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I think if we do come back it will probably be on military personnel which at the moment we cannot say is adequate. We may possibly have to come back.
Mr. Mahon. I would like to point out that we have been schooled in thinking that to blow hot and cold and to stop and start is very expensive and wasteful, and I do not want to have any part in one of these stop-and-start programs unless such a program is absolutely necessary.
Of course, we have to start when we begin a war, and we have to stop one of these days when it is over, but I would like to have the assurance that this is not going to be a wasteful program with a tremendous cut-back and an alteration that might prove wasteful.
Secretary Johnson. I think you will have that assurance in the way it is going to be presented in detail; part for the Korean operation and part for the permanent build-up of the forces without regard to the Korean situation.
ADEQUACY OF SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR THE OVER-ALL MILITARY
Mr. Mahon. General Bradley, the question has been presented to the Secretary of Defense and to the Joint Chiefs, the representatives of the three services, as to whether or not this fund requested here of $10,500,000,000 is adequate now under the facts and circumstances.
The question is not, Will you later on request and need additional funds, because we cannot predict the future and we do not believe you can with complete accuracy, but the question is, Is this enough money for Congress to appropriate at this time for the Korean situation and for the improvement of the military posture of the country? That question has been answered by others, but I would like to have your viewpoint.
General BRADLEY. Yes; I think it is at this time. We do not know, as you say, what will develop, but we think this amount of money does the thing we would like to see done at this time; that is, it supports the Korean operation and replaces in the United States the units we have sent over there.
In addition to that, it will create some additional units that we, the Joint Chiefs, think necessary at this time to increase our military capabilities. It does that at this time. Whether or not we will have to do more than that, or whether or not the Korean situation folds up, no one can foresee, but as I see it, these are the things that we need now and the things that we can come to you with and say that we honestly need now. But we must also honestly tell you that we may have to come back later and ask for more.
Mr. MAHON. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.)
Mr. SHEPPARD. I will try to be as brief as possible. I want to commend you on the general construction of your statement, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary JOHNSON. Thank you.
There are a few places in your statement that appear to be inconsistent, but I would like to have a response from you in regard to them in order that I may follow your thinking in handling these appropriations.
For example, I quote the first sentence in the second paragraph of page 17 of your statement :
Our Military Establishment has been geared to provide a sound mobilization base and a swift striking force in case of a third world war.
Well, that statement, I assume, is a general one and not predicated upon a literal interpretation as it pertains to the swiftness of defense attainable under our present preparatory plans!
Secretary JOHNSON. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.)
Mr. SHEPPARD. There is a statement contained in the third paragraph on page 17 that is extremely interesting to me, and I quote:
It is also a program designed to promote world peace by deterring further aggression.
UNITED STATES POLICY IN KOREA PRIOR TO OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES
Now, I am under the impression from the information I have obtained from various sources that considerable difficulty was involved in the Korean situation because there was publicly announced that we were finished in that particular area and we had no further intent of interjecting ourselves in the picture, at least so far as the military are concerned, until very recently, and that was the decision upon which you were basing your operational conclusions. Is that a correct assumption on my part?
Senator JOHNSON. That is correct, both as to the Military Establishment and as to General MacArthur. He has been unfairly criticized with reference to his responsibility in Korea.
Mr. SHEPPARD. That was a decision of top echelon and not at the moment a part of the military conclusions as such?
Secretary JOHNSON. Correct, sir.
Mr. SIKES. There is lack of understanding, a rather widespread lack of understanding, about some aspects of the present crisis, and there are some questions that could and should be answered by people in the policy level of Government.
REASON FOR LACK OF COMBAT READINESS IN KOREA
One of the most common queries is why was there no combat readiness in Korea, and that is an easy question to answer. We had taken our military forces out of Korea. We were not committed to a policy of meeting aggression by force in the Far East and were not prepared to do so. As a matter of fact, the administration policy was directly the opposite. It was not until the act of aggression took place in Korea that the administration's policy was reversed and our military forces were directed to begin to meet force with force.
Secretary JOHNSON. That is correct.
Mr. Sikes. I do not believe that the American people generally realize how important that change was in its military application.
Then there is the question a lot of people are asking: Why is there no more defense for the billions that have been spent ?
First, there is the fact that our defenses had to be spread over the greater part of the world and actually had to be spread thin. The forces at any given point are necessarily limited. Then ours is an expensive military organization, even though comparatively small. We try to pay our people a decent living wage, to provide them with adequate food and clothing and a proper place of shelter. It is obvious that a great part of the money has gone into so-called housekeeping expenses. Actually about half of the money has been so spent.
AMOUNT OF SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDS TO BE USED FOR KOREA
But when we take this bill to the floor we certainly are going to be required to answer this question, and I would like to have your comment on it, Mr. Secretary: How much of the $10,500,000,000 is for defense now, and by "now" I mean within a very few months? In other words, how much of it is going to be available in time to help us at an early date in Korea, or for any emergency which develops subsequent to Korea?
Secretary JOHNSON. We are already moving men and supplies and have taken steps to replace certain of the material shipped as well as to accelerate the production and delivery of needed items.
We had available under the continuing resolution, pending the passage of the bill as of July 1, the equivalent of a normal full year's appropriation. All three services are moving along as rapidly as possible to do all the things in and about the Korean situation that the Joint Chiefs and General MacArthur—and there is agreement among them—think advisable. Everything in that field will have top priority.
