

I would like to ask at this point for you to clarify the use of the words "58 wings," as compared to "58 groups." We have used the word "wing" in connection with the Air Force program before, but generally in the appropriation discussions it has been groups, and now you seemed to have shifted to the use of the word "wings." Will you clarify that terminology for the record?

General TODD. The wing, Mr. Chairman, includes the base support for the group, the combat elements of the group with the base complement. As you recall about 2 years ago the Air Force adopted this uniform base wing form of organization, and when we use the word "wing," it means the support elements which makes possible the movement of the group to overseas areas for operation.

Mr. MAHON. In other words, the word "wing" is a little more inclusive than the word "group?" That was our understanding. General TODD. Yes.

Mr. MAHON. And includes group?

General TODD. Yes, all of the 58 groups that I mentioned in the opening statement.

PUBLICATION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

Mr. MAHON. We have felt in this committee that we should not publish the types of aircraft and other information that is normally published by the Department of Defense or by other Members of Congress or committees. I personally think it is very dangerous to the security of the country to tell our potential enemy our plans, because if he knows what we are planning he can plan to meet it. I would like to have the thinking of the committee if it does not agree with me on that.

Mr. ENGEL. I am certainly in complete accord.

Mr. MAHON. We are not making it available, and in fact, personally I do not want the information in my office since I can get it quickly from the Department.

Mr. PLUMLEY. Mr. Chairman, where does our responsibility begin and where does it end as against the statements that have been made by the Secretary of National Defense's office to the effect that the press would consider only such things as were presented to it by the Secretary of National Defense in order to protect our security, and yet we find in this morning's paper the number of wings.

Mr. MAHON. I do not know. I think all we can do is what is right and proper in our own committee.

Mr. PLUMLEY. I will certainly go along with that, but I do not like to be made to look as if we are not.

Mr. SHEPPARD. There is no change in the policy that has been established in the committee heretofore?

Mr. MAHON. No.

(Off record discussion.)

FIFTY-EIGHT AIR GROUP

Mr. MAHON. How does the projected 58 group compare with the 58 group for which we had provided funds in fiscal 1950 but which were withheld by the executive department?

(Off record discussion.)

Mr. MAHON. If we go to the 58 group but do not later project ourselves beyond the 58 group what will be the estimated requirements for annual appropriation?

General RAWLINGS. Charts covering that will be furnished for the committee.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Sheppard, any questions?

ABILITY OF INDUSTRY TO MEET PLANE PRODUCTION REQUIREMENTS

Mr. SHEPPARD. In response to an inquiry, I believe by Mr. Sikes, relative to when you expected to attain the end product, your answer was in 1954?

General RAWLINGS. Fiscal 1954.

Mr. SHEPPARD. We have had a series of statements here relative to the procurement situation. It occurs to me that it is going to be rather difficult for you gentlemen to come out with the answer to the end result unless extremely careful directional procedure is indicated as to the contracts for plane production?

General RAWLINGS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHEPPARD. In other words, the ability to produce in the aviation industry, even though you might ultimately get production by reactivating certain plants in a stand-by status, still has its limitations and a tremendous lead-time requirement.

Just what decisions have been made, if any at this time, that would indicate, as regards the contracts for planes, how your branch is going to fit into industry? We have had evidence given us; so far there has not been indicated any complete solution, and in the absence of a very definite directive in procedure the end result is going to come up against the same or worse competitive situation we had in World War II.

General RAWLINGS. Sir, let me handle that in two parts.

As to the first part, General Shepard has a presentation which will clearly indicate the schedule for completion of planes; the status of the aircraft facilities, country-wide, the percentage capacity as opposed to the capacity available, the impact on certain critical raw materials

Mr. MAHON. Idid not specifically refer to the Navy, but I have reference to meeting the requirements some of which involve priorities. General RAWLINGS. Insofar as the general impact of the Air Force program is involved, the Munitions Board has a program for the respective services and the over-all understanding that the capacity is available. This committee made provision for going to a higher rate of production to have industrial capacity. The aircraft industry representatives have been in and we have had a general discussion of this problem with the Under Secretary, and with the Chief of our Procurement Division, including General Shepard, and they all feel that we can make a program, that there are going to be some tight

situations of materials, probably, but those situations are being dealt with, in terms of the priority situation in the Munitions Board, and in terms which the over-all capacity of this program envisions.

It might be helpful if we went through the presentation, and in that way maybe a lot of questions you have in mind would be answered.

Mr. SHEPPARD. That is perfectly satisfactory just so long as the questions may be asked at the time.

DATE OF FORMULATION OF PROPOSED AIR FORCE PROGRAM

Mr. TABER. I am wondering when this chart and program was adopted?

General RAWLINGS. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this program, as I recall, on the 4th or 5th of July; I think it was the 5th. Actually the program has been under study since sometime back in April or March, I cannot remember the exact date, but it has been under continuous study.

This program has been worked on for a long period of time, but actually this document was signed on the 5th of July which was after the Korean situation, and the Korean situation was considered at that time, and in a broader way this paper was firmed upon the long-range build-up.

This program except for the Korean portion was not one which was put together after the Korean situation.

Mr. TABER. Was the composition of wings or units changed at that time?

General RAWLINGS. No sir. The experience they have had up to the 5th of July was considered in the final approval of the program. The composition was not shifted from the base plan that had been worked out.

Mr. TABER. That is as to the numbers

General RAWLINGS. Of fighters.

Mr. TABER. In each grade was the same?

General RAWLINGS. Yes, sir.

Mr. TABER. It had been up some little time?

General RAWLINGS. For some little time; yes, sir.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Sheppard?

Mr. SHEPPARD. No further questions at this time. When we reach the proper place I will ask my questions.

General TODD. Yes, sir.

Mr. MAHON. Another thing the Members want to inquire into is the installations, and things of that kind.

Mr. SIKES. I do want to ask one question now.

It appears obvious that this is a part of a long-range build-up in strength and that it is not directed to Korea as such. I would like to know what parts of this new program are actually required in the Korean operation and will be used in the Korean operation.

General TODD. That deployment will be given later, Mr. Sikes. Mr. SIKES. Very well.

General TODD. I can give it out of my head now, but it will appear later.

Mr. SIKES. That will be all right. That is all.