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(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SIKES. Let me put it in another form: Could we carry on our defense in Korea without this appropriation, or without the greater part of it?

Secretary Johnson. No, sir; we could not.

Mr. SIKES. You must have additional money to take care of our commitments in Korea ?

Secretary Johnson. Relying on the need of the hour, we have been spending money which normally would have been available for the whole year, because we are doing things in Korea as speedily as possible and to the best of our ability, to minimize the loss of American life and shorten the task that we have as our responsibility there.


Mr. SIKES. You spoke of the necessity for a balanced force, and I certainly agree with you. I wish that you would give me more information on what you mean by the balance between forces. Do you mean substantially the same balance that we now have between forces, or is there going to be additional emphasis on certain forces as a result of the appropriation in this request ?

Secretary JOHNSON. I have earlier testified before this committee that in the past matériel for the Army had not received sufficient emphasis. Korea emphasizes that. There is now and will be no rule of dividing the defense dollar on an equal percentage basis among the military departments. I repeat that, there is none now and there will be none in the future. It is a question for the Joint Chiefs to determine the forces and matériel required over-all without logrolling. I see no sign of it these days. Our allocation of funds is based on a concept of over-all defense and not on a concept of oneservice defense. The actual distribution will change somewhat from time to time, but the Joint Chiefs arrive at the things that are necessary for the one guiding post that we have—the security of the United States. That will be the yardstick in measuring the balance of these forces. After the forces and major matérial requirements have been determined, they are priced and then the allocations to the respective military departments are established.


Mr. SIKES. Are we going to place additional emphasis on tank procurement in this appropriation?

Secretary JOHNSON. The answer to that is “very definitely," as the money in this budget will show.

General COLLINS. That is right.


Mr. SIKES. This is a general question : Because of the nature of our forces, we have only 10 divisions with a total Army force of over 600,000. Will the same proportion apply in the new forces to be called in, or will we have additional striking forces? It appears to me there will be a higher proportion of striking forces within the framework

of the Army.

Secretary JOHNSON. I would like for General Collins to answer that. That is an excellent question.

General COLLINS. We will have an increased number of units actually on duty with the Army. Frankly, at this stage of the game the major need of the Army is to modernize its equipment. I will say that we are going to follow here the basic concept of keeping the Regular forces of the Army down to the minimum and relying largely on our National Guard and Organized Reserve for the build-up.

Most of our money is going to go into the procurement of modern equipment, tanks, antiaircraft, antitanks, and the ability to move our troops by air. Those are the four general categories.

Mr. SIKES. Are we not short on striking forces now?
General COLLINS. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SIKES. May I ask if we are placing emphasis on aircraft carrjers and antisubmarine defenses over and above that which we had prior to this request for funds?

Admiral SHERMAN. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SIKES. Will the funds we are now asked to appropriate take care of Korea, and of Formosa, if it should develop, or will you have to come back for more?

Secretary JOHNSON. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.)


Mr. SIKES. There has been some question about the value of our Intelligence services. I think we would like to know whether you feel the Intelligence services have been functioning adequately and efficiently in view of recent developments.

Secretary JOHNSON. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SIKES. We are rather accustomed in this country to getting burned once; but, now that that is over, do you think that our Intelligence is going to be able to cope with the situation henceforth? Do you think that we are getting information that we seek and should get from our Intelligence services?

Secretary JOHNSON. I suppose no one is fully satisfied with the Intelligence that comes in, but I think we have the right to expect now that our Intelligence is going to be pretty good.

Mr. SIKES. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SHEPPARD. When orders go out for an actual operation, a combat operation, they frequently go out in blank, and the specific date involved is in a last-minute notice to even the local command; is that not true?

Secretary JOHNSON. I would presume that a dictator contemplating aggression would follow that practice.

Mr. SHEPPARD. It would be pretty hard for Intelligence to determine that an offense was going to take place at 9 o'clock on a particular Sunday morning!

Secretary JOHNSON. I think it is a fair guess that the commanders that came on south although they had been furnished equipment, may have received their notice to keep on going even after the troop movements started, in order to preserve the secrecy.

Mr. SIKES. But there has to be a build-up of men, materials, equipment, and fuel in order to keep an operation rolling. Surely our Intelligence can spot those things.

Secretary JOHNSON. The Intelligence did spot them and reported Sunday morning raids for a year or so, and that a build-up had existed there for a period of a year or so.

Mr. SIKES. Was there no report of such a build-up just prior to the actual attacks in Korea ?

Secretary JOHNSON. None of a special nature.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Secretary, I have no intention of going into the details of the budget, but there are two items under the heading of the Office of the Secretary of Defense that come under your direct control and supervision which I think should be explained by you personally.

The first item of the budget estimate reads as follows:

For emergencies and extraordinary expenses arising in the Department of Defense, to be expended on the approval or authority of the Secretary of Defense and such expenses may be accounted for solely on his certificate that the expenditures were necessary for confidential military purposes ; $50,000,000.

Can you give us, either on or off the record, some explanation of that?

Secretary JOHNSON. I have an outline of the basis upon which Mr. McNeil put the figures in. The President and the Budget allowed them. I would rather not put them in the record.