The rest of these things, like the building of new tanks, new airplanes in the original program will be produced just as fast as the American economy can bring them and deliver them. When action is taken on this request—the minimum of time will elapse in the placing of orders for critical matériel.
The men are being called as fast as the services can get to it and get their instructors, and so forth, present. I think that answers your question generally.
Each of the chiefs of the services, or their budget officers, will be able to break down the estimates for you. The supporting data will all be available. We are not asking for a blank check.
Mr. SIKES. That is too general. I realize it is difficult for you to be specific, but I think the Congress and the country are going to want to know how speedily we can be prepared by this additional appropriation to cope with the world conditions that now confront us—6 months or 6 years?
Secretary Johnson. I do not think either figure is right. I think this program is going to run across the next 2 or 3 years. The Korean situation, I hope, is a 6 or 8 months' proposition. You are talking about the basic thing?
Mr. Sikes. I am talking about the over-all program. Can we, out of this appropriation, get striking forces quickly to help in Korea, or make them available elsewhere if needed.
Secretary Johnson. To help in the Korea situation; yes. With replacement as soon as possible.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. SIKES. Let me put it in another form: Could we carry on our defense in Korea without this appropriation, or without the greater part of it!
Secretary JOHNSON. No, sir; we could not.
Mr. SIKES. You must have additional money to take care of our commitments in Korea?
Secretary Johnson. Relying on the need of the hour, we have been spending money which normally would have been available for the whole year, because we are doing things in Korea as speedily as possible and to the best of our ability, to minimize the loss of American life and shorten the task that we have as our responsibility there.
DISTRIBUTION OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS BETWEEN THE SERVICES Mr. Sikes. You spoke of the necessity for a balanced force, and I certainly agree with you. I wish that you would give me more information on what you mean by the balance between forces. Do you mean substantially the same balance that we now have between forces, or is there going to be additional emphasis on certain forces as a result of the appropriation in this request ?
Secretary JOHNSON. I have earlier testified before this committee that in the past matériel for the Army had not received sufficient emphasis. Korea emphasizes that. There is now and will be no rule of dividing the defense dollar on an equal percentage basis among the military departments. I repeat that, there is none now and there will be none in the future. It is a question for the Joint Chiefs to determine the forces and matériel required over-all without logrolling. I see no sign of it these days. Our allocation of funds is based on a concept of over-all defense and not on a concept of oneservice defense. The actual distribution will change somewhat from time to time, but the Joint Chiefs arrive at the things that are necessary for the one guiding post that we have—the security of the United States. That will be the yardstick in measuring the balance of these forces. After the forces and major matérial requirements have been determined, they are priced and then the allocations to the respective military departments are established.
INCREASE IN TANK PROCUREMENT
Mr. SIKES. Are we going to place additional emphasis on tank procurement in this appropriation?
Secretary JOHNSON. The answer to that is “very definitely,” as the money in this budget will show.
General COLLINS. That is right.
INCREASE IN STRIKING FORCES
Mr. SIKES. This is a general question: Because of the nature of our forces, we have only 10 divisions with a total Army force of over 600,000. Will the same proportion apply in the new forces to be called in, or will we have additional striking forces? It appears to me there will be a higher proportion of striking forces within the framework of the Army.
Secretary JOHNSON. I would like for General Collins to answer that. That is an excellent question.
General COLLINS. We will have an increased number of units actually on duty with the Army. Frankly, at this stage of the game the major need of the Army is to modernize its equipment. I will say that we are going to follow here the basic concept of keeping the Regular forces of the Army down to the minimum and relying largely on our National Guard and Organized Reserve for the build-up.
Most of our money is going to go into the procurement of modern equipment, tanks, antiaircraft, antitanks, and the ability to move our troops by air. Those are the four general categories.
Mr. SIKES. Are we not short on striking forces now?
Mr. SIKES. May I ask if we are placing emphasis on aircraft carrjers and antisubmarine defenses over and above that which we had prior to this request for funds?
Admiral SHERMAN. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.)
Mr. SIKES. Will the funds we are now asked to appropriate take care of Korea, and of Formosa, if it should develop, or will you have to come back for more?
Secretary JOHNSON. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.)
EFFICIENCY OF OUR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
Mr. SIKES. There has been some question about the value of our Intelligence services. I think we would like to know whether you feel the Intelligence services have been functioning adequately and efficiently in view of recent developments.
Secretary JOHNSON. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.)
Mr. SIKES. We are rather accustomed in this country to getting burned once; but, now that that is over, do you think that our Intelligence is going to be able to cope with the situation henceforth? Do you think that we are getting information that we seek and should get from our Intelligence services?
Secretary JOHNSON. I suppose no one is fully satisfied with the Intelligence that comes in, but I think we have the right to expect now that our Intelligence is going to be pretty good.
Mr. SIKES. Off the record.
Mr. SHEPPARD. When orders go out for an actual operation, a combat operation, they frequently go out in blank, and the specific date involved is in a last-minute notice to even the local command; is that not true?
Secretary JOHNSON. I would presume that a dictator contemplating aggression would follow that practice.
Mr. SHEPPARD. It would be pretty hard for Intelligence to determine that an offense was going to take place at 9 o'clock on a particular Sunday morning!
Secretary JOHNSON. I think it is a fair guess that the commanders that came on south although they had been furnished equipment, may