(Discussion off the record.)




Mr. ENGEL. The second item is

For transfer by the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the Bureau of the Budget, to any appropriation for military functions under the Department of Defense available for research and development or industrial mobilization

From where would you transfer that? Would you transfer it from any place that you found it available in the Army?

Mr. McNEIL. It is an appropriation request for $190,000,000; $120,000,000 was earmarked for research and development, and $70,000,000 for industrial mobilization, subject to being transferred to the appropriation for those purposes in any one or all of the three military departments as the industrial mobilization program and the research and development program needs develop during the current fiscal year.

Mr. ENGEL. It is a direct appropriation for $190,000,000, which can be transferred to any of the three services for research and development or industrial mobilization, as the need requires.

Mr. McNeil. Apportioned by the Secretary of Defense to any one, two, or all of the military departments.

Mr. ENGEL. Such transfer being made by the Secretary of Defense? Mr. McNEIL. That is correct.

Secretary JOHNSON. I just received notice that I must attend a Cabinet meeting at 4 o'clock this afternoon. With your permission, I would appreciate it very much if I could be excused.

Mr. MAHON. You may be excused, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. McNeil. General Bradley is available and has a short prepared statement.

STATEMENT OF GEN. OMAR BRADLEY General BRADLEY. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I do not know just how much ground has been covered by the questions, because I was not here to hear some of them.

I have a short statement prepared which can be used as the basis of questions, or I can skip that and answer any additional questions that you have, whichever you prefer.

Mr. MAHON. If your statement is not long, you may read it.

General BRADLEY. It is now apparent that the aggression in Korea was well planned and well prepared, and that militant international communism inspired the northern invaders. It is also apparent that communism is willing to use arms to gain its ends. This is a fundamental change, and it has forced a change in our estimate of the military needs of the United States.

We have come to the only conclusion possible to a free people. We have had enough of aggression, and we have finally drawn the line across its path.

We may, in this way, succeed in forcing the respeet which we now know conciliation, appeasement, and weakness can never bring. The cost will be heavy, but not as heavy as the war which we are now convinced would follow our failure to arm.

We are planning to speed up our military requirements in an orderly fashion. Certainly, we will not go so slowly that we fail to achieve our aim. On the other hand, we are trying to follow the old adage, “Make haste slowly.” We will build rapidly, firmly, and permanently, for as long as the need exists.


We are faced with three requirements. First, in order to win the war in Korea, we must get more men and equipment over there as soon as possible. This means that the pipeline of essential supplies and personnel must be started flowing, and it must be kept flowing for as long as may be necessary.

Second, although the forces we have sent to meet the immediate threat in Korea still may be considered as part of our over-all defense, the effect is a reduction in that defense. We must therefore replace those units sent from other areas, particularly the United States, and thus restore our military capabilities.

Third, it is now evident that we must have an even great flexibility of military power in the United States itself. Not only for our own protection, but also to give us a ready, highly mobile stand-by force which we can bring to bear at any threatened point in the minimum time.

Mr. Johnson, the Secretary of Defense, has presented the over-all manpower and production needs of the Armed Forces. General Collins, Chief of Staff of the Army; General Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the Air Force; and Admiral Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, will give you detailed breakdowns of the forces and matériel needed by the respective services.

As a background to their presentations, I would like to analyze for your consideration the force requirements of the present situation.

The first requirement is to build up the present forces in Korea to war strength and battle capability. For example, the infantry regiments fighting there have only two battalions. A third will be supplied as quickly as possible.

Second, the divisions in the United States which have furnished battalions to Korea, and new units activated under this authorization, will require replacement units of their own. For example, the tank battalions taken out of the armored division must be replaced.

Third, units overseas will be built up to war strength. Most of them have been running at 65 percent in general, even in the regiments and battalions that have been part of the reduced divisions.

Fourth, the units in the United States which have been kept at approximately 60-percent strength will be built up to the 85-percent strength that is essential for a state of readiness. You all know that there are many military occupations within a division that need not be filled on zone-of-interior duty. While serving in the United States, for example, artillery sections do not need the full ammunition crews that they would need in battle.

I have already pointed out that the pipeline from the United States to the units overseas and to those fighting in Korea will also have to be filled.

I have used Army examples in this discussion. But the same applies to the Air Force and the Navy, all the way from the front lines back to the units operating with reduced complements inside our continental limits.

Similarly, in the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the equipment and matériel for these units have to be brought up to strength—battle strength, including sufficient additional equipment for battle losses, in the combat zone; war strength for those top priority units overseas; and approximately 85 percent for those units in the zone of the interior.

I would like to emphasize that this program of requirements has not devised on short order. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been considering the build-up of our Armed Forces as part of a long-range plan which is still in effect and which is only accelerated and enlarged by the present action in Korea. Many of these developments reflected in our present requests have been studied as part of the fiscal year 1952 budget which we have been working on since March. The overall program is balanced and will become an effective part of the longer-term plans.


I would also like to point out that the forces requested here are considered adequate for the emergency situation which exists today. But possible future developments in Korea and elsewhere in the world may require early revision upward of these initial requests. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been directed by the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense to keep these matters under continuous

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